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Thesis Abstract 
 
Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) describes a condition in which a 
person desires to self-amputate in order to feel whole, and the phantom limb 
syndrome (PLS) occurs when an individual feels (typically painful) sensations in a 
non-existent limb. These conditions have been predominantly researched through 
biomedical models that struggle to find comprehensive reasons or cures, while a 
psychological model is lacking. Thus, these conditions insist that we debate them 
from a more nuanced view, which I approach through literature, cultural works, 
and psychoanalysis. In order to do this, we must attend to what is central to both 
phenomena: a feeling of rupture that contrasts a desire for wholeness. 
This theme will be elaborated through a discussion of the mirror-box, which 
is a therapeutic device that alleviates phantom limb pain by superimposing a mirror 
image of the existent limb onto the absent one, to create an illusion of bodily unity. 
I use this example to illuminate how texts and psychoanalysis involve reflections of 
self that can lead to a symbolic reconstitution. What this dialogue illuminates is 
how theoretical and psychical notions are intertwined with physical experience. 
I begin by surveying BIID and PLS, which is followed by two case studies 
that convey personal experiences of living with the syndromes. Chapter Two 
examines how BIID and PLS bring out an affinity between psychoanalysis and 
literature. The third chapter uses examples to fortify these links by tracing the 
theme of the double. The question of recuperation is raised in Chapter Four 
through the work of D.W. Winnicott, and Chapter Five investigates a novel by 
Georges Perec, which ties together those themes in discussion. Reading BIID and 
PLS through these works ultimately raises questions concerning what we can 
discover about how we are constituted through signs, and how this affects our 
sense of self. 
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Introduction 
 
La suppression radicale d’un membre, ne présentant plus au cerveau que des images [...] de 
bras et de jambes, de membres lointains et pas à leur place. Une espèce de rupture intérieure. 
 
Suppression of a limb, transmitting to the brain no more than images […] in 
the shape of arms and legs, images of distant and dislocated members. Sort of 
inward breakdown. 
--- Artaud, Anthology (29) 
 
Antonin Artaud’s fragmented description of dislocated limbs reflects the focus of 
this thesis, which involves experiences of physical, psychical, imaginary, and 
linguistic fracture in relation to illusory limbs. Body Integrity Identity Disorder 
(BIID) is a condition in which individuals desire to amputate a limb because they 
feel that it does not belong to their body: they feel “incomplete” with four healthy 
limbs. A phantom limb occurs when amputated individuals feel the sensation that 
their absent limb still exists. Thus, BIID and the phantom limb syndrome (PLS) 
are the inverse of one another. Though individuals with both conditions desire to 
remove an extraneous limb (in BIID an existing limb, and in PLS a phantom), they 
reflect a similar problem with a feeling of incompleteness and a dissonance between 
the mind and body. While in BIID, the concept of completion concerns a sense of 
being in physical excess, a fantasy of destruction, and appears to begin in the mind, 
PLS involves a fantasy that fills an absence, originates in the body, and can, in 
certain cases, be healed through a mirror illusion. V.S. Ramachandran invented the 
mirror treatment in 1996 through what he called the mirror-box (also known as 
mirror therapy), a box with a mirror in the centre into which amputees place their 
whole limb on one side, and the stump on the other. When they move the existent 
limb and look at its reflection, it appears as though there are two limbs, and that 
their phantom is moving. In turn, the often uncomfortable or painful phantom 
sensations can disappear. Thus, a re-imagined version of the self transforms a 
disturbing experience of rupture, a concept that is also central to certain 
psychoanalytic, fictional, and literary works. These types of texts, therefore, can 
provide insight into the BIID, PLS and mirror-box phenomena. 
In this thesis, I will explore BIID and PLS as psychosomatic conditions that 
involve a dissonance between the mind and body, and fragmentation and 
 7 
wholeness. Since they have, thus far, only been studied through a biomedical 
paradigm that fails to find definitive answers or cures, I argue that a theoretical 
analysis is necessary. Through the use of psychoanalytic, literary, and fictional texts 
that foreground bodily fragmentation, this thesis explores various ways of 
illuminating the drives towards wholeness experienced by those with BIID and 
PLS. More specifically, it attends to how a form of possession (the need to control 
one’s sense of being complete) can be mediated by a particular kind of exchange. 
Moreover, since through mirror therapy the restored self is made possible through 
a process of reflection, the mirror-box acts as a metaphor for the structure of this 
thesis, which is a linguistic reflection upon BIID and the phantom limb syndromes. 
Psychoanalysis provides a starting point for this exploration because, in the 
words of Marilia Aisenstein,  
 
if psychoanalysis is unique, and irreplaceable, in relation to other forms of 
psychological treatment, it is so, in my view, because it opens up thought 
processes and enables the subject to reintegrate into the chain of psychic 
events even something unthinkable, such as the appearance of a lethal 
illness. (“Indissociable” 679) 
 
Psychoanalysis, therefore, offers new ways of thinking about BIID and PLS, two 
phenomena that are to a great extent, incomprehensible. In this thesis, therefore, I 
draw relationships between psychoanalysis and the two bodily conditions, which 
focus on the fractured psyche and soma. By paying attention to the body, this 
exploration will illuminate what is involved in the disorders, while also providing 
nuanced ways of reading psychoanalytic theories. Naomi Segal states of Didier 
Anzieu that, “[s]ince Lacan, the stress on language had meant that the body was 
not being psychoanalytically theorised; yet ‘every psychic activity leans on [s’étaie 
sur] a biological function.’ Anzieu’s aim is to fill this gap” (Consensuality, 44 
emphasis in original). This thought provides a helpful backdrop for my exploration 
here (although I do not discuss Anzieu’s work), because I am interested in 
corporeality. However, not unlike Anzieu, I do not only investigate the body, I also 
foreground the importance of language and the way in which it mediates between 
the mind and body. In reading the two bodily conditions through a psychoanalytic 
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and literary lens, I address the importance of linking literature, the psyche and the 
body. As Peter Brooks writes: 
 
[T]here ought to be a correspondence between literary and psychic 
dynamics, since we constitute ourselves in part through our fictions within 
the […] symbolic order, that of signs, including, pre-eminently, language 
itself. Through study of the work accomplished by fictions we may be able 
to reconnect literary criticism to human concern. (Reading xiv) 
 
Studying literature and the psyche together can help elucidate the ways in which 
we are constituted through fictions, and BIID and PLS both concern fictive 
versions of the self that involve an imagined sense of unity. Moreover, the mirror-
box demonstrates how visualising oneself as a sign (the mirror illusion is a sign of 
the phantom limb) can have bodily affects. Thus, mirror therapy acts as a material 
and metaphorical example of the way in which we are formed through signs, in the 
way the body is understood and constituted as a language and through language. In 
drawing these connections between psychoanalysis, literature and the body, this 
thesis explores how the fictions through which we are formed can alleviate 
experiences of fragmentation. 
To provide a foundation for these analyses, a survey of relevant literature 
follows. I begin with a detailed review of BIID, PLS, and the mirror-box, focusing 
on the neurological and psychological hypotheses already in play. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the “hysterical body,” which introduces concepts about 
how the body can symbolise psychical pain, and how this can be worked through in 
psychoanalysis. For this, I focus on the concepts of “conversion,” psychosomatics, 
symbolism, and transference. This section establishes how psychoanalysis is helpful 
in exploring BIID and PLS, and how language is vital to this process. Following 
this is a brief survey of trauma studies, which develops the relationships between 
trauma, psychoanalysis, and language from a theoretical standpoint. This opens a 
dialogue about literary theory, which is concerned with postmodernism’s interest in 
physical and linguistic fragmentation. I conclude by discussing other literary works 
about phantom limbs and BIID, and how my investigation differs. My intention is 
to review current research on the two conditions, in order to demonstrate why a 
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theoretical approach is necessary, and to introduce why psychoanalysis and 
literature are fundamental to this exploration. 
 
Body Integrity Identity Disorder 
As noted, BIID, also known as xenomelia and apotemnophilia, is a condition 
wherein individuals desire to amputate an existing limb because they feel that it 
does not belong to their body. Paradoxically, then, the present limb makes these 
individuals feel incomplete, while the idea of its removal enables a sense of 
completeness. “The main motivation for the preferred body modification,” explains 
Rianne Blom, “is believed to be a mismatch between actual and perceived body 
schema” (1),1 a disjunction between physical structure and identity. Those with the 
syndrome complain of feeling that with four limbs they are not themselves, and 
become obsessed with the desire for the removal of a limb. Some who are unable to 
amputate have a strong urge to commit suicide. Though there are no known cures, 
several individuals explain that they have found most relief when they are able to 
amputate the limb. However, many are driven to continue to amputate parts of 
their body after they have followed through with the original amputation.  
According to a survey conducted in 2003 by Dan Cooper, who initiated the 
Internet Yahoo! Group “Fighting It” which I discuss below, 36% of those with BIID 
believe it is a neurological problem, while 63% believe it has psychological origins, 
44% with the syndrome are straight males, 28% gay males, 13% straight females, 
4% gay females, and 8% transgendered. However, Cooper also writes in an email 
that “[t]hese are informal polls. There is no control over who chooses to participate. 
Nevertheless, these are probably the best data available” (“Fighting It”). Other 
studies demonstrate that although the most common request is an above-the-knee 
amputation of the left leg, BIID may also involve other parts of the body or a desire 
to remove certain senses (hearing, sight, and so on). The syndrome, moreover, 
usually originates in childhood, and is often associated with a memory of seeing an 
amputee for the first time. Amy White explains that in one of the first studies 
conducted on BIID, Michael First “found that 65% of patients experienced onset of 
BIID before age eight and 98% of patients before age sixteen. Several subsequent 
                                                
1 According to Paul Schilder, a body schema is “the immediate experience that there is a unity of the 
body [… it] is the tri-dimensional image everybody has about himself” (11). In the case of BIID, 
there is a loss of unity in one’s body schema. 
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studies have reported that most individuals with BIID experience early onset” 
(231). Since BIID involves the fantasy of losing a limb, it is often confused with 
(though may still be linked to) acrotomophilia, a sexual attraction to other 
amputees (as some with BIID are attracted to amputees). In order to self-cure, 
some sufferers (referred to as “pretenders” in the BIID community) may feign a 
disability by using devices such as wheelchairs, prostheses or leg braces. The term 
“wannabes,” on the other hand, refers to those who self-injure, self-amputate, or 
pursue black-market surgery. Some simply want to be disabled, some desire the 
challenge of living in a disabled body, and others wonder if a physical disability will 
reduce a felt psychical one. This raises the question as to what a disability means. 
As one sufferer (Nelson) explains, when he pretended to be an amputee, he “never 
felt disabled” (“Living” 86). Another individual states that he “crafted and used the 
term ‘transabled’, to describe someone who has BIID […]. Transabled means to 
me that I am in a transitional position, between a body that is not what I need it to 
be, and hopefully reaching that body at some point soon” (O’Connor, “My Life” 
89).  
According to Ferguson, disability studies should “reshape the way that 
society understands people with disabilities” (72). The field “looks at disability, 
through politics, the arts, ethics, history, and more recently, phenomenology and 
personal experiences” (Ferguson 71).2 Although it is a wide field that involves 
several of the humanities and is largely analytical, it was founded as a 
predominantly social movement aimed at reducing stigma, calling for changes in 
healthcare, and bringing visibility to those with disabilities. My study of BIID and 
the phantom limb is also analytical. However, rather than focusing on a social 
movement, I embark upon a more detailed discussion that is specifically concerned 
with issues of fragmentation, wholeness and imperfect bodies. Since disability 
studies also touches on these themes, it is helpful in providing a more robust 
understanding of BIID and PLS. Disability studies began to develop in the 1990s 
with questions such as: “[w]hy are not issues about perception, mobility, 
                                                
2 For more on disability studies see Rosemarie Garland Thompson’s Extraordinary Bodies (1996), 
Robert McRuer’s Crip Theory (2006), Dan Goodley’s Disability Studies: An Interdisciplinary Introduction 
(2011), Colin Cameron’s Disability Studies: A Student’s Guide (2013), and Alice Hall’s Disability and 
Modern Fiction (2013). 
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accessibility, distribution of bio-resources, physical space, difference not seen as 
central to the human condition?” (Davis 2). It hinges upon questions regarding 
how the disabled and impaired body is treated and perceived. Some theorists hope 
that the field will pull together differences implied in gender, bodies, nationalities, 
sexual preferences, and ethnicity, rendering them the “ultimate example, the 
universal image, the modality through whose knowing the postmodern subject can 
theorize and act” (Davis 5). 
 Since those with BIID generally feel different to the “norm” and desire to be 
physically disabled, I, in line with Davis’ thinking, relate the syndrome to 
postmodernist theory, with a focus on bodily, psychical, and linguistic fracture. 
Additionally, certain scholars such as Mairian Corker and Sally French argue that 
some disability theorists confine disability to various definitions that omit 
experiences of disability. The problem with forming definitions will reoccur 
throughout this thesis, in relation to the term BIID, Freud’s difficulty 
differentiating terms and finding origins, and the concept of a set or “cohesive” 
identity. The field is also concerned with drawing a differentiation between 
“impaired” and “disabled,” the former referring to a partially invisible disability 
(such as BIID), and the latter referring to a visible disability (closer to PLS, which 
I later expand upon). This differentiation, Corker and French explain, is partially 
formed to draw attention to the “invisible” disabilities. In relation to this, the BIID 
community struggles with feelings of social invisibility, as the majority of those with 
the condition feel alone, mentally ill, and believe that an increase in visibility will 
normalise the condition and lead to legalised surgery (reflective of transsexuality). 
While disability studies generally uses postmodernist theory to alter social and 
political views, I am interested in exploring issues of fragmentation and imperfect 
bodies. I additionally focus on how language is integrated into the individual’s 
bodily construction, creation, experiences, and identity, and in how psychoanalysis, 
literature, and fictional works illuminate the individual struggles with physical and 
psychical fragmentation. 
 Though disability studies does employ psychoanalysis to reach this goal, 
some theorists are dubious of the discourse. Dan Goodley writes, “be warned: 
always view psychoanalysis with healthy scepticism rather than deluded 
affiliation!” (123). “Our concern is […with] the kinds of psychology that are 
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reproduced in society that, for various reasons, marginalise disabled people” 
(Goodley xii). Psychology and psychoanalysis are often used to create social 
change, and although this thesis brings awareness to BIID, a disorder unknown to 
most, I focus on the relationship of psychoanalysis and the individual struggles with 
the impairment involved in BIID. Though my exploration also involves questions 
about how individuals are shaped through the environment, and does not ignore 
questions about social construction, I do not aim to challenge social norms. I will, 
more specifically, be investigating how the individual is formed through a loss, by 
employing various psychoanalytic theories that have yet to be discussed alongside 
BIID. In sum, although my aim to explore theory in relation to lived physical 
conditions overlaps with the interests of disability studies, my writing focuses on 
the individual subject. At this point, I return to the syndrome itself.  
Though “BIID” was not coined until 2004 by Michael First, and was 
renamed xenomelia by Paul McGeoch in 2011, documented cases date back to 
1785. The syndrome is recently beginning to gain recognition through films such as 
Complete Obsession [2000], Whole [2003], Quid Pro Quo [2008], and Armless [2010], 
through Ramachandran’s interest in the condition, and with the rising popularity of 
Internet forums, specifically, the Internet Yahoo! Group called “Fighting It,” which I 
draw upon throughout my thesis. This forum is dedicated to “discussion and 
support for living with or reducing this need [to be an amputee] and understanding 
its origins” (“Fighting It”). Although I aim to more thoroughly understand the 
syndrome, I am not searching for a definitive origin or reason. I am interested in 
learning more about the condition by investigating various theories that pertain to 
experiences that are related to BIID. It is this more analytical perspective that 
differs from those biomedical paradigms currently in discussion. 
Although research on the syndrome is limited, what literature exists 
suggests that the majority of sufferers remember having idolised an amputee at an 
early age, and know exactly what part of their limb must be removed (Bayne and 
Levy 11). Reports also reveal that patients feel as though they are not themselves 
with all their limbs intact, that the primary reason for amputation is the wish to feel 
complete through a lack (First 2005), and that most fear social stigma and therefore 
keep the desire secret. Although “this puzzling condition remains for the most part 
a mystery to medical science, and a lot more research is required to discern its true 
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causes” (“Body Integrity Identity Disorder”), some psychological and physiological 
hypotheses exist. Sabine Müller writes that  
 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists offer quite different 
explanations for the amputation desire: they discuss whether it is a neurotic 
disorder, an obsessive-compulsive disorder, an identity disorder like 
transsexuality, or a neurological conflict […] which could stem from 
damage to a part of the brain that constructs the body image in a map-like 
form. (“Body” 37) 
 
One psychological study conducted in 2015 examined the role of childhood 
experiences with BIID, as well as “abnormalities in parents’ behaviour of BIID 
sufferers [… which] should be followed up in future research. […]. Until now, 
there are no other studies about childhood-related experiences in BIID people 
[…]. Childhood experiences have not been subject of systematic psychological 
research in BIID context yet” (Obernolte 7). This thesis attends to this lack by 
exploring childhood experiences, albeit from a theoretical, psychoanalytic, and 
literary standpoint, as opposed to a biomedical one. It does not conduct a survey of 
individuals’ childhood experiences, but rather explores ideas about the way in 
which infants and children are formed in relation to their environments, 
particularly through the works of psychoanalyst Donald Woods Winnicott.  
The debate as to whether the syndrome is considered to be a psychosis also 
acts as a backdrop to this study. For several psychologists, such as Bayne and 
Levy, First, Schlozman and Blom, apotemnophilia poses a conundrum because the 
sufferers’ beliefs differ from “normality” and “reality.” However, unlike in 
psychosis, patients do not hallucinate; they acknowledge their intact limb. 
Moreover, those with BIID tend to reject the classification for fear of further 
stigmatisation. First agrees that the condition differs from psychosis, noting that in 
his case study of the BIID condition, “no subject reported any history of mania 
delusions or hallucinations” (First 7).3 He explains that, according to a case study 
                                                
3 In this thesis I refer at times to apotemnophilia and PLS as delusions, however, I do not suggest 
that they are complete delusions; but that they contain elements of delusion, that psychotic 
mechanisms are at work. As Freud explains in The Future of an Illusion (1927), while both illusion 
and delusion involve a contradiction with reality, a delusion is fully believed (Future 31). In 
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conducted by Schlozman in 1998, only “11 cases of self-inflicted upper extremity 
amputation described in the past 30 years were manifestations of a psychotic 
disorder” (“Desire” 8). Additionally, although Tim Bayne and Neil Levy explain 
that sufferers “appear to satisfy the DSM definition of a delusion: they have beliefs 
that are firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite 
incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary,” they argue that 
they are not delusional because the subject “clearly recognises that the leg is hers: 
she does not identify it as someone else’s leg, nor does she attempt to throw it out” 
(8).  
In the DSM-V (published in 2013), BIID is listed under Body Dysmorphic 
Disorder (BDD). However, the manual asserts that in BIID, “the concern does not 
focus on the limb’s appearance, as it would in body dysmorphic disorder” (247). 
Noll writes that in contrast to BDD, “in BIID subjects there is only a very small 
tendency to judge the attractiveness of the concerned limb as ‘unaesthetic’ and 
‘disgusting’” (230). Those with BIID focus on a body image, not the visual aspect 
of bodily incongruity, and are less “delusional” than those with BDD. Moreover, 
“[t]hose with BDD have a consuming preoccupation with an ugly body part or 
parts” (Lemma, Under 61). They “often describe that they are not seeking an ideal 
body; they just want to be ‘normal’” (Lemma, Under 83). Thus, another difference 
between BDD and BIID is that those with BDD associate the ideal body with 
normality, while those with BIID associate the ideal body with what is considered 
to be abnormal. Although BIID is also sometimes compared to anorexia, according 
to White, “[a] person with anorexia will believe they are overweight despite 
contrary evidence. Persons with BIID acknowledge that their bodies are healthy, 
they just identify as a disabled person […]. It is a mismatch that causes a BIID 
patient to suffer, not an alleged false belief” (229) (though I note that this may not 
always be the case). Nevertheless, anorexia illuminates another way of viewing 
BIID: it demonstrates the way in which desiring to erase part of one’s body to 
reach an imagined ideal is not entirely uncommon, as the same principle applies on 
a lesser scale to disordered eating. In this way, there is a gradation between the less 
                                                                                                                                      
connection with this, my use of delusion can be perceived as a more extreme and unhealthy form of 
illusion, a theme that will be unpacked throughout. 
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radical and more radical forms of desire for bodily removal, a recognition that may 
allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the syndrome. 
From a psychoanalytic point of view, Thomas Ogden suggests that an 
anorexic person may have an “unconscious fear that he does not know what he 
desires” (Primitive 214); there is no exact goal. Though this is to some extent true of 
those with BIID, the majority of sufferers believe that they know precisely what 
they want: the removal of a particular limb. Lemma hypothesises that the body may 
“have to be denied, or visibly modified to create an experience of ownership of the 
body” (Under 94). Again, this parallels BIID in that perhaps, the desire to self-
amputate is related to an experience of controlling and owning one’s own body, a 
concept I will develop throughout this thesis, predominantly in Chapter Four, 
through the thoughts of Winnicott. Winnicott believes that anorexia is “an illness of 
[the patient’s] mind” (“Psycho-Somatic” 108), which brings us to one key factor in 
the similarity here: BIID involves a problem of the mind, and thus, to discover 
more about BIID, we must discover more about how the mind is involved in the 
disorder. Since most BIID sufferers do not discuss their psychological experiences, 
this thesis aims to unearth more by analysing various ways that individuals have 
written or spoken about physical and mental fragmentation and wholeness, the key 
components involved in BIID. As Sebastian Schmidt, a BIID sufferer, explains, it 
is “not about the functionality of the limb but about the ‘feeling’ of having or not 
having it” (“My Life” 80). I aim to learn more about this feeling. Although there are 
similarities between anorexia and BIID that illuminate different ways of thinking 
about the syndrome, they are distinct illnesses. 
 The concept of body modification, which can range from tattooing to severe 
forms of cosmetic surgery, in relation to BIID may also allow for a greater 
understanding of the syndrome. Lemma suggests that “the modification of the body 
provides the means through which [some individuals] can reassure themselves that 
they are indeed separate from the other, and it defends against the wish to fuse with 
the other” (Under 94), an idea which I will later expand upon. Although body 
modification and BIID may be analogous in this way, tattooing, is, again, more 
clearly related to the altering of one’s appearance for aesthetic reasons, rather than 
an intense desire to cut off a part of oneself. Though theories about different forms 
of BDD provide insight, and are touched on in this thesis, I focus on 
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psychoanalytic and literary theories that explore concepts of psychosomatic 
fracture, as opposed to physical appearance. BIID is also often paired with Gender 
Identity Disorder (GID), in which individuals are uncomfortable with their 
anatomy and desire to surgically alter their body as a result. Both disorders, then, 
involve a drive to seek out surgery to meet an imagined ideal. Moreover, in both, 
writes First, “the individual reports feeling uncomfortable with an aspect of his or 
her anatomical identity […], with an internal sense of the desired identity” 
(“Desire” 8). Thus, “[s]ufferers of BIID,” writes White, “often describe themselves 
as being transabled, drawing a parallel with transgendered individuals” (226).4 
They also display a male predominance, symptoms tend to begin in childhood, and 
there have been individual case reports and descriptions of MtF transsexuals who 
have undergone limb amputation. Furthermore, several BIID patients exhibit 
gender identity issues, are often homosexual and bisexual, and some have reported 
feelings of wanting to be the opposite sex (Lawrence 264). In turn, some 
researchers are beginning to ask, “[h]ow can our understanding of GID help us to 
better understand BIID?” (Lawrence 154). This thesis focuses on a similar logic, 
albeit in relation to psychoanalysis and literary theory. This is not to say, however, 
that gender is not essential to the foundations of this thesis.  
 The field of gender studies is dedicated to the way in which gender and 
sexuality are represented and constructed as an identity, which is analysed 
predominantly through LGBTQI or queer studies, women’s studies, and men’s 
studies. More specifically, researchers in the field focus on how gender and 
sexuality are positioned in several discourses in the humanities. Some of the 
concepts discussed within this field overlap with those in this thesis, one of which 
involves the castration complex. The castration complex is a Freudian notion that 
individuals are driven by an anxiety that begins in childhood: for men, that their 
genitals will be castrated, and for women, that they are born with a physical lack 
(of the male organ), and in turn have “penis envy.” The girl assumes “that at some 
early date she had possessed an equally large organ and had then lost it by 
                                                
4 For more on current discussions regarding the conceptual vocabularies for transgender studies, see 
Robert Phillip’s article “Abjection,” in Transgender Studies Quarterly Volume 1, Number 1-2: 19-21. 
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castration […], whereas the boy fears the possibility of its occurrence” (Freud, 
“Dissolution” 665). The castration complex is problematic in several regards, as it is 
founded upon a concept that women are anatomically structured through a loss. 
Moreover, as Karen Horney states, it “treats the penis, as, in many ways, the 
fulcrum of human identification, for males and females alike” (Horney qtd. in 
Hook, 49). Horney also links the castration complex to her concept of womb envy 
(wherein the male desires a womb),5 which provides a different perspective on 
BIID. While the BIID drive to rid oneself of a limb (particularly in males who 
predominantly have BIID) might be paired with a desire to control castration, it 
also might be paired with the desire for female genitals, or the womb. From this 
perspective, in other words, a male might unconsciously amputate a limb to 
resemble the female body, which can bear children. The parallels between the 
castration complex and BIID will be further developed in this thesis. 
It is this kind of a psychoanalytic approach that I take, thus paralleling the 
neurobiological studies in some ways, though from a theoretical standpoint. These 
kinds of paradigms are not taken as fact, but are used to illuminate what is at work 
in BIID. To return to GID, the disorder differs in that in BIID, desires to 
amputate are directly related to the arms and legs (in most cases) as opposed to the 
genitals and breasts, and, as one woman who suffers from BIID writes: 
 
I could have a sex-change operation, but it would not give me the male 
experience. I would not be a man; I would be a woman with no vagina and 
an enlarged clitoris […]. To the contrary, [the] curiosity [of the BIID 
sufferer] is encouraged by the knowledge that it can be perfectly satisfied. 
(Mensaert 21) 
 
From this woman’s perspective, those who desire a sex change are left 
unsatisfied because they can never completely embody the opposite gender, 
whereas those with BIID can definitively attain their goal to remove the limb. This 
is problematic however because, firstly, the statement assumes that there is a 
                                                
5 For more on this see Karen Horney’s Feminie psychology (1923). 
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specific definition of “gender” (and “sex”),6 and some individuals with BIID who 
go through with their desired amputation remain unsatisfied. Those with BIID 
often emphasise the similarities between transsexuality and BIID for practical 
reasons, as sex reassignment is legal, while BIID surgery is not. As the 
aforementioned woman with BIID argues, “sex-change surgery is considered a 
worthwhile medical treatment because it provides the physical appearance and 
semblance of function [… and] thereby alleviat[es] great mental torment” She 
continues, “I propose that the mental torment undergone by wannabes be 
recognised as a seriously debilitating condition similar in nature to and as important 
as transsexualism, and that amputation not be ruled out as a reasonable way to treat 
it, just as gender reassignment is used to treat transsexuals” (Mensaert 24-5, 
emphasis in original). Amy White holds a similar view, stating that “[w]hen gender 
dysmorphia began to be recognised, the possibility of a patient requesting surgery 
to align a self-image with their actual body seemed irrational” (231), and in this 
way, comparing transsexuality to BIID may allow others to begin to identify with 
it, accept it, and even perform the desired surgery. However, it must be recognised 
that “unlike surgery to treat gender dysmorphia, surgery for BIID will leave 
sufferers physically, and perhaps problematically disabled. Also, surgeries like 
amputations often are risky and prone to complications […]. After surgery for 
gender dysmorphia, a patient still can perform most of the actions they could before 
surgery” (White 231-2). Thus, the links drawn between gender dysmorphia and 
BIID open a way of thinking about and understanding BIID. What interests me 
about this parallel is that it demonstrates that the core of BIID is not entirely 
uncommon, and this thesis is interested in exploring related concepts of the 
“imperfect” and fractured body. 
The syndrome has additionally been compared to various conditions that 
are believed to be outcomes of tumours or strokes, such as Capgras syndrome, 
which involves a delusion that someone close to the patient is an imposter. Also 
falling under this category is Alien Hand Syndrome, wherein a stroke causes 
patients to believe that their left hand is alien to them (though only fifty cases have 
been documented). Although this parallels the alien limb in BIID, in contrast to 
                                                
6 For more on this differentiation see The Psychology of Gender (1993), by Alice H. Eagly; Anne E. 
Beall; Robert J. Sternberg, Different but Equal (2001), by Kay E. Payne, Biology at Work (2002), by 
Kingsley R. Browne, or Language and Gender (2003) by Penelope Eckert and Sally McConnell-Ginet. 
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these two disorders, patients suffering from BIID “perceive this limb as mere 
ballast. This difference may explain why one and the same symptom is perceived as 
a disturbance by stroke or brain tumour patients, but as a part of their identity by 
BIID patients” (Müller 39). In short, BIID is more psychically orientated; the 
condition is a part of one’s identity, and does not necessarily originate in the body 
(a concept soon to be expanded upon in relation to PLS). There is additionally 
Cotard’s syndrome, where patients fail to recognise themselves, archaic limb 
phenomenon, where individuals feel attacked by their limbs, instances of 
neurological and psychiatric patients feeling as though they are in another being, 
and cases wherein individuals with paralysed bodies feel that they are functional. 
These are thought to result from physical traumas, and although I do not argue that 
BIID is not linked to a physical trauma, the physical trauma is not necessarily 
specific or known as it is in the case of stroke victims, or, as I will later explore, the 
phantom limb syndrome. In turn, BIID calls for a more robust exploration outside 
of neurology. Rather than asking questions about the possibility of a bodily wound, 
I am concerned with the way in which one’s physical and mental sense of self is 
shaped through more abstract experiences and feelings of trauma. However, the 
parallel between BIID and these types of neurological conditions have led to 
various neurological hypotheses. 
I now visit some of these, beginning with Ramachandran, who contends 
that the brain contains a map of the body, which is mismatched in BIID. There is, 
he suggests, a discrepancy between the body image and the physical body, which 
creates a cognitive dissonance; the brain fails to incorporate the limb. Since there is 
no stimulation or a dysfunction of the right parietal lobe, he argues, the limb cannot 
be felt. Though prominent, his research has been criticised by others in the field 
because those who desire an amputation often change their preference as to the 
limb they would like amputated. Furthermore, as Alicia Johnson points out, those 
who have self-amputated often report that they feel phantom limbs. Johnson 
explains: “if the limb could not be felt at all, as Ramachandran suggests, subjects 
would not feel a phantom limb or want to replace it with prosthesis post-
amputation” (13). These phantom feelings, writes Noll, “contradict the theory of 
BIID as a limb not embedded in the brain’s body-schema” (222). Those with BIID 
are not numb in the specific limb, as Ramachandran suggests, but rather (almost in 
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contrast to Ramachandran’s theory) feel that the limb is an excess appendage. 
Though this illuminates an overlap between the phantom limb and BIID that I will 
later discuss, for now I remain focused on neurological discussions of BIID.  
Though medication prescribed for various mood disorders has (rarely) 
worked to reduce suffering, attempts to clarify whether these medications relieve 
BIID specifically remain unsatisfactory. Alternative psychological and neurological 
methods are rarely pursued. However, one study conducted in 2015 by 
Lenggenhager, Hilti and Brugger used a “rubber foot illusion” to test BIID 
individuals’ responses to feeling ownership of a false foot. Those who conducted 
the study altered the rubber hand illusion (wherein the synchronous stroking of an 
artificial hand and one’s own hidden hand leads to an illusory feeling of ownership 
of the false hand) and created a rubber foot for those with BIID, and those without 
it. What they found was that both groups experienced the rubber foot illusion in 
the same way, suggesting that those with BIID have normally functioning senses, 
and that the integration of visual, tangible and proprioceptive information is intact, 
again contradicting Ramachandran and McGough’s hypothesis. Subjects could, in 
other words, feel ownership of an artificial foot, and yet continue to deny 
ownership of a real one, suggesting that the syndrome is not solely neurological. 
Those who conducted the study wonder if this experiment could be used to alter 
body representation to allow those with BIID to re-integrate the body part, 
however, this has yet to be tested. Additionally, in a small minority of cases, a 
combination of medicine and Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (a psychological 
treatment that is aimed at retraining psychological and physical habits) has been 
helpful in relieving feelings of obsession and depression. However, it does not 
eradicate BIID. Additionally, Ramachandran states that in very few cases, “merely 
having the patient look at his affected limb through a minifying lens to optically 
shrink it makes the limb feel far less unpleasant, presumably by reducing the 
mismatch” (Tell-Tale 257). Though some therapies are in development, most BIID 
patients report that they only feel better if amputated, and several argue that this is 
the only cure. Although self-amputation is reportedly more dangerous than, for 
example, gender reassignment surgery, Noll insists that based on his studies of 
those who have undergone amputation, “[t]hey listed several disadvantages, but in 
total they said that the advantage to have reached their goal outbalanced these 
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disadvantages by far” (230). Though patients often feel that the only way to relieve 
BIID is to have the limb amputated, several are open to other possible treatments. 
Furthermore, the number of individuals who have amputated or undergone therapy 
is minimal, and cannot be accurately tested. White writes, “[w]hile anecdotal 
evidence suggests a high satisfaction rate from those who have managed to realise 
their ideal disabled body, studies are on a very small scale” (227). This is partially 
due to the fact that “unnecessary amputation” is illegal, and a scarce amount of 
individuals with BIID have publicised their desires. However, “[s]everal 
individuals find ways to amputate limbs themselves. They may use a wood chipper, 
a chainsaw, shotgun, or dry ice. Others seek surgery on the black market, one 
individual suffering from gangrene and dying” (White 226). Although it seems that 
surgery performed legally would be helpful for those seeking dangerous methods, 
“sometimes the success is not sustainable: some amputated patients develop further 
amputation desires” (Müller 42). Müller hopes that “less invasive and efficient 
therapies can be expected” in the future (Müller 42).  
Certain individuals, however, believe surgery to be “ethically permissible 
because it will prevent many BIID patients from injuring or killing themselves” 
(Bayne and Levy 79). In the medical community, this question of ethics is often 
related to the patient’s mental health. On very rare occasions, if the patient can be 
trusted to make the right decision, they may be permitted to have the amputation. 
Several believe that if the patient seems rational enough to make a decision, it 
should be legal. However, this involves a problematically distinct differentiation 
between the rational and irrational and mental health and sickness. In order to 
make decisions regarding psychical health, White suggests that before amputation 
“there should certainly be a screening process in place to ensure informed consent” 
but that “less radical treatment options for BIID should be utilised before a surgical 
intervention” (234). Less radical treatments, however, have not been sought out at 
great length, aside from a small number of those who have undergone counselling, 
have taken medication for accompanying symptoms, and the experiments 
mentioned above, all bearing mixed and unsubstantial results. Kaur suggests that a 
medical cure has not been identified because “identity is not located in any simple 
way in anatomy” (1), indicating that since medication treats the body (specifically, 
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the brain) sufferers’ pain must be psychologically rooted. To approach this 
problem, First calls for more studies that examine psychotherapeutic forms. 
I now turn to some researchers’ thoughts regarding the effectiveness of 
psychotherapy in treating the disorder, a field more closely aligned with my own 
interests. Some researchers suggest that psychotherapy can be used as an 
alternative to, or in conjunction with medication, because the syndrome appears to 
be closely linked to mood disorders. According to Bayne and Levy, “psychotherapy 
is the appropriate response to the disorder” instead of amputation or medication, 
and “we know of no systematic study of the effects of psychotherapy on the desire 
for amputation” (11). First states that in his study, “for none of the subjects did 
psychotherapy reduce the intensity of the desire for amputation” (7). However, he 
also notes that a large number of patients never told their therapists about this 
desire, for fear that the therapist would consider this evidence of a severe mental 
illness. In addition to this, assessing the success of psychotherapeutic treatment is 
problematic because “there are very few professionals that are well versed in this 
particular disorder” (Body Integrity Identity Disorder); the majority of “talk therapy” 
being “geared towards looking at past experiences and trying to figure out where 
this longing for the absence of a limb has come from” (Body Integrity Identity 
Disorder). However, one study conducted in 2011, entitled “Body Integrity Identity 
Disorder – First Success in Long-Term Psychotherapy,” charted the case of a man 
with BIID whose two years in psychotherapy proved effective. Another small 
study found that psychotherapy “can reduce the psychological strain in BIID 
affected persons” (Kroger 110). In sum, as Noll, who conducted a study of those 
who have carried out self-amputation, writes: “there has to be further research on 
how to improve psychotherapy for people with BIID and to make it more effective” 
(231).  
Thus, neurological, psychological, and psychotherapeutic researchers 
continue to face difficulties defining terms and finding origins and cures. My 
exploration of BIID differs because I do not attempt to find a specific origin or 
cure, and do not focus on neurological research. My research aims to understand 
the more psychical components of BIID, particularly the struggles with fracture 
and imperfect bodies. For this, I turn to literature, psychoanalysis and fictional 
texts because they provide insight as to what might lie beyond the neurological 
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studies discussed above. I explore human struggles with issues related to BIID that 
illuminate a more robust understanding of what the disorder entails. 
Psychoanalysis and fiction are specifically helpful because, as I will soon explain, 
the kind of psychoanalysis I examine explores the struggles with mind/body 
dissonance, and how this relates to the way in which we are mentally and 
physically formed by our environment, experiences, and language. More 
specifically, these theories foreground how illusion, images and symbols are 
involved in the mind/body link, a concept also central to the phantom limb 
syndrome. As one apotemnophile on the film Whole explains, for him, BIID is  
 
like mirrors and prisms and how lenses invert images, and this idea that 
actually by making something less, you make people more complete, which 
is the complete opposite to most amputees who perhaps have accidents or 
disease. By taking that limb away from them they feel less complete. But for 
us, it’s the other way around. By taking it off you make us more complete. 
(Whole) 
 
I now want to look at those who suffer from what this individual refers to as 
the “complete opposite” of those with BIID: those who have had a bodily 
amputation that they are driven to fill through a painful phantom. However, we 
will soon find that although PLS may seem as though it is opposite to BIID, there 
are several overlapping issues. The following section thus focuses on PLS wherein 
a physical lack feels painfully present, as opposed to a physical presence that feels 
painfully absent. It additionally explores how mirrors and “lenses that invert 
images” (as stated above) may, in fact, help treat those who have phantom limbs.  
 
The Phantom Limb 
As previously noted, PLS involves a sensation that an amputated limb is still part of 
the body. While a person knows the limb is gone, she feels both physically and 
psychologically that it is still present. The phenomenon pertains to roughly eighty 
percent of amputees, including those born without a limb (congenital phantoms).7 
It was Ambroise Paré who first officially documented the syndrome while working 
                                                
7 For purposes of clarity, I focus on non-congenital phantoms in this thesis.
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with wounded soldiers in 1551. He believed that the phantom pains occurred in the 
brain, as opposed to in the physical stump itself. Weir Mitchell is also well known 
for writing about the phenomenon in a story published in 1866 in The Atlantic 
Monthly, which characterised a “quadri- amputee in the presence of others who 
‘walked across the room on limbs invisible to them or me’” (cited in G.D. Schott, 
961). The story describes the features of a phantom limb, which he refers to as an 
“unseen ghost of the lost part” (Mitchell qtd. in Schott 961). Numerous authors 
have subsequently written about the phenomenon, including René Descartes, 
Aaron Lemos, and Charles Bell. 
Currently, we know that phantom limb sensations are usually painful and 
uncomfortable. They may include tingling, throbbing, burning, clenching and 
cramping and can fluctuate in accordance with changes in mood and weather. 
Although phantoms often move in sync with the rest of the individual’s body and 
revert to a habitual position, they may also feel paralysed or disfigured. This 
disfigurement is connected to what is called telescoping: a (usually painful) change 
in size, shape and length, often triggered by material circumstances such as the 
wearing of prosthetics. According to Schilder, a hand may also become like the 
hand of a child, or go through the patient’s own body (64). One amputee describes 
a feeling of “‘being in contact with every part of my body. Because of the painful 
itching I know where my legs are, and through the pain I can feel my knees and 
toes as if they were there’” (Nortvedt 602). Another amputee explains that he feels 
invaded by insects that are “‘not only crawling all over my skin, but through my 
veins:¾and it itches! But it’s very difficult to explain. It’s as if I am lying in a nest 
of insects, and they’re constantly crawling not only outside but inside my body’” 
(Nortvedt 602). “‘It’s as if the skin of my arm has been ripped off; salt is being 
poured on it and then it’s thrust into fire’,” states another (Nortvedt 602). What is 
interesting in these descriptions is that all amputees use metaphors, which Nortvedt 
explains, “provide an inter-subjective perspective that conveys a common 
dimension of everyday life that could be a significant method for conveying and 
communicating their pain to others” (602). The use of metaphors to describe 
physical pain illuminates a theme that will be examined within this thesis: the 
possibility for and importance of communicating pain through language. The above 
statements additionally convey that there is a loss involved in translating physical 
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feelings, a loss that is replaced with an image. Although the phantom limb cannot 
be described, an image (of insects, for example) enables expression and 
communication, a concept I develop throughout this thesis, specifically in relation 
to mirror therapy. 
A variety of treatments have been explored to ease or eradicate phantom 
limb pain (PLP), including robot hands, vision-based therapies and the rubber 
hand illusion, in which by stroking an artificial hand one may feel sensations in the 
absent limb (paralleling the previously mentioned BIID rubber foot illusion). Thus, 
there is an important relationship between images and PLP that is central to this 
thesis, in relation to the ways in which the mind and body and self and other 
connect, and how language is involved in this process. Additionally, the 
cocainisation of nerves can cause the phantom to temporarily disappear, and 
hypnosis has been known to modify a small phantom to a normal size. Some have 
also reported that phantom limb sensations dissolve within three or four hours after 
the administration of LSD for a period of time. And although some hypotheses 
exist regarding the causes PLP, “there are many aspects of phantom limb 
experience that current theories of phantom limb phenomena do not explain, or 
which cannot be tested under current models” (Giummarra 224). As with BIID, I 
attend to this lack by engaging with certain types of dialogues about different 
sensations, experiences, thoughts, and concepts involved with the predominant 
issues at stake, several of which align with BIID. In order to ground this 
exploration, I shall briefly discuss some key neurological and psychological theories 
in development. 
I begin with Ronald Melzack; a neurologist whose work is of interest due to 
his concern with the mind/body link. Based upon the belief that psychological and 
physical processes are intertwined, Melzack put forward the “neuromatrix” 
hypothesis in 1965, which proposes that individuals have different innate neural 
patterns that define them as entire beings; the brain is prewired to believe that it 
has four limbs. When a limb is amputated, therefore, the brain continues to send 
sensory signals in its place that cause the limb to “feel real.” The brain says, “‘this is 
my body, it belongs to me, is part of my self’” (Malle 94 emphasis in original), 
indicating that a person is neurologically wired to be whole, and that the body 
shapes the psyche. However, Guimmarra points out that Melzack’s theory is “too 
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broad and difficult to be tested empirically” (Guimmarra 224). Other researchers 
suggest that visual signals clash when the limb is suddenly absent, and that there 
are “maladaptive” changes in the primary sensory cortex post-amputation. Some 
believe that an inflammation occurs in the severed nerve endings on the limb, 
which is misinterpreted by the brain as pain. However, research and treatments for 
these theories are unverifiable.  
Herta Flor posits a neurological theory that interests me, because she is 
concerned with the link between memory and bodily loss. Flor’s “pain memory 
hypothesis” suggests that since phantom pain may resemble that which occurred 
before a limb was amputated, “pain memories established prior to the amputation 
are powerful elicitors of phantom limb pain” (“Characteristics” 877). Though 
phantom pain usually resembles pre-amputation pain, Flor explains that her theory 
remains inconclusive, partially due to the influence of the psychical upon the 
physical. Moreover, she explains, “these samples included few traumatic amputees 
and mainly amputees with long-standing prior pain problems, in whom pain 
memories can have developed over a long time period” (“Characteristics” 877). She 
therefore concludes “more longitudinal research is needed to test the pain memory 
hypothesis” (“Phantom Limb” 878). This theory highlights a differentiation 
between long-term trauma and sudden trauma that underlies the thesis, as PLP is 
often a result of a sudden traumatic physical loss, while the traumatic feelings 
involved in BIID are long-term and ambiguous in nature. However, these 
differences are not definitive. I attend to the difference between the sudden and 
gradual traumas through various psychoanalytic perspectives, particularly through 
Winnicott’s concept of an indefinite feeling of traumatic loss experienced in relation 
to early experiences with the environment. 
 Ramachandran’s research on PLS focuses on the neurological reaction to 
the trauma of an amputated limb. He theorises that a map of the body exists in the 
brain, which is suddenly mismatched when a limb is removed, a concept that led to 
his BIID theory discussed above. While Ramachandran suggests that in BIID a 
part of the brain fails to incorporate the limb, his theory about PLS suggests that 
the area adjacent to the limb area in the brain “invade[s] the cortical hand area” 
(“Perceptual Correlates” 1160) when the limb is amputated. This causes the limb 
part of the brain in the brain map to continue to receive sensory information from 
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areas adjacent to it even though it is no longer there, which causes the individual to 
feel that it still exists. Though Ramachandran’s theory is influential, several have 
criticised it. For example, Flor found that phantom pain might be triggered by 
stimulating any part of the body or brain, not just those adjacent to the stump. 
While Ramachandran’s study suggests that sensory input invades the space of the 
lost limb to cause pain, I am interested in how PLS is not only formed by “physical 
invasion” but also by psychical impositions of a felt loss, which I elaborate through 
particular psychoanalytic and literary readings. However, Ramachandran’s 
neurological hypothesis is helpful, along with his analysis of the “mirror neurons.”  
Mirror neurons, according to Ramachandran, allow a person to understand 
or empathise with another person on a neurological level. These neurons, he writes, 
“allow you to figure out someone else’s intentions […] see the world from another 
person’s visual [and conceptual] vantage point, […] you can see yourself as others 
see you” (Tell Tale 128 emphasis in original). Since these neurons can cause an 
individual to feel what another is feeling by looking at that person, phantom limb 
perception must be influenced by physical identification with others who have 
limbs, and must thus involve mirror neurons. In support of this hypothesis are his 
findings that if an amputee sees someone being touched in a particular place, the 
amputee also feels the sensation. The material world affects the phantom feeling. 
Additionally, Schilder suggests that since the “hand and foot of the phantom persist 
longer, […] those parts of the body which come in close and varied contact with 
reality are the most important ones” (64). This neurological concept, along with 
Schilder’s observation, parallels a model of psychoanalysis concerned with how the 
individual is shaped by the environment, which I will be surveying mostly through 
object relations theory in Chapter Four. Rather than employing a neurological 
method, I examine how the psychical desire to be whole is linked to, not defined 
by, its physical component; how the limb is an organic reality that has been 
fantasised. 
Though several neurological hypotheses for PLS have been suggested, 
psychological factors have not been adequately explored. Flor contends that 
“psychological factors such as anxiety or depression […] might well affect the 
onset, course and the severity of the pain” (“Case of Maladaptive” 874). These 
factors, she concludes, “need to be explored in greater detail” (“Case of 
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Maladaptive” 878). Schilder argues that the phantom limb is “to a great extent 
dependent on the emotional factors and the life situation. Probably the way in 
which the scheme of the body is built up and appears in the phantom has a general 
significance. It is a model of how psychic life in general is going on” (68). The body 
schema to which he refers can be described as a postural figure of the body that 
arranges and alters new sensations to correlate with the body’s habitual 
movements; it negotiates and represents one’s spatial positioning, including the 
shape and length of the body and limbic organisation. He states, “we build up a 
plan for movements […], we develop this plan in continual contact with actual 
experiences […], the motor activity originates from an intention of our inner 
direction towards a goal, which comes through in the actual movements” (Schilder 
70). In the case of the phantom limb, the body schema is obstructed by a loss, 
which, in turn, obstructs habitual bodily movements or intentions. As Vivian 
Sobchack describes of her own experience with a phantom limb: 
 
looking at my body stretched out before me as an object, I could see ‘nothing’ 
there where my transparently absent left leg had been. On the other hand, 
feeling my body subjectively […], I most certainly experienced ‘something’ here 
– the ‘something’ sort of like my leg but not exactly coincident with my 
memory of its subjective weight and length (“Living” 53, emphasis in 
original).  
 
Although Sobchack’s limb does not physically exist, it exists subjectively as 
part of her body schema, albeit in distorted form. Her leg’s habitual movements 
may have ceased upon amputation; however, the body schema did not. Simmel 
suggests that this may occur because the body schema is “not capable of sudden 
change, [… it] represents something more than is physically present, something 
more than can currently be innervated. The ‘more’ is the lost part, and it manifests 
itself perceptually as the phantom” (63-4). Interestingly, in BIID, the “more” that 
cannot be innervated is the existent limb, a phantom of absence. As with the 
phantom limb, one’s physical sense of reality contrasts one’s subjective experience, 
albeit with an unclear cause for the apotemnophile. While the phantom limb fills a 
lack (perhaps, as Simmel suggested, partially due to the abruptness of amputation), 
 29 
in BIID, the “extra” limb does not fill a perceptible lack which, when related to 
PLS, suggests that it may be filling a psychical lack, a concept I return to 
throughout the thesis. For those with PLS, the phantom is perhaps necessary to the 
body schema’s intentions, as it is (generally) essential for walking with a prosthetic 
leg. “The brain then begins to accept the artificial leg as though it were a part of the 
body, able to be used for walking” (Sternburg 34). This concept of the body 
schema thus illuminates the way in which bodily movements, the environment, and 
the mind are interconnected, and it is this interconnection that is sometimes 
overlooked in neurological studies but will be central to the thesis.  
Most hypotheses in psychodynamic and psychoanalytic fields today propose 
that the phantom results from various conscious and unconscious feelings and 
analytical processes, such as denial and mourning. A patient cited in Nortvedt’s 
case study expresses these thoughts of mourning, explaining, “I feel that it can be 
compared with a feeling of grief, the kind of grief you can experience after the loss 
of a dear, old friend or family member” (603). However, some ascribe the phantom 
to a wish or need, claiming that although it “has been attributed to the non-
acceptance or denial of the lost limb […] more systematic observations have 
indicated the inadequacy of a wish or need theory” (Marmor 241-2). Thomas 
Weiss, on the other hand, believes the illusion to be an embodiment of a narcissistic 
desire, and Lawrence Kolb links it to a form of denial triggered by repressed 
desires to self-harm. According to Simmel, Kolb “observed that some patients are 
unwilling to talk about the phantom […]. This is hardly denial in the 
psychoanalytic sense of an unconscious mechanism. Rather, it is a deliberate refusal 
to acknowledge an experience” (338). Simmel’s statement, however, demarcates 
conscious from unconscious thought by suggesting that the unwillingness to discuss 
the phantom limb is a conscious refusal. The question arises as to whether that 
refusal may be rooted in, or at least connected to, the unconscious mind. 
Throughout this thesis, I consider these kinds of binaries, arguing that unpicking 
them can be helpful to understanding the conditions. Though these psychoanalytic 
themes will reappear in this thesis, it is Malcolm MacLachlan’s work that parallels 
my own most closely. He studies how a prosthesis can affect a person’s self-image, 
and how it may become “psychologically invested into the self, and hence the 
person’s relationship with it may symbolise how they relate to the world” 
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(MacLachlan 129). Although I do not focus on prostheses in this thesis, I explore 
how the mirror-box is a kind of temporary and illusory prosthesis that raises 
questions concerning how we react to psychosomatic fragmentation and loss. 
 
Mirror Therapy 
Ramachandran’s discovery of the “mirror-box” treatment (also called a “virtual 
reality box,” “mirror visual feedback” [MVF] and “mirror therapy”) began when he 
realised that when patients saw the phantom move in the mirror, they also felt it 
move, which worked to dissipate pain, and allowed them to control phantom 
movements. For a large percentage of individuals, “[t]he sustained level of pain 
reported” writes Ortiz-Catalan, “was gradually reduced to complete pain-free 
periods” (“Treatment”). Gawande suggests that the mirror works because it 
“provides the brain with new visual input¾however illusory¾suggesting motion in 
the absent arm. The brain has to incorporate the new information into its sensory 
map of what’s happening. Therefore, it guesses again, and the pain goes away” 
(“The Itch”). As briefly noted, this is one of several non-medicinal treatments for 
PLP. Others include Graded Motor Imagery (GMI). GMI involves imagining 
hand movements in order to increase the activity of motor cortical neurons and 
strengthen the body schema, a method also used for neuropathic pain (Hellman, 
“Mirror-Therapy”). This has proved effective in some cases, particularly those in 
which the mirror therapy can create a feeling of re-traumatisation regarding the 
sudden shock of feeling a missing body part. An alternative form of therapy is the 
previously-mentioned rubber hand illusion, and yet another involves a cable-driven 
prosthesis, which may allow users to grasp and manipulate objects. However, many 
amputated individuals reject these forms of treatment due partially to their inability 
to alleviate the phantom pain, and to the uncomfortable feeling of an alien body 
part. Peripheral neural interfaces have also been used to provide proprioceptive 
and tactile feedback to the phantom limb, which has at times decreased phantom 
pain. The “Bear Claw” is a sensitised robot hand, created to allow the patient to feel 
false manipulations of a phantom limb. And finally, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT) is a psychological treatment in which a therapist works with patients to 
modify their beliefs and alter physical pain. However, as I will return to in Chapter 
Two, CBT is largely unsuccessful at healing phantom pain. Although, similar to the 
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mirror-box, it is a way of transforming one’s thought processes to help individuals 
cope with and accept their pain, the mirror-box is a physical mechanism that can 
eradicate pain. It is an object that mediates between the mind and body. 
 As noted, prostheses have also been used on amputees with phantom limbs, 
but they do not consistently have healing effects. At times, they even increase pain. 
Some individuals such as Sobchack, however, have helpfully integrated the 
prostheses as part of their body schema. She writes that her phantom limb may 
have adapted to the possibilities provided by the prosthetic, and that “over time, the 
‘dys-appeared’ phantom may diffuse its self-presence discretion to become once 
more the transparent absence and integrity of one’s habitual, if self-adjusting, sense 
of one’s lived body” (“A Leg,” 60 emphasis in original). She continues, “[n]ow, 
having incorporated the prosthetic, I primarily sense my leg as an active, quasi-
absent ‘part’ of my whole body” (62). Here, similar to mirror-therapy, the prosthesis 
allows for a feeling of wholeness. However, the prosthesis is a physical replacement 
that allows the individual to walk, while the mirror-box is an illusion of the absent 
limb that can simply heal the pain. Mirror therapy, therefore, illuminates how a 
purely visual reflection can ease pain in relation to feelings of wholeness. The 
mirror illusion is a symbol of the limb that has a physical affect, rather than a 
physical substitute for it (which I soon discuss in more detail).  
Ramachandran developed the idea for the mirror-box by studying “learned 
paralysis,” which occurs when an appendage has been paralysed prior to 
amputation and causes the same sensation of phantom paralysis post-amputation. 
He theorised that when the paralysed limb is amputated, the brain continues to tell 
the felt arm not to move, leaving the individual with a paralysed phantom. The 
theory is supported by the observation that individuals whose limbs were never 
paralysed can control phantom movements when first amputated. It appeared, 
therefore, that the phantom was caused by the brain’s pre-programmed signals to 
the body (“Synaesthesia” 378). These thoughts spurred Ramachandran to ask 
whether if the patient can learn paralysis, “would it be possible to unlearn the 
phantom paralysis?” (“Synaesthesia” 378). For this, he thought, the brain would 
have to begin receiving signals that the phantom does exist and is not frozen, so 
that it can move in a less painful manner and release the paralysis, an idea that led 
to the mirror-box. By visualising the existent moving limb superimposed onto the 
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felt phantom, the patient sees the phantom move within her control; she resurrects 
her own phantom through an illusion of its presence. The illusion, therefore, can 
become a physical reality; the mirror image can alter the brain and body. 
Ramachandran found that after they practised moving their limb in the mirror-box 
daily over a period of time, most patients’ phantoms disappeared completely, and 
Ramachandran thus created what he called the first “successful amputation of a 
phantom limb” (Tell-Tale 34). The mirror-box can remove an unwanted limb in 
PLS, and this can often cause sufferers to feel complete. In the mirror-box, the limb 
is re-amputated through an image, which erases the phantom and eases the pain of 
feeling fractured. In this way, the idea of wholeness is challenged, and this 
paradoxical relationship is, I suggest, important to explore in order to understand 
more about the issues involved in PLS and BIID as it also foregrounds a 
paradoxical relationship with unity. To return to Ramachandran’s invention of 
mirror therapy, some researchers remain sceptical. Makin, for example, associates 
the treatment with the placebo effect, writing: “I don’t believe in magic” (Makin 
qtd. in Perur). However, phantom limb sufferer Stephen Sumner, who I discuss in 
Chapter One, reported that researchers, doctors and therapists have told him, 
“‘[w]ell, it’s not scientific’ – simply because mirror therapy looks too simple” 
(Perur). But, he writes, “I am an above-knee amp. I cured myself with a mirror [… 
and] I challenge someone in a white lab coat who has never been anywhere where 
it hurts to tell me otherwise” (Perur). Stephen additionally highlights the centrality 
of psychosomatics in the treatment. He states of the physical component, that “[i]t’s 
not in the head, it’s in the limb,” and of the psychical, “when I finally tried mirror 
therapy on myself […] it almost had to work. I mean, I needed something” (Perur). 
Thus, although many researchers are dubious and unsure as to how the mechanism 
works¾partially because it may not conform to their preconceived notions of 
science¾it can work, and cannot be confined either to the psyche or soma; it is 
psychosomatic.  
In another case reported in an article in The New Yorker entitled “The Itch,” 
Atul Gawande writes about his experience with a patient who had a tumour 
removed from his spinal cord, which left him with incurable PLP. For eleven years, 
he tried several different medications and electrical-stimulation therapy, to no avail, 
until finally, mirror therapy worked. “For the first time in eleven years, he felt his 
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left hand ‘snap’ back to normal size. He felt the burning pain in his arm diminish” 
(Gawande). The patient tells Gawande, “‘I’ve never had anything like this before 
[…]. It’s my magic mirror.” This drug/surgery-free treatment opens possibilities for 
several potential treatments based on the “careful manipulation” of individuals’ 
perceptions (Gawande). It additionally reveals the flexibility of the mind and 
provides insight into alternative forms of pain relief. Ramachandran explains that 
although benefits are still being discovered, he finds the mirror treatment intriguing 
because it shows that new pathways can emerge in the adult brain. “The brain,” he 
writes, “is an extraordinarily plastic biological system that is in a state of dynamic 
equilibrium with the external world” (Tell-Tale 37). The mirror-box, then, 
demonstrates the importance of the way in which images and the material world 
are integral to one’s psychosomatic constitution, and this is one of the central 
concerns of this thesis. I ask, how do physical and psychical images of self and 
interactions with the world relate to bodily pain and feelings of loss, and what can 
the relationship between BIID and PLS convey? 
To clarify, then, those with BIID and PLS both feel as though they have an 
extraneous limb, which causes them pain; they experience a feeling of excess in 
relation to a feeling of absence. In both syndromes, moreover, individuals strive for 
a sense of completion through the idea of a complete removal: they usually believe 
that their pain will be eradicated when the felt limb is amputated. There is, 
therefore, a paradoxical drive to fill through removal, a fetishistic disavowal 
wherein both BIID and PLS sufferers know that there is no bodily wholeness, and 
yet feel that there is. However, BIID and PLS suffers cope with their pain 
differently, partially due to the origins of the wound: those with BIID feel the need 
to remove a corporeal presence to fill a psychically orientated loss, while those with 
phantom limbs fill a bodily loss through a psychical feeling of presence. 
Additionally, while PLS is a response to a specific bodily trauma of amputation that 
is often sudden, BIID is gradual and of ambiguous origins. This indicates, 
therefore, that disturbing fantasies of bodily absence and presence are not always 
reactions to explicit or sudden traumatic experiences, and that reactions to trauma 
which involve fantasy versions of self can occur over time and without a definitive 
cause.  
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Both conditions additionally involve a disability or impairment, although the 
impairment in those with BIID is not visible, while the missing limb in PLS is 
apparent. This, as we will soon discover, often generates a fear of being considered 
mentally ill and feelings of alienation for the apotemnophile. Since the loss in those 
with phantom limbs can be visualised, is more relatable to various other bodily 
conditions, and is well documented, PLS sufferers do not tend to feel as ostracised. 
However, the neurological reasons for PLS remain unknown, and like BIID, do 
not fit any specific category. Nonetheless, some neurologists and psychologists 
have reached similar hypotheses regarding the origin and treatments for both 
disorders, which have rendered inadequate results. It is the mirror-box that is often 
successful for those with phantom limbs, and although sufferers of BIID often state 
that they feel better post-amputation, the results can be dangerous and are 
inconclusive. In this thesis, I do not focus on how the amputation itself (in BIID or 
of the phantom limb) can completely relieve pain, but rather on how an 
incorporation of loss can offer a sense of relief, and how this may take place 
through an image or illusion. Thus, my interest is in how certain images, symbols, 
and illusions can reshape an individual’s somatic and psychical constitution, which 
I explore through various literary, fictive, and psychoanalytic works. Since neither 
syndrome can be completely understood, I am concerned with what these physical 
conditions can tell us, and what, more specifically, the mirror illusion can reveal 
about how we cope with feelings of psychical and physical fragmentation. Since in 
psychoanalysis, “the body tells a story which cannot otherwise be told [… and] the 
somatic symptom, like all symptoms, ‘has a psychical significance, a meaning’” 
(Yarom, 54), psychoanalysis is a starting point for this exploration.  
 
The Hysterical Body 
Psychoanalysis began with Freud’s interest in how bodily symptoms stem not only 
from the body, but the mind. He looked beyond the neurological and medical 
approach, turning instead towards the psyche in an effort to establish how 
psychological issues are connected to bodily ones, and how the imagination and 
language mediate the processes involved. Thus, it is necessary to understand 
Freud’s thoughts on bodily symptoms in order to examine BIID and PLS from a 
non-biomedical view. Although psychoanalysis is often considered to be a 
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theoretical discipline, it began with the body, with Freud’s study of hysteria. 
Currently, hysteria is regarded as “the designation for such a vast, shifting set of 
behaviours and symptoms¾limps, paralyses, seizures, coughs, headaches, speech 
disturbances, depression, insomnia, exhaustion, eating disorders” (Showalter 14). 
It was originally considered a medical condition particular to women, caused by 
bodily disturbances of the uterus. Freud, however, found that the cause of hysteria 
did not reside in the body, but in the mind. Something arises, he suggests, which is 
refused access to the mind and becomes inscribed onto the body; hysteria is “a 
neurosis caused by repression, conflicted sexuality, and fantasy” (Showalter 38). 
Freud’s theory was spurred by his interest in the work of Jean Martin Charcot, 
who suggested that the symptoms of hysteria result from a traumatic accident. 
According to Charcot, when his patients were in a hypnotic state he could remove 
their hysterical symptoms, thereby leading him “to the very border between 
neurology and psychology. The preliminary condition for the successful execution 
of any movement is, he argues, ‘the production of an image, or of a mental 
representation’” (Fletcher 21). For Charcot, bodily symptoms were not only 
medical, they were connected to the mind and imagination, a concept central to my 
argument that PLS and BIID are not simply biomedical phenomena. Freud further 
developed Charcot’s theories with colleague Josef Breuer, paying particular 
attention to Breuer’s patient Anna O., who was featured in their joint work Studies 
on Hysteria (1893-5). The work, Anthony Elliot writes, “examined symptoms 
ranging from hallucinations to the physical paralysis of arms and legs […]. [It] laid 
a skeletal structure for the theoretical development of psychoanalysis” (13). Freud 
and Breuer proposed a new theory about the origin of hysteria, which hinges upon 
the concept of conversion: that bodily symptoms convey disturbances in the mind.  
Hysterical symptoms, Freud writes, might contain “symbolic meaning: they 
express repressed ideas through the medium of the body” (Language 90). These 
ideas have been repressed because, he suggests, unbearable traumatic experiences 
have been barred from the conscious mind and defensively transformed into 
somatic symptoms. The body is thus the carrier for a psychical wound, “the 
memory of the trauma¾acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must 
continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work” (Freud, “Psychical 
Mechanism” 6). The trauma itself cannot be remembered, but appears in different 
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forms, meaning that it is the memory of the trauma which invades the patient’s 
body. In this way, the symptom is both physical and mental; it is located in the 
body and psyche simultaneously. The relationship between conversion and the 
phantom limb is clear: the phantom limb can be seen as the memory of a traumatic 
loss, whether sudden, gradual, or congenital, that has been transformed into a 
foreign bodily feeling. However, while in hysteria the traumatic experience cannot 
be known, the phantom limb begins with a physical and perceptible wound. 
Moreover, the symptoms are clearly psychosomatic, unlike the paralyses of Anna 
O. They are felt but cannot be seen. BIID parallels hysteria more closely in that its 
origins are unknown, and in this way, as I later explain, resembles a neurosis. 
However unlike hysteria, in BIID the symptom does not organically arise on the 
body. Though the body feels broken, it functions “normally.” Moreover, those with 
the syndrome desire a physical wound that is reflective of that which the hysteric 
may want to remove.  
For Freud, somatic symptoms can ostensibly be remedied through the 
linguistic exchange that takes place in analysis. Here, bodily symptoms carry 
unconscious symbolic meanings that, when articulated and analysed, can be 
brought towards conscious thought. “Understanding the idea behind the feelings,” 
writes Juliet Mitchell, “can bring the conversion symptom to an end” (Mad Men, 
206). The mirror-box, I contend, parallels the psychoanalytic process of 
symbolising bodily symptoms through a linguistic exchange, because it involves a 
process of healing through a symbol of the phantom limb. It allows a subjective 
feeling to be consciously visualised. In this thesis, I examine the way in which the 
mirror-box is a type of symbol that, paralleling language, can helpfully link 
subjective to objective experiences. I am interested in how an image of a phantom 
limb has a healing affect, and how this is related to language’s affects. In order to 
more thoroughly understand what kind of symbol this is and how it works, it is 
important to briefly survey different conceptions of symbolism. 
Ernest Jones addresses the difficulties involved in defining symbolism, 
noting that the term “has been used to denote very many different things, some of 
them quite unconnected with one another” (Jones 88). One argument, however, is 
that symbols can be traced back to “the bodily self” (Jones 116), and are therefore 
useful in interpreting physical expression. “The essential function of all forms of 
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symbolism,” he writes, “is to overcome the inhibition that is hindering the free 
expression of a given feeling-idea” (144). Symbolism, then, is valuable because it 
may helpfully allow individuals to express that which has been repressed. Since 
both BIID and the phantom limb involve an inexplicable feeling, I suggest that 
finding ways to symbolise the two disorders can provide new understandings of 
sufferers’ experiences. To clarify, I do not consider the phantom limb and BIID as 
symbols; rather, they are bodily conditions that illuminate notions of somatic and 
psychical fragmentation when explored through symbolic mediums. Language and 
the mirror-box are two forms of symbolisation that can convey more about the 
disorders. For this exploration, I focus on object relations theory, because it 
foregrounds the kind of symbol that is structurally reflective of language and the 
mirror-box, as it involves a simultaneous absence and presence, and is thought to 
connect subjective to objective senses of self. 
Although object relations theorists have several different conceptions of 
symbolism, Melanie Klein “described the capacity to symbolise unconscious 
frightening, sadistic aggressive feelings for the object as an important step in ego 
development” (Auchincloss 256). Hanna Segal follows Klein’s work, theorising that 
symbol formation arises out of the ego’s attempt to cope with anxieties. Individuals, 
she writes, are “consciously aware and in control of symbolic expressions of the 
underlying primitive phantasies” (“Notes” 396). For Segal, symbols may help 
individuals gain control over their fantasies, and although there are many 
definitions of fantasy,8 Julia Kristeva states that, simply, “fantasy is an imaginary 
‘act’ or scenario” (Flesh 773). From this perspective, both the phantom limb and 
BIID are fantasies, as they involve actions and scenarios that exist in the 
imagination. Thus, since those with BIID and phantom limbs are harmfully 
affected by fantasy versions of self, symbol formation, according to Segal’s theory, 
may help individuals to cope with these fantasies. Her notion of symbol formation 
is linked to forms of communication. She writes: “[s]ymbol formation governs the 
capacity to communicate, since all communication is made by means of symbols” 
                                                
8 It is also worth noting that a fantasy that takes place in the unconscious is often referred to with a 
“ph” rather than an “f.” In the words of Thomas Ogden: “[p]hantasy, spelled with a ph, denote[s] the 
unconscious dimensions of this mental activity. Fantasy, spelled with an f is used to refer to the more 
conscious facets of this psychic activity, for example, daydreams, conscious childhood sexual 
theories, and conscious masturbatory narratives” (The Primitive 16, emphasis in original). For the 
purpose of clarity, I will be referring to ‘fantasy’ throughout the thesis. 
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(“Notes” 395). Indeed, communication between the self and other is central to 
discussions about reparation and symbolism in this thesis, as both language and the 
mirror-box can be seen as types of symbols that may engender a healing exchange. 
I will argue that they assist in integrating subjective and objective senses of self, 
and the mind and body. According to Segal, “the word ‘symbol’ comes from the 
Greek terms for throwing together, bringing together, integrating” (“Notes” 397), 
and, as BIID and PLS foreground psychosomatic dissonance, I will suggest that a 
symbol can have the effect of appeasing psychosomatic pain (which I focus on in 
Chapter Four, through Winnicott’s theories). Winnicott proposes that a type of 
symbol called a transitional object can helpfully bridge subjective feelings to an 
objective environment, a concept of symbolism that most closely correlates with the 
one I use throughout this thesis, and which, for me, acts as a template. These 
objects can be linguistic; they are, he writes, “symbolical of some part-object, such 
as the breast. Nevertheless, the point of it is not its symbolic value so much as its 
actuality” (8). In this way, the symbol does not only stand for something, it is 
“actual.” It is both illusory and concrete, and thus functions in the same way as 
language and the mirror-box. Language and the mirror-box can, like the 
transitional object, lead to a feeling of psychosomatic integration, and since BIID 
and PLS concern psychosomatic dissonance; I now turn to the field of 
psychosomatics. 
According to Winnicott, there have been “failures to classify psycho-somatic 
disorders” along with an “inability to state a theory, a unified theory of this illness 
group” (“Psycho-analytic” 111). However, Joyce McDougall describes 
psychosomatics’ central feature: “we all tend to somatise at those moments when 
inner or outer circumstances overwhelm our habitual psychological ways of 
coping” (3). If something intrudes upon the psyche, the body reacts. She suggests 
that what underlies the interconnection between the body, mind and 
communication is that “[s]ince babies cannot yet use the words with which to 
think, they respond to emotional pain only psychosomatically” (9). Here, it is the 
body that speaks, a process that extends in later life to psychosomatic illnesses in 
which the body expresses that which cannot be thoroughly explained. As 
McDougall writes, “the body has a language of its own” (12), and it is my intention 
to open a dialogue about what the body in PLS and apotemnophilia reveal. Since 
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both conditions demonstrate problems with psychosomatic fracture, I will focus on 
theories of fragmentation and splitting, such as those explored in the Paris School 
of Psychosomatics.  
The “Paris School of Psychosomatics highlights a split between the mind 
and the body” (Birksted-Breen, Reading 438).9 Their theories, therefore, offer ways 
of thinking about the mind/body dissonance involved in BIID and PLS. Several in 
the Paris School are concerned with bringing theoretical analyses back towards the 
bodily experience, and with discovering what the body reveals about the psyche. 
Dana Birksted-Breen writes that in this kind of French psychoanalysis, “somatic 
illness was discovered to be the consequence of a failure to mentalise experience, the 
body offering up an organ to bind disintegration, a progressive disorganisation 
which was seen as the product of an overwhelmed and disabled psyche” (Birksted-
Breen, Reading 35 emphasis in original). Although this echoes Freudian theory, one 
central difference is that the focus here is on bodily fragmentation. Thus, French 
Psychosomatics will be useful in opening a dialogue about the somatic fracture 
central to both conditions, and in particular, the bodily destruction involved in 
BIID. I will also focus on Winnicott’s thoughts on the mind/body relationship, 
because they allow for a more thorough understanding of how symbolic objects 
play a role in linguistic and non-linguistic communication and psychosomatic 
discord. For Winnicott, psychosomatics involves a split “that separates off physical 
care from intellectual understanding; more important, it separates psyche-care from 
soma-care” (“Psycho-Somatic” 105). My discussion of Winnicott will focus on the 
impact of the carer’s role in forming this split, and in how symbolic objects are 
involved in the healing process. The symbolic object can be helpful in patients with 
psychosomatic illnesses, he suggests, because, although they may experience a split, 
they are “in touch with the possibility of psychosomatic unity” (“Psycho-Somatic” 
114). Indeed, this simultaneous split and drive towards unity echoes the 
experiences of those with PLS and BIID, as BIID sufferers believe that 
amputation will result in a feeling of completion, and phantom limbs fill a physical 
incompleteness with a sense of unity. This paradoxical relationship with 
fragmentation and completion parallels Freud’s concept of a fetish, and to 
                                                
9 Those affiliated with the Paris School include Pierre Marty, Michel de M’Uzan, Christian David, 
and Michel Fain. 
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understand more about this, we must return to the castration complex. Freud 
writes that “in so far as one can speak of determining causes which lead to the 
acquisition of neuroses, their aetiology is to be looked for in sexual factors” (Studies 
257 emphasis in original), which can be traced back to the Oedipus Complex. 
Here, the child desires the parent of the opposite sex, and in reaction to these 
desires, suffers from castration anxiety. However, as noted earlier, this concept is 
problematic, partially because it is based upon the false assertion that females are 
(symbolically) lacking or un-whole. In this way, the underlying problem with the 
castration complex parallels BIID itself, as BIID involves a discomfort with a 
whole body, which is believed to be ruptured. In both circumstances, therefore, 
one’s conception of unity is orientated in the mind. Through the mirror-box, an 
illusory object can appease the feeling of un-wholeness in PLS, which echoes 
Freud’s notion of the fetish, which I now discuss.  
 BIID, I have suggested, echoes Freud’s concept of a neurosis because it 
seems that a psychological wound is felt on the body, but differs in that in BIID, 
there is no physical wound. The phantom limb, I suggest, resembles psychosis more 
closely, because the psychotic rejects a “present reality and replac[es] it with a 
delusion that contains a grain of truth from some reaction to a past historical 
‘event’” (Mitchell, Psychoanalysis 263). And the phantom can be considered a partial 
delusion based upon the idea of a once present limb (or visualised, in the case of 
congenital phantoms). However, “psychoses,” continues Mitchell, “tend to express 
themselves, among other ways, in delusions and hallucinations which are fully 
believed in” (Mitchell, Psychoanalysis 263). The difference between the phantom 
limb and psychosis can be found in the latter part of this statement: delusions in 
psychosis are fully believed, and individuals with phantom limbs know that the 
phantom is not objectively “real.” In this way, the phantom limb can be more 
closely aligned with a fetish, particularly when relating the phantom limb to the 
male genitals. “For Freud, a fetish is a substitute by a child for his mother’s missing 
penis. The fetish alleviates a son’s castration anxiety by restoring the mother’s 
penis. The boy thereby preserves the delusion that his mother has a penis” (Jonte-
Pace 159). In relation to this, as Adam Phillips writes, the phantom limb “is a loss 
at once acknowledged and invisible […]. Like Freud’s account of fetishism in 
which ‘only one current’ in a person’s life had not recognised the disturbing fact of 
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there being two sexes, while ‘another current took full account of the fact’, the two 
states of mind ‘exis[t] side by side’” (On Balance 105). Indeed, the phantom limb 
involves a simultaneous disavowal and acknowledgement of a bodily loss, and 
similarly, in BIID, sufferers simultaneously acknowledge that their limb is present, 
while additionally believing that it is (subjectively) absent. 
In a different way, the mirror-box echoes Freud’s notion of the fetish, as it 
involves a loss that is at once acknowledged and denied. It both preserves the 
illusion that the phantom limb is part of the amputee’s body, and simultaneously 
demonstrates that it is absent. Thus, the mirror illusion allows two states of mind to 
exist side by side; however, unlike the fetish and the phantom limb, the mirror 
image, like the psychoanalytic exchange, can enable a reparative process. I will 
argue, therefore, that mirror therapy is a metaphor for and embodiment of 
psychoanalytic transference, wherein a reparative process takes place through a 
simultaneous illusion and material reality. While the analyst and the room exist, the 
memories and actions that take place in transference are distortions and re-
enactments. Mirror therapy, like transference, “creates an intermediate region 
between illness and real life through which the transition from one to the other is 
made” (Freud, “Remembering” 155), through language, illusion, or, as Peter 
Brooks calls it, fiction.  
Brooks writes that psychoanalytic transference 
 
succeeds in making the past and its scenarios of desire live again through 
signs with such vivid reality that the reconstructions […] achieve the effect 
of the real […]. [T]hey rewrite its present discourse. Disciplined and 
mastered, the transference ushers us forth into a changed reality. And such 
is no doubt the intention of any literary text. (“Idea” 345 emphasis in 
original) 
 
Transference, like certain literary texts, may allow the individual to alter the way in 
which the past is embodied by (re)enacting it through signs. Similarly, in mirror 
therapy, a sign of the phantom reconstructs it, thereby altering the amputee’s felt 
reality to achieve the effect of the real. “The transference,” writes Brooks, 
“actualises the past in symbolic form so that it can be repeated, replayed, worked 
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through to another outcome. The result is, in the ideal case, to bring us back to 
actuality, that is, to a revised version of our stories” (Reading 344). The mirror-box 
acts as a metaphor for transference and certain types of literature in this way, as it 
actualises the past (the absent limb) in symbolic form and repeats the movement of 
the existent limb, which enables a revised version of the phantom, a changed sense 
of reality.  
 In both psychoanalysis and literature, as Lionel Trilling suggests, “change is 
produced […]. [T]he textual reader, like the psychoanalytic patient, finds himself 
modified by the work of interpretation and construction, by the transferential 
dynamics to which he has submitted himself. In the movement between text and 
reader, the tale told makes a difference” (Psychoanalysis 72). In this way, literary 
texts and psychoanalysis share an important relationship: they may create a certain 
kind of self-modification through a symbolic exchange. And similarly, the mirror-
box modifies the amputee’s sense of self through a symbol of her phantom limb. 
Thus, the links that I draw between the mirror-box, literature and psychoanalysis 
hinge upon this point: they involve a symbolic exchange that can alter feelings of 
psychosomatic rupture. In order to unpack these links between literature, 
psychoanalysis and trauma, it is important to turn to the field of trauma studies. 
 
Trauma Studies 
Freud argued that traumatic experiences are delayed and distorted forms of an 
occurrence that was too powerful to comprehend at the time. An incident, he 
found, might trigger the memory of the “original” trauma, as he writes, “a memory 
is repressed which has only become a trauma by deferred action” (Freud, “Project” 
356 emphasis in original). Again, Freud’s account indicates that the effects of a 
trauma cannot be experienced directly, but belatedly. This theory is foundational to 
trauma studies, a field of study established in the mid 1990s and concerned with the 
idea of trauma as an un-representable event. Trauma theorists approach the 
concept through psychoanalysis and poststructuralist thought, suggesting that the 
inability to represent trauma is connected to the inadequacy of language for the 
expression of trauma. The field was popularised by Cathy Caruth’s take on trauma 
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as a crisis of representation.10 Caruth follows Freud in her belief that a traumatic 
event is incomprehensible, and is registered as a blank in the victim’s mind that 
remains continually invasive. She argues that although the trauma remains 
unknown to the victim, if others listen to a victim’s speech, they may be able to 
experience the trauma. The listener must, specifically, attend to the gaps in the 
victim’s language, because it is here that the unconscious trauma (and thus traces of 
traumas throughout history) may be exposed. This, she believes, necessitates a 
certain way of listening to repetition. In Unclaimed Experience: Trauma Narrative and 
History (1996), Caruth uses Freud’s concept of trauma neuroses as a springboard 
for these ideas, focusing on his notion of “the delay or incompletion in knowing, or 
even in seeing, an overwhelming occurrence that then remains, in its insistent 
return, absolutely true to the event” (Caruth, Unclaimed, 5 emphasis in original). In 
turn, she engages with “a central problem of listening, of knowing, and of 
representing that emerges from the actual experience of the crisis” (Caruth 
Unclaimed 5), and examines how psychoanalytic, literary, and theoretical texts 
“speak about and speak through the profound story of traumatic experience” 
(Caruth Unclaimed 4). Caruth suggests that linguistic gaps can reveal what the 
author cannot represent, what is “not precisely grasped” (Trauma, 6 emphasis in 
original). In this way, the literary retelling of an event mirrors the traumatic impact 
itself. 
Drawing upon Caruth’s project, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub also 
examine how gaps in literary and fictional works reveal what cannot be known 
about history. They trace the relationship between “literature and testimony, 
between the writer and the witness” (Testimony xiii) to examine the way in which 
literature contains and bears witness to the unknown trauma. This is explored 
through a discussion of certain texts written after the Second World War, which is, 
they state, “a history which is essentially not over” (Testimony, xiv emphasis in 
original). Since the consequences of the Holocaust are still evolving in politics, 
history and culture, current disciplines¾such as literature and 
                                                
10 The “crisis of representation” refers to the crisis of representing historical events in the wake 
of the Second World War. Thinkers such as Theodor Adorno and George Steiner considered how 
to create art after Auschwitz, how to speak about the unspeakable, and how to represent the un-
representable. Thus, the Holocaust is integral to the field, and though it is not the focus of this 
thesis, it is featured in several of the texts that I study. The underlying connection here centres upon 
conflicting ideas of unity and fragmentation, and how this relates to violent physical rupture.  
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psychoanalysis¾involve traumatic aftereffects. In Felman and Laub’s endeavour to 
connect the impossibility of remembering Holocaust events to current disciplines, 
the texts discussed in Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and 
History (1991) are read in relation to empirical life. They look beyond the 
testimonies of those who experienced trauma in order to detect what has been left 
out, what unknown effects of trauma may make themselves heard within the text. 
By reading specific works through a psychoanalytic lens, Laub and Felman 
propose to “open new directions for research and new conceptual spaces for the yet 
unborn answers” (Testimony xvi). They additionally survey how traumatic stories 
affect those who listen to and read survivors’ testimonies. By listening to tales of 
trauma, they suggest, readers may feel traumatised. Although this allows the past to 
live on, it is also dangerous. “The practical hazards of listening” they write, “lead to 
a rethinking of the crucial role the (always threatened) preservation of the truth, of 
knowledge and reality” (Testimony xvii). Following Caruth, Felman and Laub argue 
that the postmodern crisis of representation is linked to the inability to witness a 
trauma. Since trauma cannot be represented, and since the text cannot represent it, 
the text itself becomes traumatic. While Felman and Laub’s views of trauma differ 
from Caruth’s, due to their interest in “the therapeutic sense of working-through 
trauma, as opposed to its endless repetitions” (Crownshaw 10), they also share 
similarities, such as their interest in the connection between trauma and 
psychoanalysis, and postmodern literature’s concern with the difficulty of linguistic 
representation. All three theorists additionally share the view that trauma can be 
registered through linguistic gaps. 
However, their theories have been critiqued because there is a certain 
generalisation in a poststructuralist approach to the notion of the ‘crisis’ of 
language, as it devalues individuals who have experienced real historical trauma. 
Although this poststructuralist concept of trauma¾that language is unable to 
capture reality and subjectivity¾is important to this thesis, postmodernism is not 
conflated with traumatic experiences. I do not suggest that BIID and PLS can be 
understood completely, or that psychoanalysis, fiction, and literature can allow a 
reader to feel or comprehend sufferers’ individual experiences. I discuss the 
syndrome in relation to these theories in order to open new ways of thinking about 
them, and about the struggle with fragmentation and unity. Various critics have 
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argued that if, as Caruth suggests, traumas can be felt through gaps in language, 
this means that firstly, the text is synonymous with the author, and secondly, the 
reader is experiencing the same trauma that was felt by the original victim, 
problematically undermining the victim’s trauma. In Trauma: A Genealogy (2000), 
Ruth Leys contends that Caruth’s account of trauma exemplifies a postmodern 
approach that precludes representation. In Caruth’s version, wherein the trauma is 
registered as a blank, the witness is “devoid of potential interpretive agency and has 
become the mere carrier of trauma” (Leys 6). Leys additionally critiques Caruth on 
the grounds that in Freud’s writings, “the origin or trauma does not present itself as 
a literal or material truth, as Caruth’s theory demands, but as a psychical or 
‘historical truth’ whose meaning has to be interpreted, reconstructed, and 
deciphered” (Leys 282). Traumas, for Freud, cannot be experienced through gaps, 
as they are always distorted and require interpretation. Leys concludes that Caruth 
“participates in a general postmodernist tendency to appropriate psychoanalysis for 
discussions of the trauma of the Holocaust and the post-Holocaust condition” (Leys 
270).  
In The Holocaust of Texts (2003), Amy Hungerford additionally criticises 
movements in trauma theory that collapse actual and fictional individuals, literature 
and personal traumatic experience. Both Felman and Caruth, Hungerford writes, 
imagine “texts as traumatic experience itself, thus transmissible from person to 
person through reading” (20). She argues that since Felman and Caruth fail to 
distinguish the structural “crisis” of postmodern thought and literature (destabilised 
language and identity) from the historical crisis of the Holocaust, “the experience of 
trauma […] defines not only the survivor, but all persons” (Hungerford 111). 
Here, the importance of embodiment is neglected, “when embodiment is exactly 
what situates us in history and makes us vulnerable to oppression” (Hungerford 
21). If literature about the Holocaust is shaped through a postmodern focus on the 
crisis of representation and its relationship to trauma, she argues, the particularity 
of people, events and experiences is overlooked. I attend to this problem of 
generalisation by focusing on specific bodily traumas. While I read these particular 
experiences of trauma though a theoretical discussion about fragmentation, I am 
careful not to generalise, as I do not suggest that the texts I discuss are traumatic 
themselves or can transmit traumatic experiences. I explore thoughts about 
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physical fracture and wholeness through postmodern theory to open a discussion 
about BIID and PLS. In this discussion, I am also interested in how mirror therapy 
illuminates what Dominick LaCapra calls a “working-through” trauma. 
Contrary to Felman and Laub, LaCapra asks if the collapse of persons and 
text can be avoided through a particular kind of writing and thinking about the 
Holocaust. He is concerned with discovering ways in which to write about the past 
productively, by paying attention to the interactions between writer and reader, 
theory and history, individual and collective. He states,  
 
[o]ne crucial undertaking for postmodern and poststructural approaches 
may […] be to address the issue of specificity as a complex mediation 
between the particular and the general. Such an undertaking may further an 
understanding of how to attempt to work through problems without either 
bypassing their traumatising potential or endlessly and compulsively 
repeating it (Representing 223).  
 
To approach this, LaCapra examines how the relationship between history and 
theory is integral to understanding and representing the Holocaust. If the trend in 
trauma studies is to submit to the impossibility of representing the Holocaust, he 
explains, it may lead to “spinning one’s wheels in the void¾a danger that should be 
resisted and not a possibility that should be invoked” (Representing 3). Though this 
cannot be avoided entirely, it can be resisted, he explains, by linking history and 
theory to social concerns, partially through a theoretical language that relates the 
text to the reader instead of distancing it from them. 
Psychoanalytic theory is particularly helpful here, because it is concerned 
with studying relationships between individual and society, the present, and the 
past. LaCapra explains, “I maintain that what Freud termed ‘working-through’ has 
received insufficient attention in post-Freudian analysis, and I stress the 
importance of working through problems in a critical manner” (Representing xii). 
Although in his analyses LaCapra is influenced by postmodern thought, he 
wonders if it can be used without trying to exceed linguistic binaries with a 
“generalised conceptual blur” (Representing 11). Psychoanalysis, for him, can enable 
a more productive forward movement. I do not follow LaCapra in specifically 
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analysing the relationship between the present and past or exploring history, and 
although the Holocaust underpins the analysis of George Perec’s W or The Memory 
of Childhood in Chapter Five of this thesis, I do not discuss it specifically or 
historically. Instead, I examine how the author’s and narrator’s psychosomatic 
experience of trauma can be “worked through” within the text, how writing can 
enable a kind of self-reconstruction and how this relates to PLS and BIID. In so 
doing, I aim to discover more about how poststructuralist theory can help us 
understand more about BIID and PLS. In this way, I move away from a 
“generalised conceptual blur” by attending to specific bodily syndromes, and 
individuals’ experiences with these syndromes. 
I additionally avoid this generalisation due to the nature of the two 
syndromes themselves, as PLS involves a traumatic physical loss which parallels 
the historical specific trauma of the Holocaust in a very different way. BIID, 
alternatively, involves a more ambiguous feeling of loss that parallels the structural 
loss discussed in postmodernist theory: the loss of stable and united identity. In 
exploring these two phenomena, I ask questions about how these psychosomatic 
conditions can be worked through, and how certain notions of working-through, 
accepting, or repairing can illuminate and can be illuminated by a discussion about 
literary and psychoanalytic working-through rupture. Although I turn to various 
theoretical works about traumatic experiences, I do not suggest that the 
experiences in discussion are synonymous with that of having a phantom limb or 
apotemnophilia. I use what has been written about experiences with fragmentation 
and trauma to more thoroughly explore those associated with BIID and PLS. In 
order to ground this discussion, I now turn to a brief survey of postmodernism, 
focusing on theories concerned with textual and bodily fragmentation. 
 
Postmodernism 
To return to the individual’s statement in Whole that for him, BIID involves an 
 
idea that actually by making something less, you make people more 
complete, which is the complete opposite to most amputees who perhaps 
have accidents or disease. By taking that limb away from them they feel less 
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complete. But for us, it’s the other way around. By taking it off you make us 
more complete. 
 
What this man seems to be saying is that those with BIID oppose the standard 
concept of normality: while others feel whole with four limbs and incomplete with 
three, those with BIID only feel complete with three limbs. They are, in this sense, 
aware of, interested in, and (to a degree) accepting of their own unconventionality, 
while still experiencing the pain involved. Postmodernism, and connected to this, 
poststructuralism (which is interested in the absence of meaning and uncertainty of 
questions, which I discuss in Chapter Three), parallels this interest in 
unconventionality. As Catherine Belsey puts it, poststructuralism “offers a 
controversial account of our place in the world, which competes with conventional 
explanations” (6). Some poststructuralist and postmodern literature is, moreover, 
concerned with how language and the body are interrelated. It is thus important to 
investigate postmodern theory concerning corporeal fracture, in relation to BIID 
and PLS. I begin with the thoughts of Fredric Jameson in order to map out the 
wider context of “fragmentation” in which I situate BIID and the phantom limb.  
Jameson is interested in fragmentation in late capitalism in terms of the 
relationship between the individual and the world of objects. He takes a critical 
stance on postmodernism’s concern with ambiguity and depthlessness, and argues 
that its break from modernism parallels “late” or “multinational” capitalism. For 
Jameson, an underlying problem with postmodernism is that it may “amount to not 
much more than theorising its own condition of possibility” (Jameson ix), and that 
although it is identified as being unsystematic, it is far from it. In this postmodern 
era, the celebration of commodity has become a commodity itself, there is a 
depthlessness that spills over into postmodern writing. He argues that a lack of 
meaning has been replaced with a kind of euphoria and overall identity defined by 
uncertainty and dissimilarity, a pastiche which “is a neutral practice of such 
[parody-like] mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated of the 
satiric impulse, devoid of laugher and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal 
tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still 
exists” (Jameson 17). Pastiche involves an empty mix of thoughts where writers 
are bereft of individual style, and in this way, for Jameson, individuality and 
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impulse have been flattened out and, as he terms it, amputated. The notion of 
amputating individual style is indicative of this era of late capitalism, and in this 
thesis I will relate the amputation involved in the apotemnophilia and PLS to this 
postmodern context. I will explore how these conditions raise questions regarding 
the ways in which an individual copes with creating a sense of self as ruptured and 
whole within a fractured environment. Although the fragmentation involved in 
poststructuralist theory opens a way of discussing BIID and PLS, I do not contend 
that these conditions are a result of a postmodern environment. Rather, I examine 
the way that postmodern theorists write about the fractured body, individual, and 
text, and how this can help us think about the experiences of those with BIID and 
PLS.  
Alphonso Lingis is interested in how the body and theory are interlinked, 
and he explores the ways in which contemporary thinkers discuss the body through 
physiology, social technology, psychoanalysis, and ethical theory. Within a 
phenomenological framework, he examines how bodily perception is linked to 
culture, identity, and philosophy. If one’s physical perception is inseparable from 
the larger context of cultural technology, how are the two interlinked, and how 
does technology affect one’s physical identity? Lingis proposes that if a tool is an 
extension of one’s body, “[i]s it not also an exteriorization of that organ¾a 
separating from our body of its own organ?” Has “technological equipping not 
been a divestment of the body of its own organs for cutting, chopping, and 
grinding, its motor forces, its powers of surveillance, and its programming faculty?” 
(ix). Lingis analyses these questions through the Freudian and Lacanian concepts 
of the phallic stage, which are thought to cause a person to identify with a loss in 
the other. Lingis explains that with “this identification, the infant enters language; 
his physical presence becomes, for himself and for others, a sign” (ix). While I am 
also interested in how others inform one’s physical presence, perception, 
conceptions of loss, and the way one is constructed through signs, I do not follow 
Lingis in specifically discussing bodily “fluidity” and its relation to politics and 
economic discourse. Although his thoughts about technological organs seem 
particularly pertinent to prostheses and amputation, I do not focus on this 
relationship. I am more interested in the mirror-box as an illusory extension of the 
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body, and the way in which illusion, the imagination, and language are involved in 
creating a sense of self-restoration. 
Ihab Hassan’s exploration of the postmodern condition focuses on the limits 
of language and literature, includes that which lies beyond postmodernism, and 
addresses the question, “what kind of self, in its society is adequate to our 
postmodern world, a world caught between fragments and wholes, terror and 
totalitarianism of every kind?” (Hassan, The Postmodern Turn xiv). Integral to 
postmodern thought, in Hassan’s account, is the fact that we cannot choose 
between binaries, but must instead “reopen […] terms to constant negotiations” 
(Hassan, The Postmodern Turn xvii), which we must approach by attending to 
linguistic silences. It is this preoccupation with silence that interests me, and is 
discussed at length in The Dismemberment of Orpheus (1971). Here, Hassan defines 
silence as the disruption of language, and examines the work of modernists who 
abandon “traditional elements of fiction such as character, plot, metaphor and 
meaning” (Woods 52). He uses the Greek myth of Orpheus as the starting point for 
his discussion, because Orpheus’s dismemberment echoes the postmodern rupture 
of linguistic meaning. When Orpheus’s broken body continues to sing, explains 
Hassan, it holds “a contradiction¾between the dumb unity of nature and the 
multiple voice of consciousness¾that the song itself longs to overcome” 
(Dismemberment 6). Orpheus allegorises the human conflict between the desire to 
destroy and the search for unity and meaning, because he is simultaneously torn 
and vocal, he expresses his fragmentation. And, as I discuss in Chapter Three 
through analysis of Blanchot’s essay “Orpheus’s Gaze” (1982), BIID and PLS both 
raise questions about the paradoxical search for unity through rupture. 
Hassan is additionally interested in the topic of schizophrenia, suggesting 
that, since schizophrenics speak symbolically rather than logically, Orpheus’s 
condition also reflects the schizophrenic. He theorises that linguistic discussion is to 
be uprooted by resisting discourse, and so we must consider the schizophrenic 
mind-set. He writes, “if the fall of human consciousness is into language, then 
redemption lies in puns and metaphor, holy derangement, the re-sexualisation of 
speech, babble or silence” (Dismemberment 16). For Hassan, literary fragmentation 
and non-coherence is integral to change. This idea of listening to a unique 
perspective from those who deal with psychosomatic fracture underlies this thesis. 
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Since those with BIID and PLS reveal a way of thinking that¾as previously 
noted¾can be related to diagnoses such as psychosis, they provide insight into the 
“non-rational.” These conditions resist language, and thus, theories concerned with 
the silences within language, on what the body expresses, can help us explore what 
is involved in each syndrome. In developing these ideas, I focus on the work of 
Maurice Blanchot, because, as Hassan writes, “Blanchot understands the authority 
of the negative; he dwells constantly on the limits, the impossibility of literature” 
(Dismemberment 19). 
Additionally, Hassan’s notion of silence “as a concept or metaphor, [that] 
fills our place” (Hassan, Orpheus 22) is reflective of the phantom limb sufferer who 
fills the place of physical lack with a silent concept of self (the phantom). However, 
the phantom limb is not precisely a concept or metaphor. Although, in this thesis, it 
is at times used as a metaphor for psychoanalysis, language, and the literary text, 
PLS is also a lived experience that involves an uncontrollable drive to fill a place 
with a silent presence that cannot be linguistically comprehended. Like Hassan, I 
am interested in how feelings of fragmentation can be expressed outside a 
dialectical and unified language and society, although I do so in connection to 
specific bodily conditions. I also turn to linguistic rupture as a way to think about 
what kind of a self exists in a “world caught between fragments and wholes” 
(Hassan, Orpheus xiv), and how a deficient sense of selfhood may be restored in 
BIID and PLS. I am not alone in drawing links between phantom limbs and 
postmodern thought, as the following analysis of literary limbs demonstrates. 
 
Literary Limbs 
In his article “Archive Trauma” (1998), Herman Rapaport argues that Derrida’s 
“The Post Card may well be Archive Fever’s phantom limb, something essential that 
has been cut off and that haunts the text” (69). Rapaport proposes that if we read 
Derrida’s writings on archives while keeping the “phantom limb in mind, archives 
occur at that moment when there is a structural breakdown in memory” (Rapaport 
69). Put another way, archives, like the phantom limb, are products of trauma. 
Rappaport suggests that archives, for Derrida, are in turn fragmented, bordering 
on a madness that, like the phantom limb, cannot be explained: “[i]t is an insanity 
that defies anything like an essentialist (but also constructivist) explanation” 
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(Rapaport 80). Rapaport also argues that Derrida’s concept that a cinder cannot be 
mourned is “alien to everything we know as the human and for which no therapy, 
psychoanalytical or otherwise, could ever be adequate. Archive Fever speaks to this 
inadequacy by way of its phantom textual limbs” (Rapaport 71). While intriguing, 
Rapaport’s reading is somewhat problematic because there is a certain conflation 
between phantom limbs, archives and texts. By suggesting that “The Post Card may 
well be Archive Fever’s phantom limb,” and that Archive Fever has “phantom textual 
limbs,” Rapaport suggests that texts are not analogous to, but synonymous with 
phantom limbs. Although a text may act as a metaphor for a phantom limb, the 
syndrome is a specific bodily problem. While I make links between texts and limbs, 
I do not suggest that the work itself is a phantom limb, or the limb a text. I aim to 
explore the way in which the absences and histories behind certain literary works 
relate to the semi-presence and absence that is the phantom limb. In this way, the 
phantom limb is not only a metaphor for certain texts, but also an experience that 
relates to a certain kind of interaction with language. 
 James Krasner allegorises PLS through literary examples in his article 
“Doubtful Arms and Phantom Limbs: Literary Portrayals of Embodied Grief” 
(2004). Krasner examines the way grief is represented through a “framework of 
tangibility” (Krasner 220) in relation to embodied grief. He asks how literature can 
bring about “discomfort by allowing us to participate in the illusions of physical 
presence to which the grieving are prone, placing us in the midst of an irritatingly 
and cripplingly present grief” (Krasner, “Doubtful”). Here, literature produces 
something similar to what is conveyed through the phantom limb syndrome: a 
feeling of bodily discomfort that stems from grieving a loss. Krasner investigates 
how grief can develop into a variety of bodily actions, by tracing various theories of 
embodiment including those found in the works of Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, and 
Freud. Krasner develops the concept of embodied grief through analysis of Virginia 
Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927), in which the widower Mr. Ramsay reaches out for 
a brief moment, expecting to find his wife’s body. Like the phantom limb sufferer, 
the protagonist does not feel the body, but “the ‘place’ where that body belongs” 
(Krasner, “Doubtful” 226). Here, “[l]iterary portrayals of grief that emphasise 
embodiment present the bereaved with compromised bodies, [… failing] to adjust 
to the physical postures and environments their losses have left to them” (Krasner, 
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“Doubtful” 226). Krasner’s article is helpful in foregrounding a more general view 
of how an environmentally imposed loss can affect physical existence. However, 
while Krasner focuses on the loss of loved ones, I do not explicitly discuss grief 
(although I do discuss parental absence). I am additionally concerned with the 
splits between fragmentation and wholeness, and the mind and body, which 
Elizabeth Grosz discusses in Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (1994). 
 Grosz weaves the phantom limb example into a discussion of how the body 
incorporates its material surroundings. The phenomenon, she writes, “attests to the 
more or less tenacious cohesion of the imaginary anatomy or body schema” (41), 
which is also apparent in hysteria, hypochondria and sexuality. Grosz emphasises 
the fact that the “biological body, if it exists at all, exists for the subject only 
through the mediation of an image or series of (social/cultural) images of the body 
and its capacity for movement and action” (Grosz 41). The phantom limb, in her 
account, raises questions about the continual transformation of the body image. She 
also points out the disconnect between body image and the lived body, in 
experiences such as sicknesses, in adolescence, within gender roles, and in relation 
to neurosis, psychosis, and hypochondria. Grosz discusses the phantom limb and 
castration, additionally asking whether “women have a phantom phallus?” and 
whether “women experience the castration complex as a bodily amputation as well 
as a psychosocial constraint? If so, is there, somewhere in woman’s psyche, a 
representation of the phallus she has lost?” (73). These ways of thinking about the 
phantom and how body images might be shaped through the environment leads her 
to conclude that any “zone of the body can, under certain circumstances, take on 
the meaning of any other zone. This occurs more or less continually in normal 
mental life but is particularly striking in neurotic and psychotic disorders” (Grosz 
78). Like Grosz, I question how the phantom limb disorder exemplifies a continual 
transformation in body identity and how the body exists through the medium of 
images. However, I expand upon her thoughts by considering what mirror therapy 
illuminates about the “tenacious cohesion of the imaginary anatomy,” and discuss 
these thoughts in relation to BIID. Since according to Grosz the phantom limb 
demonstrates that the biological body exists for the subject only through the 
mediation of an image, I ask, what does this mean for those with BIID who are 
often tortured by the fact that their biological body does not match their image of 
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self? I am interested in what mirror therapy conveys about how we cope with this 
rupture in “imaginary anatomy,” in how images and language affect one’s physical 
and somatic sense of bodily cohesion. 
David H. Evans also examines the connection between language and BIID 
in “CUT! … Flannery O’Connor’s Apotemnophiliac Allegories” (2009). Evans’s 
article considers how BIID may facilitate an interpretation of imperfect bodies in 
Flannery O’Connor’s writing, and hinges upon the question as to how BIID 
elucidates O’Connor’s portrayal of imperfect bodies. He uses the phenomenon to 
examine the content and form of O’Connor’s fiction, stating that “[t]he link 
between O’Connor’s narratives and apotemnophiles’ bodies is that they can both be 
considered texts that demand interpretation and in so doing put in question our 
reflexive valorisation of wholeness, our default preference for faultlessness” (Evans, 
“CUT!” 309). The relationship between BIID and O’Connor’s texts, Evans 
suggests, is an aim towards incompleteness, which is explored through O’Connor’s 
story, “The Life You Save May Be Your Own” (1955), as it poses questions about 
embodiment and wholeness in relation to language. One character in the book, who 
has a missing arm, is distanced from his own language. For Evans, what the 
character’s broken body suggests is that language cannot accurately convey the 
speaker or writer’s intentions, and is thus lacking, and that “it is what is missing 
that defines what it means to be human, which is the story’s ultimate theme” 
(Evans, “CUT!” 315). The theme is further developed through the argument that 
in O’Connor’s story “Good Country People” (1955) there is “no direct articulation 
between things and signs, or thoughts and bodies” (Evans, “CUT!” 318). Here 
Evans compares the apotemnophile to the legless Hulga, on the grounds that 
Hulga’s impairment becomes part of her identity and body image and is desired as 
a reinforcement of this identity. Hulga’s impairment is thought to parallel the 
story’s incomplete structure, as O’Connor omits one part. By examining 
O’Connor’s stories in this way, Evans establishes that “it is our condition of 
embodiment that constitutes our incompleteness […]. It is because we are always, 
in a sense, amputated from the beginning, ‘almost cut in two,’ that we can never 
have the whole thing” (“CUT!” 326). Lastly, a parallel is drawn between 
incompleteness in BIID and the gap between a sign and its meaning, which is a 
concept central to modern, postmodern and poststructuralist thought. This notion 
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of an irresolvable gap between sign and meaning and its relationship to 
apotemnophilia also underpins my discussions of literary theory, literary works and 
psychoanalysis. However, while Evans explores the theme through the specific 
example of amputated individuals in O’Connor’s work, I take a psychoanalytic 
perspective, and offer a more detailed investigation of how bodily composition is 
related to the way in which certain literary and fictional works are composed and 
embodied. 
In Prosthesis (1995), David Wills works from memories of his father’s 
phantom limb pain. The question he asks in relation to this is how nature relies on 
artifice, which he approaches by overlapping his own memories with a variety of 
fiction, art, psychoanalysis, film, and literary theory. He aims to show that 
“prosthesis is concerned as much with the practice of writing as with the writing of 
theory. The enfolding of one within the other, their cutting and pasting, simply 
reinforces the fact that the two are resolutely coextensive” (Wills 28). Writing, for 
Wills, is prosthetic because it is artificial and fragmented. A prosthetic leg, he 
explains, is made of some alloy, and yet it is still called a wooden leg, which 
demonstrates that “[t]he wooden leg is not really wooden. Language has already 
taken leave of reality, the literal taken leave of itself. By the same logic, that of the 
stand-in or supplement, which is that of language itself, a language that has always 
already taken leave of itself, by that same logic it is probably not a leg either” (26). 
Wills suggests that language replaces the thing, referencing the postmodern crisis 
of representation. The wooden leg is not a leg to begin with. And even if the 
prosthesis were a leg, he explains, saying this would not make it so. For Wills, 
therefore, just as the prosthesis supplants the leg, language is always at a remove 
from what it represents.  
Although I refer to the notion of an irresolvable gap between signified and 
signifier, I do not suggest that writing and a limb (phantom or prosthetic) are 
coextensive, because an amputation is a corporeal condition. I am interested in the 
way that the phantom can be undone by a kind of illusory prosthesis¾the mirror 
image¾ and it is this image that, for me, serves as a metaphor for language. 
However, I do not contend, as Willis states above, that language has taken leave of 
reality, but rather, that language is undifferentiated from “reality,” that the mirror 
limb is a symbol reflective of language that can alter pain. For me, then, the 
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linguistic and somatic are interrelated, as Segal writes, texts “invoke the movement 
of eye or hand towards something one ought to be able to caress” (Consensuality 
120). Texts and language, in this way, can have physical effects. I argue that 
analysing certain kinds of texts that are concerned with somatic and linguistic 
fragmentation can thereby illuminate the way in which the body is conceived of in 
BIID and PLS. To approach this, I will combine four types of material: individuals’ 
descriptions of BIID and PLS, psychoanalysis, literary theory, and fictional 
works.11  
                                                
11 Although I do not discuss these analyses in this thesis due to the pertinence of the arguments, 
some other fascinating insights have been made about the phantom limb syndrome. In On Balance 
(2011), Adam Phillips suggests that “[j]ust as there are phantom limbs there are phantom histories, 
histories that are severed and discarded, but linger on as thwarted possibilities and compelling 
nostalgias” (105). Here, the phantom limb acts as an allegory for ideas and words that create 
possibilities through their absence. Unique to the previous analyses of the syndrome, Naomi Segal’s 
Consensuality: Didier Anzieu, Gender and the Sense of Touch (2009) relates the phantom limb to an angel 
or imaginary friend: those lost objects that, like the phantom limb, are not exactly lost. However, 
she writes, “[u]nlike an imaginary friend, the phantom limb is a externally projected part-object 
and, as with the lost love object, it is hard to know what exactly is meant by saying ‘it’ hurts” (Segal, 
Consensuality 224). The phantom limb is subjective, and in this way, that which is responsible for the 
pain is placed elsewhere, on some “it.” What happens, she wonders, after a betrayal occurs in a 
relationship when two people become lost to one another, when someone is unrecognisable? In this 
situation, she proposes, we are the one causing the betrayal and carrying the pain: “we become their 
phantom limb” (Consensuality 227). Shawn Huffman’s “Amputation, Phantom Limbs, and Spectral 
Agency in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus and Normand Chaurette’s Les Reines” (2004) uses the 
phantom limb example to explore how sense is a performance and how action is a projection, which 
he calls, “spectral agency.” To do so, he analyses amputated characters in Shakespeare’s Titus 
Andronicus and Normand Chaurette’s Les Reines, asserting that “[t]he phantom-limb phenomenon 
manifests itself through texts. Literature haunts the body, providing it the modified means through 
which it may interact with the world” (77). In this instance, a lost body part equates to a lack of 
communication, which is performed through the text. Both examples thus reveal “the impact of 
literary discourse in shaping subjectivity, body image and perception” (Huffman 78).  
“Phantom limbs: Film Noir and the Disabled Body” (2003) analyses a variety of noir films 
in which an individual with disabilities plays a supporting role, which “serves as a marker for larger 
narratives about normalcy and legitimacy” (Davidson 57). Here, Michael Davidson uses the 
phantom limb to signify a “residual sensation of narratives that film cannot represent or 
reconstitute” (58); the phantom limb again stands for a work’s (though this time filmic) 
incompleteness. While studies of the phantom limb generally refer to a desire for a whole body 
based on a Freudian lack, states Davidson, he sees the phantom limb as body “still under 
construction” (71), and when read in light of these noir films, it stands for, more simply, otherness. 
Lennard Davis’s “Nude Venuses, Medusa’s Body, and Phantom Limbs: Disability and Visuality” 
(1997) concerns the way in which representations of the body usually portray a dialectic between 
the normal and the disabled, and how disabilities involve a space that the body cannot occupy. Two 
examples of bodies in culture are used to fortify his thesis: the Venus de Milo statue, and Pam 
Herbert (a woman with muscular dystrophy who is widely pitied). She writes, in relation to the 
Venus de Milo that in “the case of the art historian, the statue is seen as complete with phantom 
limbs and head. The art historian does not see the lack, the presence of an impairment, but rather 
mentally re-forms the outline of Venus, so that the historian can return the damaged woman in stone 
to a pristine state of wholeness” (Davis 57). 
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To begin, the first chapter takes two individuals, one with BIID and one 
with a phantom limb (who uses mirror therapy), investigates their experiences of 
psychosomatic discord, and surveys how these kinds of experiences will be 
discussed throughout the thesis. The mirror treatment prompts questions about 
how we are formed through images and symbols, which I address in Chapter Two, 
by unpacking the relationship between psychoanalysis and literature. This opens a 
dialogue about the reparative possibilities of language, which is elaborated through 
a discussion of two psychoanalysts: André Green and Marilia Aisenstein. Their 
interest in tracing split-off parts of the self (as seen in BIID and PLS) through gaps 
in speech is developed in Chapter Three, through the works of Jacques Lacan, 
Maurice Blanchot, Sigmund Freud, and the example of Powell and Pressburger’s 
The Red Shoes (1948). In this discussion, questions are raised about the physical 
impact of images and symbols in relation to fiction, literature, and the mirror-box. 
Chapter Four explores how they (images and symbols) can be helpful in 
integrating a traumatic split, through D.W. Winnicott’s theories on “breakdown” 
and the “transitional object,” which are developed through Quentin Tarantino’s 
film Death Proof (2007). What we find is that they¾as the mirror-box 
demonstrates¾ might suspend a lack, a process linked to the exchanges that can 
take place linguistically, in fictional works, and in psychoanalysis. Finally, in 
Chapter Five, I use the example of Georges Perec’s semi-autobiography W or The 
Memory of Childhood (1975) to demonstrate how the problem of striving for a false 
whole can be appeased through these types of exchanges, and how they can 
facilitate a symbolic self-reconstitution. Thus, my aim is to illuminate new 
perspectives on the kinds of experiences expressed by those who have PLS and 
BIID. As I have shown, since the disorders have predominantly been studied 
through a biomedical paradigm that fails to secure answers or cures, this thesis 
argues for a necessary analytical standpoint that reads PLS and BIID through the 
discourse of psychoanalysis, literary theory, and certain fictional texts that 
foreground bodily rupture. I do this to show how a drive towards wholeness may 
be worked through by attending to a psychosomatic and a fetishistic disavowal.  
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Chapter One: We didn’t ask for this pain 
  
“Sometimes [I] feel as if the fingers on my amputated hand are moving 
uncontrollably, which is both extremely painful and embarrassing,” writes one 
individual with a phantom limb (Nortvedt 602). And in his self-published book 
Amputation on Request (2011), BIID sufferer Alex Mensaert explains that the “need 
for amputation is an obsession that keeps a wannabe the whole day busy [sic] till he 
gets his wanted limb(s) amputated” (44). 12 Mensaert later states that the vast 
majority of the individuals he spoke to that are determined to self-amputate are 
aware that eighty percent of (BIID) amputees suffer from “severe phantom pains,” 
and that “their answer to the question what could be the reason they were not 
perfectly happy immediately [after amputation] is clearly; [sic] ‘because we didn’t 
ask for this pain’” (54) (referring both to the torment of BIID and the post-
amputation phantom). Already there is a certain paradox here: the BIID sufferer 
desires to be in the physical shape of those with phantom limbs, and those with 
phantom limbs desire to be in the physical shape of those with apotemnophilia. 
Although they oppose each other in this way and involve seemingly different types 
of pain (the physically generated phantom versus the psychically orientated BIID 
limb), they undergo a very similar struggle, and, in a sense, mirror one another. 
Individuals with both syndromes want to amputate what feels like an extra limb. In 
what follows I will be unpacking the similarities and differences between these 
phenomena through the stories of two individuals’ struggles. First I examine the 
story of Peter, a man with BIID, and second that of Stephen, whose phantom limb 
was healed through the use of mirror therapy. Both individuals convey a feeling of 
helplessness, a difficulty with psychical and physical fragmentation and wholeness, 
and a dissonance between subjective and objective senses of self: with how they feel 
and how they are perceived.13 In turn, both desire to feel psychosomatically 
                                                
12 As discussed in the Introduction, the term “wannabe” refers to those with BIID who self-injure, 
self-amputate, or pursue black-market surgery. 
13 Since this thesis is concerned with the body, and the body is fluid, or according to Anzieu, “[t]he 
skin is permeable and impermeable” (qtd. in Segal, Consensuality 45), the divide between internal 
and external is blurred. As Drew Leder explains, “the inner body is characterized primarily by its 
recession from awareness and control. The body surface, conversely, is lived out primarily through 
ecstasis. Yet this contrast does not constitute a new dualism. It only serves to highlight the limit 
points of a comple-mental series that embraces interfusion, exchanges, and intermediate modes” 
(The Absent 56). Although I differentiate internal and external at times, this is not to suggest that 
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integrated, accepted, and complete. However, their experiences with these feelings 
differ on several accounts. 
 An additional connection between Stephen and Peter is that they struggle to 
comprehend their sensations. For both, language is an insufficient tool with which 
to completely understand and allow others to understand their feelings. This is 
particularly harmful for Peter, as he is thought to be mentally ill by those close to 
him, and is insufficiently supported. Interestingly, it is in fact support from friends 
and family that both Stephen and Peter find integral to their improvement. Peter 
was able to begin accepting and sharing his struggle through the help of internet 
research and by communicating with others who have BIID, though these 
communications were often fragmented and ambiguous. I suggest that this 
ambiguity facilitates the expression of non-logical sensations. A similar point will be 
made about the importance of the fictional aspects of Peter’s story, the telling of 
which was beneficial to his recovery. In relation to this concept of fiction, the 
mirror therapy Stephen uses to self-heal parallels a certain notion of language, 
because it involves a fictional recreation, an image of Stephen’s physical unity that 
is at once fragmented and whole. In drawing these links, I will establish how both 
Peter and Stephen use language and communicate to recreate their bodily and 
psychical selves, and how this is manifested in the mirror-box, which Stephen uses 
to integrate his mind and body. In this chapter, I will introduce the ways in which I 
will be using the selected texts within this thesis to understand more about how 
Peter and Stephen’s cases can be explored from outside a biomedical approach. In 
what follows, both case studies will be evaluated and related to each chapter in the 
thesis in order to map out the ways in which I will be analysing the experiences of 
those with BIID and phantom limbs from a non-biomedical framework.  
 
Peter 
In Amputation on Request, Mensaert discusses his own experiences with BIID, while 
also sharing several interviews and letters from other apotemnophiles. Amongst 
these letters is one from Peter, who is a man of unknown origin, and who tells of 
his struggle with the syndrome. His letter is written in broken English and 
                                                                                                                                      
there is a binary, keeping Leder’s explanation in mind. I use these terms at times for clarity, and in 
response to other theorists’ (such as Winnicott and Melanie Klein’s) use of the words. 
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chronicles how his long-standing desire to amputate his left leg above the knee has 
affected his life, relationships, and body.14 In this first chapter, Peter’s story will be 
used to develop an understanding of BIID that is separate from the biomedical 
approach. My intention here is to introduce the way in which Peter (who serves as 
an example for others with BIID) has experiences that are related to the cultural 
texts that will be discussed throughout this thesis. Before I develop these links I 
will introduce Peter’s story, and establish how it relates to each of the following 
chapters of this thesis.  
Peter’s struggle with BIID began when, at the age of seven, he saw an amputee 
and thereafter grew obsessed with the desire to lose a leg. He never understood the 
origin of this obsession, and did not share his struggles with family or friends. He 
did, however, continually cut off his arteries with ligatures, which he describes as 
being both painful and pleasurable: though it caused him pain, he also enjoyed the 
feeling of paralysis. The act, however, was ultimately unsatisfactory, and Peter later 
went on to freeze his calf in order to have it amputated. However, when the 
attempt failed, Peter was left feeling helpless and alone. Subsequently, he began to 
research his condition online, and upon discovering that others shared his feelings, 
he was able to reveal the secret to family and friends. Although they did not 
completely understand, they (primarily) learned to accept his struggle and need to 
amputate. The numerous amputations that followed began when he froze and 
severed his own toe, and proceeded to cut off every toe on one of his feet. Although 
the psychological symptoms of his BIID were partially alleviated, Peter faced 
several dangers, some of which resulted in hospitalisation. As he continued to 
remove parts of his body, Peter also removed himself from relationships with the 
people closest to him, and found others who he felt understood him. Though his 
wellbeing increasingly improved (partially) as a result of these new relationships, 
he remained discontented with his physical form. He thus injected his body with 
bacteria, and was thereafter sent to a mental institution. Peter explains that here he 
was treated by doctors who¾rather than listening to him¾defined his problem as 
a suicide attempt and a form of self-mutilation, a diagnosis that angered him and 
                                                
14 All of the quotations from Peter’s story are taken directly from the text, which includes several 
misspellings and misused words. Although this could be considered problematic in the following 
analysis, I am predominantly interested in what we can discover from the way in which he expresses 
himself more generally, rather than deciphering the exact meanings of the words he uses. 
 61 
left him feeling increasingly alienated. He subsequently escaped from the 
institution, was threatened by the police to return, and was eventually granted the 
right to leave, after which he contacted a doctor on the internet who gave him 
anaesthesia to facilitate the desired amputation. Under the anaesthesia, Peter 
severed yet another toe, removed his foot with a hammer, and told others that he 
had been involved in an accident, which, he claims, they believed. In spite of these 
bodily modifications, Peter remained unfulfilled, and eventually fooled a surgeon 
into amputating his entire leg by telling him that he had terrible stump pains. 
Finally, Peter explains, he was able to start a “new life,” but remained angry at the 
inability of those in the medical world to understand his struggle. 
What this story suggests is that there is a strong link between Peter’s desire to 
remove parts of his body and to remove people in his life, that written texts play an 
important role in his ability to share and alter his feelings, and that a nuanced 
understanding of BIID must be developed because this has not thus far been the 
case in existing medical interpretations of the condition. I want to begin by drawing 
out some theoretical threads between Peter’s case study and each chapter in my 
thesis in order to introduce the ways in which I will be using psychoanalysis and 
literature to open new ways of thinking about BIID. In Chapter Two I discuss the 
potential problems with using a solely biomedical approach to understand BIID, 
and the ways in which certain types of psychoanalysis and literary theory are 
concerned with reading the body. I focus particularly on bodily and linguistic 
absences, and the ways in which these relate to the bodily lack involved in BIID. 
Since I begin Chapter Two by examining the weaknesses of the biomedical field in 
understanding and treating BIID, the current chapter will begin by tracing the 
ways in which Peter was disappointed by his experience with medical doctors.  
When Peter finally decided to reveal the condition to his doctor (who is also 
a good friend), his doctor would not “talk to [him] about it, and that was just what 
[he] wanted, someone who wanted to listen to [him]” (65). Although the doctor 
primarily accepted that he had the condition, Peter explains that he ultimately felt 
betrayed by him, a person “who I trusted and knew for fourteen years, a man who 
promised me to never change my wannabe feelings” (69). Although the doctor 
attempted to help Peter by providing him with painkillers and sending him to a 
mental institution, he was unable to sufficiently understand or treat the problem. 
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Peter was additionally upset with the way the doctors and psychiatrists in the 
institution treated him. He explains, “I was some kind of state property without any 
rights. […] On the forms made by the psychiatrists stood all lies, according to them 
I was someone who thought about nothing else but suicide and self-mutilation” (68 
emphasis in original). These doctors, therefore, though presumably with good 
intentions, further stigmatised and defined Peter, causing him to feel increasingly 
misunderstood. Peter’s having been labelled as suicidal exemplifies the way in 
which professionals in the medical field often respond to cases like Peter’s. They 
attempt to categorise those with BIID in order to facilitate treatment, which is 
necessary in some ways, as some BIID sufferers are suicidal. However, it can also 
lead to a limited and problematical treatment. In Peter’s case, this categorisation 
further alienated him, as he writes, “[i]t was terrible hearing this, knowing I didn’t 
want to die, I only wanted a leg off” (Mensaert 68). Eventually he was released 
from the institution on the condition that he saw a psychiatrist. The “crazy 
psychiatrist,” writes Peter, “told me he thought that internet-thing was some kind of 
sect, and internet was the cause of me–continuing my plans to get rid of my leg. I 
always kept saying that I didn’t want to loose my leg anymore; just to get rid of 
him” (69 emphasis in original). Here, Peter conveys that he not only felt 
misunderstood by the psychiatrist, but also encouraged to neglect the very thing 
that allowed him to feel most successfully understood: the internet. However, the 
internet sources were often dangerous to Peter, as some suggestions about how to 
self-amputate were hazardous to his health. This raises the question of whether 
there is an alternative way of understanding his dilemma, and I suggest that 
consideration of the connections between the body, language, and fragmentation 
can contribute new insight. Since Peter’s story demonstrates that textual mediums 
play an important role in his struggle with BIID, I now want to investigate the 
ways in which Peter engages with and is affected by various types of text. 
Throughout the story, Peter’s actions are influenced by various texts 
(including conversations, posts, and threads on internet groups) that advance his 
understanding of BIID, and provide a platform from which to discuss the condition 
with those close to him. These texts, moreover, help Peter feel as though he is not 
alone, and it is this feeling that allows him to open up to others. After learning that 
others suffered from BIID, Peter was able to use medical texts to explain his 
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condition to his friends and family. In this way, texts affected Peter’s life by 
enabling him to begin to accept and communicate his experiences with the 
syndrome. His actions were additionally shaped through a textual medium when he 
read about how to tie his limbs with an elastic ligature, and when a German 
wannabe and “internet doctor” taught him how to paralyse his toe and leg. Thus, 
although these texts did not engender physically healthy outcomes or enable self-
understanding (though they eased his feelings of alienation), it is clear that in 
Peter’s life, texts informed actions. They played a large role in facilitating his 
communication with others, and with the process of self-amputation. I explore this 
further in Chapter Two, in my discussion of the role played by texts and language 
in communication between the self and other, and the bodily effects caused by this. 
I will be discussing one specific example that depicts this concept through a 
case study wherein a psychoanalyst, Marilia Aisenstein, works with a patient that 
has a psychosomatic condition. Paralleling Peter’s experience in some ways, the 
patient (Mr. L) does not explore the meaning behind his own physical disorder, 
and Aisenstein is concerned with this lack. However, she does so with the intention 
of processing it psychically so that it ceases to be caught in the realm of the somatic, 
and in this way, she differs from Peter’s internet interlocutors. In her article “The 
Man from Burma” (1993), Aisenstein suggests that the patient had physically 
registered a trauma that had been erased from the psyche, and by attending to the 
absences in his language she was able to repair his physical illness. In relation to 
the ideas brought forth in Aisenstein’s case study, in this current chapter I am 
interested in that which might be hidden within Peter’s story. However, in my 
reading I am not creating a psychoanalytic interpretation. Rather, I am simply 
introducing the concept of how hidden aspects within one’s language might be 
illuminated. I pay particular attention here to how the psyche, language and the 
body are interconnected. 
Firstly, when reading Peter’s story from this standpoint, we find that his 
language is often conflated with his physical condition, rather than solely being 
used to describe it. For instance, in regard to revealing his condition to his wife, 
Peter states, “I told her I was a lie” (65). Rather than declaring that he had been 
lying, Peter maintains that he is a lie, demonstrating that he could be perceived as 
physically defined through language: he embodies a (verbal) lie. The collapse of 
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boundaries between language and the body can also be detected when Peter tells 
his doctor of the condition: “I told him what feelings I was walking around already 
for years” (Mensaert 65). Here again, Peter’s language suggests that he is literally 
walking with his feelings; his body symbolises his feelings in a literal sense. In 
Aisenstein’s case study, Mr. L’s body acts as a carrier for psychically orientated 
feelings he cannot access, and it is by unearthing these feelings through a linguistic 
reading, by attending to what is not directly stated in the patient and analyst’s 
discussion, that his bodily pain decreases. Here, hidden elements of Mr. L’s 
thoughts surface, and it is in Chapter Three that I focus on these thoughts as an 
other, obscure, self, a silent double. This concept is introduced currently as I 
investigate the ways in which Peter desires to perceive his own lack, and how this 
parallels literary theory and psychoanalytic practice concerned with perceiving a 
lack. I am particularly interested in the ways in which the body and language affect 
one another, and in how the desire to possess an absence, as seen in BIID, can be 
mediated by language. This, I suggest, is related to a discord between subjective 
and objective notions of self, and wholeness and fragmentation. Though I develop 
these concepts in Chapter Three, I shall introduce them now through the works of 
Sigmund Freud and Maurice Blanchot. 
The most fundamental notion for Blanchot is that language is structured 
around an absence; that a void underlies the linguistic system. According to 
Blanchot, this system is an illusory and incomplete yet necessary one that is used 
for communication. What interests Blanchot is this notion of incompleteness, and 
the way in which writing involves an experience of erasure (as Leslie Hill writes, 
Blanchot’s aim was to “bear witness to thinking of effacement” [Maurice, 116]). 
This mirrors BIID, I will suggest, in that those with the syndrome are interested in 
experiencing and expressing feelings of absence; and how language is inadequate in 
conveying this. In relation to this, for Blanchot, engaging with a text is a bodily 
experience, one, as we will soon explore, involving negation. Blanchot’s thoughts 
thus elucidate the ways in which Peter’s testimony demonstrates an overlap 
between language and the body. More specifically, this link illustrates the ways in 
which a deficiency in expression might be connected to a bodily deficiency. As 
noted, Peter faces difficulties in articulating his hidden feelings of fragmentation 
with others. When he first tells his wife of the syndrome, for example, it is in an 
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ambiguous manner. He writes: “[i]ndirectly I tried to talk about it with my wife 
[…]. I printed out the medical texts I found, and gave them to her as a sign […]. 
We didn’t talk much about it” (65). Perhaps this ambiguity can be attributed to a 
difficulty in completely expressing feelings. He conveys that he must communicate 
through texts and signs, through a fragmented dialogue that suggests a linguistic 
deficiency. Blanchot is interested in what underlies fragmented exchanges, and in 
illuminating that which language cannot reveal, what a word cannot express.  
Blanchot’s “Literature and the Right to Death” (1995) discusses what is 
referred to as the two slopes of literature (which will be elaborated in Chapter Three). 
Briefly, these slopes “constitute the poles of [literary] ambiguity” (Critchley, 49 
emphasis in original), as theorist Simon Critchley writes, “[l]iterature always has 
the right to mean something other than what one thought it meant” (Critchley 49). 
I will concentrate on the first slope of literature in order to illustrate the way in 
which it parallels Peter’s plight. The first slope of literature involves a notion of 
abstraction in the service of meaning. It is, according to Blanchot, “meaningful 
prose. Its goal is to express things in a language that designates things according to 
what they mean” (“Literature” 332). However, language cannot completely express 
thought or sensation, as Peter cannot completely express his feelings. Furthermore, 
Blanchot contends that language “murders” the “thing”: in naming something, that 
thing is negated. Thus, language involves an experience of death and erasure. 
Blanchot explains: “[f]or me to be able to say, ‘This [sic.] woman,’ I must somehow 
take her flesh-and-blood reality away from her, cause her to be absent, annihilate 
her. The word gives me being, but it gives it to me deprived of being. The word is 
the absence of that being, its nothingness” (“Literature” 322). When the woman is 
named she is erased, because language is at a remove from the physical, the “flesh-
and-blood.” Put another way, when “things” are translated to conscious thought 
they are negated. Literature, writes Blanchot, “is my consciousness without me” 
(“Literature,” 328 emphasis in original). Peter’s disorder can be seen, therefore, as 
a failure to function on the “first slope,” to understand language as that which puts 
us at a distance from ourselves. From another perspective, perhaps his 
amputational drive is a kind of failure in the connection between what Freud refers 
to as thing-presentation and word-presentation.  
Similar to Blanchot’s first slope of literature, the thing-presentation is 
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comprised of visual (ambiguous) images in the preconscious, while the word-
presentation brings images to conscious thought. Freud writes that “[v]erbal 
residues […have], as it were, a special sensory source. The visual components of 
word-presentations are secondary” (The Ego 633). The preconscious, wherein the 
thing-presentation resides, is closer to the sensory, however as the image becomes 
conscious through a word-presentation, it is distanced from the sensory. Thus, 
perhaps we can see Peter as being trapped in the “thing-ness” of his limbs (the 
preconscious “thing-presentation”), as he is unable to render them linguistic 
entities. His feeling of absence must be represented through the body rather than 
through language. While Peter’s expression must occur somatically, in Freudian 
psychoanalysis the sensory drives can ostensibly be distanced from the body 
through language. In Blanchot’s thought, this removal from the sensory 
additionally occurs through language, though not in a curative sense. As he writes, 
“I say my name, and […] I separate myself from myself” (“Literature” 324). From 
this point of view, Peter is unable to adequately grasp or comprehend what is 
involved in his desires, and is driven to physically experience them. His subjective 
feelings of deficiency cannot be vocalised or comprehended linguistically; he is 
trapped in the “thing-ness,” in that failure to function in the first slope of literature 
and use language to mediate bodily absence. 
After having amputated a toe for the first time, Peter explains: “[I] wanted 
to feel the good amputation feeling. I wanted to feel my stump. I decided to 
amputate another toe, this time without informing my wife. I thought that when 
this time I would cut off my big toe that I would be able to enjoy the feeling of 
amputation” (66-7). Firstly, Peter desires to physically feel an absence, one that 
seems nearly impossible to obtain. Thus, just as language as Blanchot conceives of 
it cannot completely convey sensations because it is lacking, Peter cannot 
completely obtain his felt absence by enacting it. Moreover, since he did not tell his 
wife, the above quotation suggests (from this perspective) that a lack of 
communication is connected to the amputation. This again illustrates, in relation to 
Blanchot’s theory, a clear connection between a lack of expression and a physical 
absence, specifically, a partial bodily death. Blanchot believes that death involves a 
possibility and impossibility (which is elaborated in Chapter Three), wherein 
individuals understand death because they experience the loss of another, and are 
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additionally unable to understand it, because it cannot be consciously apprehended. 
This can be related to Peter’s desire for a partial “death.” Blanchot is also interested 
in how the human relationship with death involves a desire to grasp the impossible. 
The German wannabe that Peter encounters exemplifies this notion, as he freezes 
his amputated toes. Although he does not want to die, the man needs to grasp a 
part of his dead body (the frozen toes), and in this sense experience a kind of death. 
This, as I will argue in Chapter Three, reflects the literary writer’s plight as 
Blanchot perceives it. These concerns with a desire to experience death and with 
not knowing what “speaks in me” are also central to Freud’s concept of the 
uncanny. 
Peter’s story begins with the statement that upon seeing the amputated girl 
(Helen) at the age of seven he was stricken with “a strange inner feeling.” “Why,” 
he asks, “isn’t it me who is lying there in the hospital with one leg off?” (64). It is 
precisely a strange feeling that Freud’s essay “The Uncanny” (1919) explores, a 
double self that one may not recognise but that is always buried within. Freud 
states that it is “a special core of feeling […] that class of the frightening which 
leads back to what is known of old and long familiar” (“Uncanny” 218-19). From 
this perspective, Helen represents a kind of double self that is buried within Peter, 
and that continues to invade his body and mind throughout life. Moreover, for 
Freud, the uncanny is a feeling of rupture and death that cannot be controlled, and 
that can manifest psychosomatically. Speaking of the incident when he froze his 
calf before attempting to amputate, Peter writes his calf was “black and dead,” he 
“didn’t knew how it happened, it was suddenly there” (64). Interestingly, then, 
although he froze it, Peter claims not to know how his calf became black and dead, 
suggesting that he both knew and did not know. Or, as one of Freud’s patients 
Lucy R. states of her symptoms of hysteria, “‘I didn’t know¾or rather I didn’t 
want to know’” (Freud, Studies 117). From this perspective, Peter’s denial that he 
caused the limb to turn “black and dead” is a kind of disavowal, a failure to 
recognise and a simultaneous recognition of the appendage.15 As he later states in 
response to his psychiatrist labelling him suicidal, “I didn’t want to die, I only 
wanted a leg off” (68). Though he does not want to die, he is driven to experience 
                                                
15 Although Freud’s definition of disavowal changed throughout his writing, Jean Laplanche and 
J.B. Pontalis write that it is a (common) “mode of defence which consists in the subject’s refusing to 
recognise the reality of a traumatic perception” (Language 118). 
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and possess a partial bodily death. And indeed, according to Freud, “[m]any people 
experience the feeling in the highest degree in relation to death and dead bodies” 
(“Uncanny” 13). Also reflective of the uncanny, a part of Peter’s body feels foreign 
to him¾it feels as though it should be absent¾and he is repeatedly driven to 
remove it. For Freud, it is by tracing what is hidden in one’s speech (the 
unconscious) that the experiences and ideas behind this drive may begin to be 
revealed (in psychoanalysis). In Chapter Four I expand upon the psychoanalytic 
interest in the hidden self, focusing on trauma and psychosomatic rupture through 
the works of D.W. Winnicott.  
Like Freud, Winnicott is interested in the way communication and language 
are related to feelings of fracture, and in Chapter Four I focus on his thoughts 
about how a linguistic exchange might enable a reparative integration between the 
mind and body, the self and other. The essay upon which I focus, “Fear of 
Breakdown” (1974), explores a particular type of trauma in which, due to an 
absence experienced in infancy, a child is left with an incommunicable feeling of 
emptiness, reflective of Peter’s struggle. In Winnicott’s theory, if the infant’s carer 
leaves it for too long, it experiences a feeling of being split between the mind and 
body, and is left with a feeling of anxiety. These traumatised individuals embody 
something similar to Peter’s description of having a “strange inner feeling” from a 
young age that cannot be understood, and that materialises in various psychical and 
somatic forms. Since in infancy the feelings that relate to being left cannot be 
comprehended linguistically, Winnicott contends that they are registered in the 
body, and thus, traumatised individuals embody a psychical feeling, a concept that 
is reflected in a selection of Peter’s statements such as the previously noted one: 
that he was a lie. Peter also, as noted, told his doctor “what feelings [he] was 
walking around with” (65), indicating that his body physically carries a psychical 
wound, and it is this type of wound that Winnicott analyses in “Fear of 
Breakdown.” Although this does not suggest that Peter is traumatised precisely in 
the way Winnicott describes, the connection between Peter and the traumatised 
subject provides a helpful model with which to more thoroughly understand his 
experiences. 
Winnicott theorises that traumatised subjects will, for the remainder of their 
life, endure an unconscious desire to return to a primitive state and re-experience 
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the feeling of traumatic fragmentation in order to gain control and restructure 
themselves. Therefore, at times, they engage in self-destructive acts. Traumatised 
individuals, in other words, may be unconsciously driven to reintegrate their 
feelings of being split and empty, and to feel as though they are “gathered” 
together. However, Winnicott suggests that they may additionally fear re-
experiencing this traumatic state. Here there is a paradoxical split wherein the 
individual both fears and desires to experience fragmentation. Since Peter attempts 
to fragment his body, he reflects the traumatised individual who is driven to return 
to his early trauma to survive and restructure himself in order to feel integrated. 
Moreover, the traumatic state of rupture in Winnicott’s theory relates to the 
absence of another individual (a carer), and thus, Winnicott suggests that 
reintegration must be approached through the help of another, such as a 
psychoanalyst. 
Peter demonstrates a desire to be supported by another individual, thereby 
paralleling the traumatised patient in need of reintegration through the help of 
another. We see this when he seeks the help of the German wannabe in order to 
amputate his toe and bind his wound. However, rather than finding the supportive 
figure that Winnicott’s theory calls for, it is another pained individual who teaches 
him how to “ti[e] up the wound”; to gather together his feelings of fracture through 
another’s support. While for Winnicott, a traumatised patient attempts to 
experience a breakdown in order to feel more thoroughly integrated, in Peter’s 
case, a similar kind of attempt proves insufficient. When read alongside Winnicott’s 
paradigm, this can be related to the notion that traumatic experiences have been 
stored in the psyche rather than the body, and thus, the psyche is where integration 
must take place. Or, as Winnicott states, a traumatised subject might be “sending 
the body to death which has already happened to the psyche” (“Fear” 93). The 
patient, in other words, must experience a psychical, rather than somatic 
annihilation, in order to safely re-experience the trauma and subdue feelings of 
fragmentation. Peter additionally illustrates an attempt to restructure himself 
through stories about “false accidents,” as he explains that he created stories about 
how he lost his limbs in order to convince others that his amputations were 
accidental. From Winnicott’s point of view, he may be attempting to reform his 
identity in order to decrease feelings of rupture.  
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Winnicott offers an alternative concept of repair wherein an analyst helps 
traumatised subjects re-experience past trauma through a supportive and 
reparative linguistic and physical exchange. When Peter states that he “didn’t want 
to loose my leg anymore: Just to get rid of him [the psychiatrist]” (69), he 
demonstrates that a desire to remove part of the body is closely connected to a 
desire to remove unsupportive people in his life. Throughout the majority of his life, 
Peter feels unsupported by his doctor and wife. However, he eventually is divorced 
and finds a girlfriend who he “got to know better and who understood me and tried 
to listen to my wannabe-feelings” (67). Thus, Peter’s process of psychical recovery 
and physical destruction is aligned with the search for support. I contend that the 
kind of support this new girlfriend provides parallels that which Winnicott calls for 
in his model. Peter explains that she “[l]istened to me, not that she approved of 
what I wanted; having my leg off, but at least she paid attention to me. We fell in 
love and kept coming closer to each other more and more” (67). In Winnicott’s 
paradigm, the psychoanalyst is able to provide a certain amount of distance that 
allows the patient to accept others’ absences. Though Peter’s girlfriend does not 
completely approve of his decisions, she remains present. Although this does not 
stop him from self-amputating, it does enable him to feel stronger. This does not 
suggest that she replaces an analyst, but that a certain type of support is important. 
Peter’s interaction with the internet doctor also parallels the psychoanalytic 
process in Winnicott’s theory. Just as Winnicott suggests that the analyst and 
analysand are to enable healing by, in a sense, re-living the past in the present, 
Peter and this doctor devise a story as to why he had an accident. Here, rather than 
creating false accidents alone, Peter is assisted, and in turn, according to Peter, a 
surgeon believes him.16 However, since the internet doctor helped Peter self-
amputate, rather than, for example, helping him linguistically undo feelings of 
absence, this is not an exact parallel of Winnicottian psychoanalysis, but rather a 
demonstration of a similar kind of psychical support. Although his repair was 
attributed to a physical removal, I suggest that it was intertwined with having felt 
supported by others. It is not known whether he continued to amputate after the 
leg was completely removed, but often individuals with BIID continue to remove 
                                                
16 Although I am drawing a parallel between Winnicott’s theory and Peter’s experience here, I am 
not claiming that it was definitively not the removal of the entire leg (that Peter desired) that 
engendered Peter’s feelings of relief. 
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parts of their body. The novelist George Perec explores a process of psychosomatic 
reparation through a fictional self-reconstruction in W or the Memory of Childhood 
(1975),17 and Peter’s story can be related to Perec’s experience as it is reflected in 
this text. This literary example demonstrates how language and the body 
interconnect, and I explore W further in Chapter Five. I shall first examine the 
ways in which Peter and Perec convey a similar experience of feeling 
psychosomatically broken, misunderstood, and alienated from society. For Perec, 
language has a reparative effect, and I want to explore how language also plays a 
role in Peter’s life. Specifically, Perec engages in a process of rewriting himself by 
fictionalising his past and identity through a text. In relation to this, the possibly 
fictional elements in Peter’s story might be linked to his processes of bodily and 
psychical healing. 
Peter’s story begins with a description of having felt psychosomatically broken 
from an early age, and in W, Perec writes of a similar feeling. Although, like Peter, 
he never precisely understands its origins, Perec searches for them through the 
processes of psychoanalysis and in writing W. W is founded upon the premise that 
the past cannot be accurately remembered, and thus it is not an autobiography, but 
a semi-autobiography; it is aware of¾and plays with¾its fictional elements. 
Through metaphors, descriptions of photographs, and borrowed memories and 
stories, Perec shares the way in which his traumatic past affected and shaped him. 
He was physically weak throughout his childhood, and felt lonely and estranged 
from wider society. Similarly, Peter has feelings of incomprehensible fragmentation 
and estrangement. Like Perec, he feels as though he was defined by a lack from an 
early age, which he attempts to mend through the physical means of self-
amputation. Additionally, they both encounter a struggle with the definitions that 
have been imposed upon them by society, which are related to false concepts of 
truth and wholeness.  
In describing what occurred at the mental institution, Peter states that one 
patient was “one-hundred percent nuts” (68 emphasis in original). Here, his 
prejudicial language highlights his feelings about mental illness, suggesting that he 
employs the very definitions he fears. He continues to explain that this “old fool 
[…] had millions of dollars hidden under his pillow, and he had to guard it all night 
                                                
17 Throughout the remainder of the thesis I refer to W or the Memory of Childhood as W. 
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long” (68). Firstly, “one-hundred percent” might suggest that for Peter, systems of 
wholes are closely related to sanity (the number seems to act as a proof). Possibly, 
therefore, some individuals who feel un-whole and use language in this way are 
attempting to (perhaps defensively) exclude others through a similar paradigm. 
Additionally, Peter states that he was “searching for perfection” (65), which, from 
this angle, may not only be related to bodily incongruity, but to a feeling of social 
inadequacy. He explains: “I tried to get my friends to understand it” but “heard 
from others they were laughing at me behind my back” (69). Perec also describes 
several instances of feeling isolated from social confines, which he illustrates 
through a fictional island called “W” that serves as a metaphor for society. 
Physically weak individuals are sent off this island and essentially tortured, while 
the “perfect” individuals strive for a “united” community on the island. It is this 
kind of social structure, Perec indicates, that contributed to his own feelings of 
rupture. Similarly, when Peter was sent to the mental institution he was not only 
socially ostracised; he was physically removed from society and heavily medicated. 
Thus, we can see how one’s psychical and bodily feelings of being cut off are 
intertwined with the environment. Peter and Perec convey that this is partially due 
to the ways in which language is formed through a system of wholes, which I 
discuss in relation to poststructuralist theory throughout this thesis. 
Both Peter and Perec demonstrate a need to use a fragmentary and 
ambiguous form of language to communicate. Since upon sharing his syndrome 
with his wife, Peter “printed out the medical texts [he] found, and gave them to her 
as a sign,” Peter displays a need to communicate in an ambiguous and detached 
manner. Later, when Peter tells his friend that he is an apotemnophile, “without 
thinking,” his friend explains that the root of the word, “apotemno” suggests “that it 
had something to do with amputation, he studied and knew the meaning of the 
word apotemno” (65). What Peter remembers of these moments, therefore, 
involves fragmented and more abstract linguistic forms. Perec’s text is concerned 
with a similar type of communication, and is written in a ruptured form. As I will 
argue in Chapter Five, Perec indicates that a linear language based on a system of 
wholes is insufficient for expressing feelings of incompleteness. As a child, before 
he was aware of a problem with linguistic expression, Perec drew pictures to 
convey his incommunicable feelings, which echoes Peter’s experience with BIID.  
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Peter explains that when he told his old friend (and doctor) about his 
condition, his friend stated that he should have known because “[d]uring all our 
friendship he saw me often enough make drawings about amputees” (65). This 
form of expression through drawing may signify a frustration with communication 
and comprehension, as drawing involves a visual element that may be able to 
portray something more subjective than words can convey. Additionally, drawings 
are generally more abstract than language; they do not directly explain that Peter 
has BIID, but rather can depict the images and feelings involved. Interestingly, 
Perec also drew pictures of fragmented bodies from a young age, which denotes 
that Peter and Perec share similar difficulties with expressing feelings of rupture 
linguistically. Therefore, a less direct form of communication may, in some cases, 
more adequately express experiences of brokenness.  
Perec, moreover, acknowledges that his past cannot be remembered 
accurately, shared objectively, or understood completely, either by himself or by 
others. It is because he is able to recognise this that he distorts and obscures his 
past. In this way, linguistic form echoes a drawing (in its obscurity). However, 
language is more successful in expressing the specificity of Perec’s feelings. By 
writing in this manner, I contend, Perec is able to begin rewriting his identity in 
order to more comprehensively understand, share, and in turn, begin to repair his 
painful fracture. He is able to do this by, primarily, recognising the fictional aspects 
of his life and identity. I now want to return to Peter’s statement about the patient 
at the mental institution (that the “old fool” “had millions of dollars hidden under 
his pillow, and he had to guard it all night long”), because it suggests that for Peter, 
individuals who are unaware of the fictional nature of their own stories are “mad.” 
This “old fool” had money under his pillow, rather than claiming to have it. Although 
it is obvious that Peter means to say that the man claimed to have money, his 
neglecting to use this word suggests that Peter is knowingly mocking the delusional 
man, and is therefore not “mad.” He himself is aware that his leg is objectively 
attached to his body, and is in closer contact with the environment. For Peter, then, 
health is defined in part by individuals’ abilities to recognise the fictional nature of 
their subjective feelings of reality, and to recognise that they are not objectively 
shared. 
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Thus, tracing the possible fictions within Peter’s narrative further 
illuminates the ways in which Peter feels misunderstood. There are some tenuous 
aspects of Peter’s story. First, the assertion that he escaped the mental institution is 
questionable, as this is a highly unusual occurrence. Secondly, various amputations 
that Peter describes, such as cutting off his foot with a hammer, are dubious. 
Another unrealistic claim is that towards the end of his struggle, people in Peter’s 
life believed that his foot amputation was the result of an accident. Since at this 
point people were aware of his BIID condition, it seems unlikely that they would 
unquestionably believe the story. We cannot, of course, know the absolute truth 
(and, as I argue, this does not exist), and this is not my interest here. Rather, I am 
concerned with what some of the (partial) fictions discussed here and elsewhere in 
this thesis can reveal about concealed thoughts and experiences. In relation to 
Perec’s experiences of writing a semi-fictional narrative, I suggest that illuminating 
the fictional (though, ostensibly, subjectively true) aspects of Peter’s autobiography 
can allow for an alternative kind of listening. Towards the end of his story, Peter 
explains that after amputating his foot, “I told another story and made everyone 
believe I had an accident. Fortunately, everyone believed me, and the next day I 
woke up with my left leg amputated under the knee. Finally, at least I reached my 
goal, or at a least for a large part” (70). Though this relief coincides with a 
dangerous self-amputation, it is by attending to the other aspects of Peter’s 
experience and story that we can begin to understand this kind of a fragmented and 
painful relationship between the psyche and soma, self and other, language and the 
body. He continues to explain that when his third surgeon believes his story and 
amputates his left leg completely, he starts a “new life.” Here we see how Peter’s 
repair is closely linked to a fictional reconstruction of the self, and it is a different 
kind of fictional self-reconstruction that has reparative and healthier effects in 
Stephen’s experience of having a phantom limb, which I will now survey. 
 
Stephen 
On the website www.reddit.com, activist and amputee Stephen Sumner shares his 
experience of having a phantom limb. His posts were written eleven years after 
Stephen lost his left leg in a “horrific” motorbike accident, after which he suffered 
multiple traumas and fell into a coma. However, his only lasting pain, he explains, 
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was a phantom limb. After roughly five years, Stephen was introduced to mirror 
therapy,18 which he used for two years, until his pain disappeared. He explains that 
after his pain disappeared:  
 
It dawned on me that I was, basically a very lucky dude to have had all 
these circumstances collude to give me back my life and places on Earth 
where peeps, for myriad of reasons, are not nearly so fortunate […]. So I set 
about forming a one-man humanitarian organisation aimed at using Mirror 
Therapy […] to help relieve the suffering caused by PLP in these 
traumatised places.19 
 
He travelled through various impoverished countries in Asia with mirrors and 
taught individuals how to use them to help with PLP. As those on Reddit proceed to 
ask questions about the experiences involved, Stephen describes the phantom limb 
pain as a relentless feeling of “strangeness” and “agony.” The pains, he writes “tend 
to hit you in very specific spots” and are “SUPER-intimate,” involving sensations 
such as crushing, cramping, pins and needles, restless leg syndrome, burning, and 
(most painfully) electric shock. The only sensation he was unable to eradicate was 
the burning, although, he explains, it is mild, and in one spot. It is “nothing,” he 
writes, “next to the smoking, black-out electrical spasms I used to host.” Although 
medicine was unable to “touch the pain,” by sticking to a routine of mirror therapy 
he was able to “rewire” and alter his sensations. Though he asserts that the 
sensations are impossible to completely describe, they were, he writes, 
“comforting,” “cool” and “uncanny,” “kinda like a homecoming.” When he first 
gazed into the mirror, Stephen was “suffused with a sense of calm completion,” and 
a “very vivid feeling of ‘activation’ in the gone leg. It was there again and it was 
comforting,” and after five weeks, the pain was almost completely eradicated. 
Ultimately, he found the strength to improve his condition through the support of 
his family and friends, who believed that he was “a big strong guy,” and who 
offered “a huge amount of very quiet assistance.” By keeping an open mind, looking 
                                                
18 Since Stephen uses a flat mirror rather than a mirror-box, I refer to the phenomenon as mirror 
therapy throughout this chapter. However, the original model by Ramachandran was a mirror-box, 
and therefore I also refer to it as a mirror-box throughout the thesis. 
19 As with Peter, I have not altered the grammatical errors in Stephen’s statements. 
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at his reflection, and engaging with his imagination, he explains, Stephen’s was able 
to “move” his phantom and it eventually vanished. He also states that he “really 
like[s] to help folks,” and as he teaches them to use the mirror, he tells them to 
practise moving, touching, and looking at their existent limb. Thus, it was through 
communal support and a psychosomatic process, rather than a medical one, that 
Stephen’s PLP was eliminated. 
I now want to relate Stephen’s experiences to the thoughts that will follow 
throughout this thesis, as I did in the case of Peter, beginning with the difficulty 
involved in the biomedical approach to relieving PLP. As discussed in the 
Introduction, many people with phantom limbs find medication to be unhelpful, 
and as Stephen explains, although Opioids and Neurontin reduced the “panic 
element” that accompanies phantom limb pain, medication (a purely medical 
approach) was ultimately useless. However, a purely psychical approach was also 
unhelpful, as Stephen demonstrates in his statement that he endured the pain for 
four or five years “thinking that I could ‘man up’ or ‘mind-over-matter it,’ but no 
dice. It was bigger than me.” Thus, paralleling the solely medical physical 
approach, this attempt was also unsuccessful in healing the psychosomatic pain. 
Since it was mirror therapy that helped Stephen, I shall now discuss its position in 
the medical field. In his online dialogue, Stephen writes: “from a neuroscientific 
view the guy you want to search [… is] VS Ramachandran.” Although 
Ramachandran is a neurologist who invented the mirror-box cure by studying the 
brain (rather than the mind), his technique is unconventional in that it does not 
treat a physically present disorder through medical means. Rather than healing the 
body through medical intervention or taking the “mind-over-matter” approach, 
mirror therapy involves both the psyche and soma; it affects a psychically felt and 
physically orientated pain. Stephen demonstrates the ways in which the therapy 
relates to both his mind and body in his statement that when introducing it to 
others in the world, he “inculcate[s] this mantra: LOOK, MOVE, IMAGINE.” 
Indeed, this mantra involves an interaction between the physical acts of looking 
and moving, and the psychical act of imagining. For Stephen, then, the only way to 
heal a psychosomatic injury is through a psychosomatic mechanism, suggesting that 
since the physical feeling involved in the phantom is located in the psyche, it must 
in this case be treated through the psyche. The mirror-box, in other words, works 
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because it is not only psychical or physical; like the phantom, it is both at once. 
There is a paradox here that relates to the way in which Stephen uses language to 
describe phantom limbs (as they can and cannot be expressed), and in what follows 
I explore this by returning to the theory of Blanchot. What is essential is that 
Stephen is frustrated with the inability to understand an absence, and it is precisely 
this kind of a difficulty that concerns Blanchot. 
PLP, writes Stephen, was “bigger that me.” The burnings and electrical shocks 
“totally beggar words,” and the mirror experience is “impossible to describe.” 
Although he explains that the sensations cannot be described, they are nonetheless 
depicted as being “strange, uncanny, and cool.” Here, language can and cannot 
communicate: though the sensations can be partially expressed, they ultimately 
escape definition, reflective of Blanchot’s first slope of literature. Here, Stephen’s 
paradoxical experience with language echoes Blanchot’s notion of language 
because, as discussed, for Blanchot, a thing is murdered by its description, and thus 
sensations cannot be captured in language. This concept additionally echoes mirror 
therapy in that, as Blanchot writes, “real things […] refer back to that unreal 
whole” (“Literature” 330), just as the real loss of the original limb creates an 
imaginary whole: the phantom. Language, in other words, involves an illusory 
whole that is necessary for communication. Critchley explains that for Blanchot, 
literature “negates reality and posits a fantasized reality in its place” (Very Little 52). 
Similarly, the mirror Stephen uses negates the real feeling of the phantom limb, 
replacing it with a fantasised reality, the mirror image creates a new subjective 
reality. As the word “gives me being, but it gives it to me deprived of being. The 
word is the absence of that being, its nothingness” (Blanchot, “Literature” 322), the 
mirror image gives Stephen control of the phantom by erasing it. The image, in a 
sense, kills or negates the felt phantom. Thus, the mirror is a metaphor for and 
embodiment of language as Blanchot conceives it. In this way, the body and 
language do not only parallel one another, but are connected, and as noted in my 
discussion of Peter, I am interested in how language and the body overlap, and 
affect one another. Similar to the way in which Peter states that he “was a lie,” 
Stephen conveys a conflation between language and the body. The phantom limb, 
he writes, left him feeling “ripped-off,” a statement that indicates a similar collapse. 
What Stephen presumably means is that the phantom caused him to feel cheated, 
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however the language also indicates a literal and physical ripping off. From this 
point of view, it is important to explore what the body and language can convey 
about one another, and it is this relationship that psychoanalysis investigates. In 
Chapter Three I examine this relationship through Lacan’s concept of the mirror 
stage.  
In the mirror stage, an infant identifies itself in its mirror image, which is an 
unreal whole that contradicts the fragmented and ever-changing subject. Lacan 
contends that here a divide is formed between the fantasy whole mirror image, and 
the uncoordinated one. The mirrored reflection is thought to act as a blueprint for 
the subject’s relation to images and language, which, as I will elaborate in Chapter 
Three, is related to the split that those with phantom limbs may feel: a bodily 
discord that contrasts a fantasy whole (the mirror limb). In forming these links I 
am careful to avoid what Vivian Sobchack warns against: that for several people 
who write about prosthetics, “corporeal wholeness tends to be constituted in purely 
objective and visible terms; body ‘parts’ are seen […] as missing or limited and some 
‘thing’ other […] is substituted or added to take their place” (“A Leg” 210). What is 
neglected here, she continues, is the “structural, functional, and aesthetic terms of 
those who successfully incorporate and subjectively live the prosthetic and sense 
themselves neither as lacking something nor as walking around with some ‘thing’” 
(Sobchack, “A Leg” 210). The works that she suggests neglect to discuss the more 
structural and functional aspect of prostheses differ from mine in that they discuss 
prostheses as opposed to phantom limbs and the mirror-box. Although the mirror 
limb is, in a sense, an illusory prosthetic, it is not used for functioning in the 
environment, but for pain relief. For me, the concept of a bodily lack is not limited 
to objective observations, as Sobchack warns against, but to the pain that is 
involved in a physical absence and how the mirror-box can offer a healing sense of 
“corporeal wholeness.” As Stephen explains, during mirror therapy “I was literally 
suffused with a sense of calm, completion.” He continues: 
 
you gotta look right in the eyes and it is incandescent and unmistakable and 
is, truly, that LOOK, the reason I continue […]. The first instant that I 
gazed into a mirror at a sound limb that was bending and waggling and all, 
in place of this epicentre of electrical storms. 
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Stephen, like the baby in Lacan’s mirror image, is delighted and transformed upon 
recognising himself in the mirror. Lacan writes, “[we] have only to understand the 
mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: 
namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an 
image” (Écrits 2, emphasis in original). Stephen explains that the mirror image 
allowed him to feel complete, and thereby relieved. Similarly, in Lacan’s theory, the 
infant feels fragmented and “caught up in the lure of spatial identification,” 
however, when it identifies with its mirror reflection, the “fragmented image of the 
body […transforms to a] form of its totality” (Écrits 5). This results in the creation 
of “an identity that will mark [… its] entire mental development” (Lacan, Écrits 5), 
which echoes Stephen’s statement that identification with his mirror image 
“rewires” his brain. In both scenarios, then, the subject is shaped through a split 
between an illusory wholeness and a felt fragmentation. A double is thus formed, 
which, as discussed in relation to Peter’s double self, is reflective of the uncanny. 
 As mentioned, Peter experienced a “strange” uncanny feeling upon seeing 
an amputee at a young age, which, I suggest, relates to Stephen’s experience with 
PLP. Stephen writes that “strangeness or the accountability is a really big part of 
the trauma […]. Your arm or your leg […] is GONE. Yet it’s still agonizing you?” 
However, for Peter, this feeling is instigated by the observation of another, while 
for Stephen, it is from his own sudden and traumatic bodily amputation. Moreover, 
as we see in Freud’s notion of the uncanny, for Stephen, it is not what is there that 
causes pain, but rather, what is not there. Freud suggests that an uncanny feeling is 
rooted in the unconscious, wherein traumas from the past continue to haunt the 
subject. Viewed thus, the phantom limb is not only an allegory for the unconscious, 
but an embodiment of it: it is a lingering pain with no present source, often derived 
from a trauma, an invisible part of one’s past self (in non-congenital phantoms) that 
returns in a ghostly form. However, one difference between the traumas discussed 
in Freud’s work and the phantom limb is that although the limb pain is located in 
the psyche, it definitively stems from a physically, rather than psychically 
orientated trauma. It is, moreover, a visible absence, while the traumas Freud 
writes of are often ambiguous in nature. Nevertheless, in both cases, the subject is 
left with a feeling of discomfort without a specific and present treatable wound. As 
Stephen writes, “the itches are the worst cuz you truly can’t scratch them.” 
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Although Stephen cannot scratch an itch because there is no body part to scratch, 
Freud suggests that disturbing feelings similar to these can be treated in 
psychoanalysis, which is itself an uncanny experience “laying bare […] hidden 
forces” (“Uncanny” 14). However, in psychoanalysis it is language that acts as the 
mediator between discomfort and its source, and for Stephen, it is the mirror 
illusion. The key factor here, in the words of Paul de Man, is that “[t]o make the 
invisible visible is uncanny” (qtd. in Royle, 108). 
 In Freudian psychoanalysis, the analyst and patient relive traumatic pasts in 
a different form, and through this process, the terror of the old experience can be 
recognised and become less terrifying. Similarly, for Stephen, the mirror therapy 
experience is “both cool and uncanny. It’s also deeply comforting.” The mirror can 
thus be envisioned as a manifestation of the analytic encounter; an uncanny “old” 
and “familiar” experience becomes comforting through a process of self-reflection. 
In other words, for Stephen, it is mirror-therapy that “scratches the itch,” that 
allows him to “touch” and “command” the pain, while in therapy it is ostensibly 
appeased through the patient-analyst dynamic. Therefore, Stephen begins to find 
relief through a mirror reflection, just as in Freudian thought the patient can be 
healed through verbal reflection. Although these two modes of reflection (language 
and mirror therapy) are different, they are closely interlinked, share a similar 
process, and even, as I will argue in Chapter Four, share a similar structure. 
Language, in other words, is a type of mirror, and just as the mirror can physically 
affect amputees by replicating the real existing limb, language can affect the patient 
in psychoanalysis by replicating an (typically) ambiguous trauma (though 
distorted) in the present moment. This is a relationship I establish in this thesis, 
partially through a discussion of Winnicott’s “Fear of Breakdown,” which suggests 
that the analyst and analysand can recreate a kind of experience that happened in 
the past in order to helpfully affect the patient. 
Stephen writes that his phantom sensation is “bigger than [him]” and 
“beggars words.” This description, I argue, parallels that of the infant in 
Winnicott’s model, as he suggests that a baby is not originally a complete human 
being; it is one with the mother and psychosomatically fragmented. “There is no 
such thing as a baby” (“Theory” 38), Winnicott writes; the infant is part of a 
relationship. Additionally, the baby is helpless and cannot describe its sensations as 
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there is no cognitive ability or knowledge of language at this time, and I suggest 
that the baby’s situation resembles Stephen’s un-articulable experiences. For 
Winnicott, a baby is psychosomatically unintegrated, and becomes integrated as it 
matures. Thus, it may develop if the carer holds the baby to create a continuity of 
being, so that the infant can learn to cope with impingements from the 
environment. He writes that integration occurs when one “com[es] together and 
feel[s] something” (Winnicott, “Primitive” 150), or becomes a “unit,” when they 
feel as though they are “seen or understood to exist by someone [… that they] have 
been recognised as a being” (qtd. in Jacobs 36). Indeed, Stephen feels as though 
his absent limb moves when he can visualise it in the mirror. In Winnicott’s terms 
he can recognise himself as a being a “unit,” as having a more complete ego. For 
him it is when another individual (the carer in particular) recognises the subject 
that the baby feels that “I am here, I exist here and now” (qtd. in Jacobs 46). 
Echoing this is Stephen’s statement that you “watch and monitor that movement in 
the mirror. It really helps to focus on the afflicted area and move it […] you can 
feel that phantom foot and you can flex that phantom ankle and wiggle those 
phantom toes.” Stephen, like the baby, feels as though he exists, as though he can 
feel himself upon recognising himself. He continues (as quoted above), “I gazed 
into a mirror at a sound limb that was bending […] in place of this epicentre of 
electrical storms I was literally suffused with a sense of calm, completion.” This 
echoes the baby’s process of integration in Winnicott’s model, which can take place 
through a transitional object.  
The transitional object can be any number of things such as a “wool cloth” 
or “blanket” that helps the child cope with a carer’s temporary absence. It can also 
be linguistic; he states: “[a]s the infant starts to use organised sounds […] there 
may appear a ‘word’ for the transitional object” (Playing 5). This symbol, as noted 
in the Introduction, can also lead to a feeling of psychosomatic integration. It is this 
definition that I use as a template for my use of the word “symbol,” as it is both 
illusory and concrete, and in this way, reflects the mirror-box. The objects allow 
the child to grow from a fragmented and dependent baby to a more independent 
and complete individual. It separates the subjective baby from the objective world, 
the “me” from the “not-me,” and is thus in an intermediate state, a “potential space” 
between the subjective and objective senses of self. It is also, Winnicott states, the 
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basis for language and cultural experience, and I want to suggest that thinking 
about the transitional object in relation to mirror therapy provides a unique way of 
understanding the phenomenon. Stephen explains to others on Reddit that the 
mirror helps him to “command” the phantom pain, that it is a “magical” solution, 
and that it allows him to control his muscle coordination. Indeed, Winnicott writes: 
“[i]n relation to the transitional object the infant passes from (magical) omnipotent 
control to control by manipulation (involving muscle coordination pleasure)” 
(Playing 10). Additionally, like the transitional object, the mirror image involves 
“[t]he existence of an intermediate area, neither inside the individual nor outside 
him, [… it] is therefore based on a paradox” (Clancier 90). The object, in other 
words, embodies a contradiction between illusion and objective reality; it is part of 
the subject and separate from it. Stephen’s mirror image also involves a paradoxical 
relationship between illusion and reality, as it is an illusion that can be visualised 
and has a physical effect. It is part of the subject and separate from it as it is not the 
actual limb but is a reflection of his existent one, and in this way functions as a 
transitional object. “The essential feature in the concept of transitional objects and 
phenomena,” writes Winnicott, “is the paradox, and the acceptance of the paradox: the 
baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created and to 
become a cathected object” (Playing, 104 emphasis in original). The baby must 
accept that the transitional object is never completely part of the individual and is 
part illusion. Similarly, Stephen must accept that the mirror image is not an existent 
limb, but an illusory one, and that, as suggested of the process of integration and 
psychoanalysis, the subject is never completely healed. Stephen writes that the 
mirror can “eradicate everything BUT the burning sensations,” though these 
sensations are “mild,” and although the transitional object may help the individual 
separate from dependence on the carer, “[t]he finished creation [of the self] never 
heals the underlying lack of sense of self” (Winnicott, Playing 64). 
As noted, Winnicott believes that traumatised individuals can begin to 
restructure themselves through a certain kind of psychoanalytical support. Adam 
Phillips explains that the “analyst, like the mother, facilitates by providing 
opportunity for communication and its recognition” (Winnicott 141), and the 
mirror, in Stephen’s case, provides the opportunity to visualise and psychically 
communicate to the body that the phantom is real. This is not to suggest that mirror 
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therapy can replace psychoanalysis, but to provide a way of understanding more 
about how this type of psychosomatic integration works. Moreover, the therapeutic 
encounter echoes the (“potential”) space of the transitional object, in that it 
“provides space to play, to create illusions, and to move through disillusionment 
into new perceptions of and approximations to reality” (Jacobs 61). In this way, 
therapy is connected to a transitional object and space, which, I argue, parallels the 
space in which one’s phantom limb is reflected in mirror therapy. I now want to 
return to Stephen’s statement that when he teaches others to use the mirror he tells 
them to “LOOK, MOVE, IMAGINE. It really helps in making a new map, which 
is what you are doing.” Similar to the psychoanalytic process, mirror therapy 
involves playing with images and creating illusions through the body, mind and 
imagination, which enables a process of restructuring. In psychoanalysis, this 
works because, according to Winnicott, early relationships with the carer have 
shaped the individual’s mind, and psychoanalysis offers the potential to alter the 
mind’s map. However, it is not only in analysis that individuals may feel supported 
and grow towards psychosomatic cohesion and independence; it is through other 
objects and people in their life. 
Christopher Bollas writes: 
 
The way people interact reveals implied or tacit assumptions about their 
relation to the self as object. Each person forms his own ‘culture’ through 
the selection of friends, partners and colleagues. The totality of this object-
relational field constitutes a type of holding environment and reveals 
important assumptions about the person’s relation to the self as an object at 
the more existential level of self-management. (Shadow 49) 
 
In Stephen’s case it was the support of family and friends that enabled him to 
effectively use the mirror. He writes, “[m]y recovery was complete in virtually 
every way, largely thanks to the help of a phenomenal group of family and friends 
plus a really good rehab therapist.” It was, therefore, not only the mirror itself, but 
also the strength provided by others that allowed him to successfully engage in 
mirror therapy. He later states, “I have a great family and dynamite friends, so I 
was super-duper lucky in that regard. For all of them, I would say they did the 
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right thing: it was like, whoa! That’s a big one, but he’s a big strong guy and won’t 
want a big ol’ fuss […]. So I got a huge amount of very quiet assistance.” It was not 
only the familial presence and trust in Stephen that was helpful, but also their quiet 
assistance, a familial relationship that echoes the healthy therapeutic relationship in 
Winnicott’s theory. Winnicott writes that it “is not the accuracy of the 
interpretation so much as the willingness of the analyst to help, the analyst’s 
capacity to identify with the patient and so to believe in what is needed and to meet 
the need as soon as the need is indicated verbally or in non-verbal or pre-verbal 
language” (qtd. in Phillips, “Winnicott” 140). It is often in silence and through 
gestures that the patient can begin to psychosomatically integrate, as this preverbal 
experience replicates that of the infant. By recreating the infant’s experience of 
learning to use transitional objects, in other words, the pattern of how the subject is 
shaped may begin to alter. As Bollas writes: “[i]ndeed, the way she [the carer] 
handled us […] will influence our way of handling our self” (Shadow 36). He also 
notes that the “search for symbolic equivalents to the transformational object, and 
the experience with which it is identified, continues in adult life” (Shadow 17), again 
suggesting that in order to psychosomatically integrate throughout life, the 
individual seeks assistance from these kinds of symbolic (transitional) objects. For 
Stephen, the mirror image symbolises a phantom delusion (which is replacing a 
loss). Through a slow process of playing with the mirror image, and with support 
from others, he was able to more thoroughly connect his psyche and soma. 
Although Stephen emphasises the importance of supportive individuals in his life, it 
is ultimately his own strength that allows him to heal. He writes:  
 
One of the most persuasive and beautiful things about the therapy is that no 
one ‘administers’ it to you. You have to take the initiative: you have to take 
the mirror in your own hands and take personal intimate steps to improve 
your own well-being. To me this forms a fundamental part of the 
effectiveness of the therapy. I can’t give it to you; you have to give it up to 
yourself. 
 
Stephen’s description of mirror therapy functions in a similar way to Winnicott’s 
model of psychoanalysis, wherein the patient should have space to find their own 
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gestures and experiment with them in a safe place and to grow increasingly 
independent. As Annette Kuhn writes in Little Madnesses (2013), this space 
“involves an interrogation of the existence of a sustaining self, a self able to engage 
with and make use of the world, of relationships with persons and things located in 
‘the potential space’ between the individual and the environment” (Kuhn, xviii 
emphasis in original). It is a space for language and gestures, a space between self 
and other. And I will argue in Chapter Five that it is Perec’s text W that also acts as 
a transitional object, which, through a process similar to mirror therapy, helps 
Perec cope with feelings of physical and psychical fragmentation. Like both Perec 
and Peter, Stephen feels broken and psychosomatically dissonant in relation to a 
loss. However, unlike Peter, Stephen is able to repair this feeling through the use of 
an object that is both present and absent and illusory and real; an object that acts as 
a mediator between the mind and body, the “me” and the “not-me” (as Winnicott 
terms it).  
Sumner’s memoir Phantom Pain: a memoire (2015) describes his experience in 
the hospital after his motorbike accident. He writes, “I’m lost in loss […]. I’m 
having a problem with loss” (Sumner, 24-5). Shortly after the loss of his limb, it 
seems as though Stephen could not digest the sudden bodily loss that resulted from 
his motorbike accident, and that he was psychically lost in a physical loss. 
Similarly, throughout W, Perec writes about the loss of his mother in the Second 
World War both directly and metaphorically. At one point, he describes a scene in 
which he has broken his arm and is wearing it in a sling, which, I will argue, stands 
for the way in which he has embodied the loss of his mother. The loss of his mother 
at an early age, he indicates, has been registered in the mind and transformed into a 
fictionalised and psychosomatic one. This embodiment is echoed in Stephen’s 
explanation that after his accident, he attempts to understand which body parts 
belong to him, as he writes, “my new arm hangs above me. Hangs in a sling and 
from a stand” (12). It is unclear to the reader whether this new arm is the existent, 
pre-amputation, arm or the amputated one, which is presumably reflective of 
Stephen’s own confusion at the time. Both Stephen and Perec demonstrate a 
psychosomatic split and find it difficult to discern the “real” from the “unreal.” 
Stephen writes: “I also know that somewhere down there I’m missing […]. It’s 
mostly in my head” (42). What, he seems to ask, is physically real, and what is 
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psychically real? Perec’s account of having broken his arm echoes this sentiment, 
as he later discovers that the accident did not in fact happen to him but to a friend. 
Like Stephen, therefore, Perec is attempting to locate psychical pain through his 
body. The broken arm seems to him an appropriate representation of his emotional 
pain, and thus he mistakenly attributes the accident to himself. 
 In order to cope with these feelings, Stephen and Perec use strategies that 
possess several of the characteristics of a transitional object. Winnicott explains 
that the transitional object assists in creating a psychosomatic border, in separating 
the baby from the “not-me” as it becomes a “unit”; or as Winnicott puts it, one can 
study “the place of the object¾outside, inside, at the border” (Playing 2). Related to 
this, Stephen writes, “I’m sitting up taking stock and I find I can’t affix any borders 
to me” (Sumner 44). As he attempts to comprehend and integrate the trauma of his 
accident, he struggles to separate the true from the false, the “me” from the “not-
me,” the phantom from reality. This difficulty with self-definition is also found in 
W, and in Chapter Five, I will investigate how a linguistic exploration, through 
psychoanalysis and writing, helps the author to create a bodily border with which 
to separate from feelings of incomprehensible fragmentation. However, here, it is 
language that acts as a border that allows Perec to begin defining himself and 
integrating his mind and body, while for Stephen, it is the mirror that forms a 
visible outline. These borders (shaped through the transitional object, the text of 
W, and the mirror) are not “completely” existent or “real,” as they involve the 
imagination, body and mind. Perec plays with this illusory border in W, as he 
devises memories such as the arm in the sling, that he discovers in the process of 
writing W to be imaginary. It is the fictionalised version of the self, as is also 
perceptible in Stephen’s case, that helps Perec undo his feelings of fragmentation 
and loss. Therefore, reading Perec and Winnicott together contributes to a nuanced 
understanding of mirror therapy. By linking the mirror phenomenon to the 
transitional object and to W, it becomes clear that a certain type of object, and 
moreover, a certain type of exchange that involves a relationship between the self 
and other, and presence and absence, can begin to undo particular forms of 
suffering. By unpacking these links throughout the remainder of this thesis, I will 
develop new concepts about a non-biomedical way of understanding both BIID 
and the phantom limb. 
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Thus far, I have introduced the ways in which these syndromes will be 
discussed throughout this thesis through two case studies that demonstrate the 
shortcomings of medical treatments. For Peter, although people within the medical 
world attempted to help, they ultimately caused him more harm. Although 
Stephen’s encounter with doctors was not harmful, the medications prescribed to 
him were unhelpful. He was, however, exposed to mirror therapy, which, although 
invented by a neurologist, entails a psychosomatic, rather than a purely physical 
cure. This signals that it is necessary to explore the phenomena from an alternative, 
more psychosomatic approach. When exploring Peter’s description of BIID I have 
focused on his uncanny feelings in relation to a limb that is attached to his body yet 
feels alien to him, while in Stephen’s case I have suggested that his phantom limb 
syndrome is a physical manifestation of the uncanny double, a concept developed 
Chapter Three. I additionally have established that mirror therapy functions in a 
way reflective of the psychoanalytic encounter, and that, furthermore, Winnicott’s 
concept of psychoanalysis, which focuses on psychosomatic integration, is helpful 
in shedding light on these two syndromes. 
Like the traumatised baby in Winnicott’s model, Peter and Stephen are 
driven to integrate their psyche and soma, and in different ways they attempt to re-
form themselves. While Peter attempts to restructure himself through an act of self-
destruction, it is through the support of others that he is able to experience feelings 
of relief. However, his desire to self-amputate does not dissipate, and his life 
becomes endangered. Stephen’s restructuring, alternatively, is attained through a 
partially illusory object, which offers something similar to what language offers: a 
symbolic exchange. Since these types of symbolic exchanges are simultaneously 
illusory and physical, part of the self and the other, and fragmented and whole, I 
suggest that certain types of dialogues that involve these components might provide 
further insight into what can assist in repairing the psychosomatically fragmented 
individual, which I later discuss through the work of Georges Perec. I have argued 
that certain psychoanalytic thought, and particular types of literature and fiction 
that are concerned with this kind of exchange, might illuminate ways of facilitating 
psychosomatic integration. However, as will become clear throughout this thesis, I 
do not suggest that language can cure those with BIID or PLS, but rather, that a 
linguistic analysis of the syndromes’ central aspects is important. 
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The case studies of Peter and Stephen, therefore, serve as examples for the 
individuals with BIID and phantom limbs that will be discussed throughout this 
thesis. What I have shown is that, most essentially, both individuals share a discord 
between the mind and body, self and other, and illusion and material reality, which 
generates painful feelings. Apotemnophilia, however, is felt in the body and 
involves a stronger psychical experience of a felt lack. Although it is often triggered 
by a childhood encounter, as seen in Peter’s experience with Helen, it is not 
necessarily attributable to a sudden accident or loss. Moreover, those with BIID 
pursue self-destruction, which they state is a desire to appease pain rather than to 
cause it. As conveyed in Peter’s description of the pleasurable pain of tying his 
ligatures, then, there is a blurred boundary between the desire to remove a limb 
and to cause physical and psychical pain. There is, in other words, a paradoxical 
desire for self-repair through self-fragmentation. Though such a drive for self-
repair is also apparent in Stephen’s case, he conveys the inverse, the mirror image 
of those with BIID. While, like Peter, Stephen wants to remove a (delusional) limb 
in order to appease his pain, it is not because the limb feels as though it is absent, 
but because it feels as though it is present. Peter, on the other hand, attempts to 
repair the split between his mind and body through self-amputation, through which 
he hopes to transform his psychical sense of reality into a physical one. While for 
Peter, communicating with others is at times helpful in appeasing his feelings of 
alienation; it is additionally problematic, as he is often (dangerously) advised by 
others with similar difficulties. This raises the question as to whether there is a 
particular type of communication that can be helpful. In the case of Stephen, 
although communication assists in providing the strength to heal, ultimately, it is 
the mirror illusion that offers him relief. And although the mirror is not language, I 
suggest that it parallels language, in that it is an illusory presence that can affect the 
body. Since Peter and Stephen struggle with similar feelings of psychosomatic 
fragmentation, and Stephen’s is assisted by an illusion that functions in a way 
similar to language, what might this relationship mean for the fractured individual? 
To address this question, in the following chapter I turn to a detailed exploration of 
other disciplines that take an interest in the ways in which the mind and body 
interact through symbolic exchanges. For this, I further explore the deficiencies in 
the medical field, the relationships between psychoanalysis and literature, and the 
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theories of two psychoanalysts that will shed light on the experiences of those with 
BIID and PLS. 
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Chapter Two: Why psychoanalysis and literature? 
 
Nun ist die Luft von solchem Spuk so voll, 
Daß niemand weiß, wie er ihn meiden soll. 
 
Now fills the air so many a haunting shape, 
That no one knows how best he may escape. 
--- Goethe, Faust 
 
Freud’s The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901) opens with this epigraph, 
illuminating not only the inextricability between literature and psychoanalysis, but 
also their similar concern with “haunting shapes,” with the daunting unknown. 
Although the BIID and phantom limb phenomena involve a literal desire to escape 
a haunting shape, these syndromes, as discussed, havea been predominantly studied 
from a neurological perspective. In this chapter, I will look at how the two 
conditions might benefit from a literary and psychoanalytic perspective. One 
individual who suffers from apotemnophilia writes on the Internet Yahoo! Group 
“Fighting It”: “it is possible that the neuroscience of BIID might have very little to 
do with its cause, and even less to do with any potential treatment” (“Fighting It”), 
raising the question as to how the syndrome can be explored outside of a purely 
neurological view. In response to this question, I will be employing psychoanalysis 
and literary works to examine the two conditions, because they help to illuminate 
the complex somatic and psychical dimensions of the limb scenarios and the mirror-
box treatment. This chapter will primarily examine the problems with a 
neurological approach, focusing on a neurological reductivism, which fails to 
distinguish how the “mind” (the intertwinement of psyche and brain), is more than 
the (purely physical) “brain.” Following this, I discuss the affinity between 
psychoanalysis and literature, which will be elaborated by a discussion of Freud’s 
difficulties with reconciling literature and empirical science. I then turn theorists 
from the Paris School of Psychosomatics, focusing on André Green. And lastly, I 
explore Marilia Aisenstein’s case study “The Man from Burma” (1993), which 
exemplifies a case reflective of (predominantly) BIID (wherein a body offers up an 
organ to register a psychical lack), and additionally dramatises the relationship 
between literature and psychoanalysis. 
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The Problem with Naming a Problem: Science and Psychoanalysis 
To begin unpacking these thoughts, I review how the attempt to find a reason and 
cure for the two conditions through a biomedical paradigm is limited. As 
demonstrated by Peter and Stephen, psychiatrists were unable to help relieve pain, 
and sometimes, in the case of Peter, increased feelings of alienation. For Stephen, a 
mechanism that treated the mind and body at once was helpful, one that involved 
his “looking, moving, and imagining.” Although the neurological and psychological 
hypotheses about BIID and PLS lend insight, they were, as discussed in the 
Introduction, unable secure a precise cause or treatment. The most successful 
treatments for these conditions, researchers have found, do not involve a purely 
medicinal method; they treat the psyche and soma in more unconventional ways. 
As explained, these include, for BIID, the minifying lens experiment, and for PLS, 
the “Bear Claw” method, GMI, and the rubber hand and foot illusion (which has 
also been tested for BIID). These methods, although promising in some cases, have 
not been successful in eradicating pain, have not been adequately tested. For those 
with BIID, CBT methods have, in a small minority of cases, reduced the obsessive-
compulsive component and need for self-amputation. In the case of PLP, though 
few studies have been conducted, CBT has (at times) been helpful in allowing 
amputees to cope with phantom sensations, and reduce the irritation involved in 
having a phantom a limb. The most prominent study of CBT and phantom limbs 
(“Chronic and American Stump Pain Among American Veterans,”), found that 
only 1% of participants reported lasting benefits from CBT methods¾mirror 
therapy demonstrated a higher success rate (though more research is needed). As 
noted, although CBT and mirror-therapy are similar in that they are both solution-
focused, and based on the concept that the mind can affect the body, the methods 
are different. In addressing conditions such as chronic pain, anxiety, mood 
disorders, and prevention of mental illness, CBT can help individuals cope 
emotionally with symptoms and stress levels, often by allowing them to adopt a 
more positive outlook. The mirror-box, while it can alter amputees’ psychosomatic 
feelings through the mind, does not begin with the psyche; it is a physical 
mechanism. Furthermore, the mirror-box involves an illusory mirror image, a 
visual symbolisation of the phantom, which, unlike CBT, is helpful in removing 
(rather than teaching the individual to cope with) phantom sensations. The 
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symbolisation in the mirror-box, I suggest, reflects the way in which symbols are 
used in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis, although it begins in the psyche rather 
than through a physical object, differs from CBT because it is concerned with 
searching for meaning by tracing symbols within the patient’s unconscious. 
However, psychoanalysis is not often taken as seriously in the medical world, 
perhaps because (as with mirror therapy) illusion is central to its process. 
Nevertheless, as Stephen Sumner explains, mirror therapy is not often recognised 
in the medical world, “‘[w]ell it’s not scientific’ – simply because mirror therapy 
looks too simple” (Perur). Thus, although the mirror-box may not conform to 
preconceived notions of science, it can work to treat psychosomatic conditions. 
Psychoanalysis, as it is also concerned with the way in which illusion is integral to 
treating or understanding psychosomatic conditions, can thus lend insight. 
 Psychiatrist Bishnu Subedi states that for PLS, “most successful measures 
employ multidisciplinary approaches in the management of pain and in 
rehabilitation” (3). Since the syndrome is felt in the body but located in the mind, 
researchers must attend to not just the (physical) brain, but also the (psychical) 
mind. Bertram Malle states, “I maintain that, due to the current state of empirical 
science […] we may have to change our concepts of physical states in order to 
relate them to non-physical phenomena in an intelligible way” (95). The “mind-
body problem,” according to Malle, cannot be sufficiently explored through an 
empirical system; there must also be a method that focuses on the non-physical. 
PLS, I suggest, not only calls for this kind of an exploration, but also demonstrates 
its importance. As Elizabeth Grosz remarks, the “irreducibility of psychology to 
biology and of biology to psychology can be illustrated with […] the phantom 
limb” (89). It is because psychoanalysis deals with precisely this¾with how the 
body is shaped through the psyche¾ that it seems natural to use this discourse. 
More specifically, the field is concerned with exploring delusion, misplaced pain, 
and a fragmented and unknowable self, which are also central to the limb 
phenomena. Psychoanalysis, moreover, poses questions regarding imaginary 
concepts of wholeness. Indeed, “[t]he phantom,” writes Grosz, “is an expression of 
nostalgia for the unity and wholeness of the body, its completion. It is a memorial to 
the missing limb, a psychical delegate that stands in its place. There is thus not only 
a physical but also a psychical wound and scar in the amputation or surgical 
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intervention into any part of the body” (73). BIID also involves a psychical feeling 
of a physical wound that is related to an expression of the desire for bodily unity. In 
this way, PLS, BIID and psychoanalysis raise the question as to how one’s united 
image of self is decentralised by a fragmented and unknowable other, and how this 
other shows through in symbolic forms. As Terry Eagleton writes that in 
psychoanalysis, “I am not actually the coherent, autonomous, self generating 
subject I know myself to be in the ideological sphere, but the ‘decentred’ function 
of several social determinants” (150). Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis 
write that psychoanalysis is “a method of investigation which consists essentially in 
bringing out the unconscious meaning of the words, the actions and the products of 
the imagination (dreams, phantasies, delusions) of a particular subject” (367). Since 
both of the limb conditions raise questions about the relationship between delusions 
and illusions of one’s coherence that cannot be understood in the medical world, 
analysing the syndromes from a psychoanalytic perspective is vital. 
Norman Doidge writes that the mirror-box is a treatment that “uses 
imagination and illusion to restructure brain maps plastically without medication, 
needles, or electricity” (194). In this sense, therefore, it is a kind of embodiment of 
psychoanalysis, as psychoanalysis is interested in how symbolising elements of the 
imagination and illusion (dream work, for instance), can alter one’s mind and 
actions. Here, however, Doidge writes that the mirror-box can alter the brain 
(rather than the mind), which indicates that the mind and body are inseparable, 
and continually altering one another (an idea I return to throughout this thesis, also 
in relation to the way in which texts can alter the mind and body). Dreams, for 
instance, are central to analysis, where they are not only considered inseparable 
from reality, but provide clues to understanding pain. A fantasy may illuminate 
how and why a patient may unwillingly repeat painful experiences. Psychoanalysis 
then, as Doidge writes of the mirror-box, works by “fighting one illusion with 
another” (186). If PLP and a patient’s pain can be altered through fantasy, perhaps 
this is because, according to Doidge, “‘pain is an illusion’ and […] ‘our mind is a 
virtual reality machine,’ which experiences the world indirectly and processes it at 
one remove, constructing a model in our head. So pain, like the body image, is a 
construct of our brain” (192). The mirror-box and analysis, therefore, can be 
effective because they work in a removed space that plays with image, material 
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reality, the psyche, and moreover, a specific form of emptiness (inside the room and 
inside the mirror-box, or the mirror itself), a concept I will expand upon later in 
this chapter.  
As mentioned, although Ramachandran uses creative, imaginative, and 
untypically scientific tools to explore the BIID and phantom limb disorders, he 
insists upon finding a biological cause. In The Tell-Tale Brain (2010), he writes that 
apotemnophilia is sometimes seen as arising from a Freudian wish-fulfilment 
fantasy because a limb resembles a penis. However, Ramachandran finds “these 
psychological explanations unconvincing. The condition usually begins early in life, 
and it is unlikely that a ten-year-old would desire a giant penis (although an 
orthodox Freudian wouldn’t rule it out)” (Tell- Tale 255). First, Ramachandran’s 
logic is questionable here, as it would seem that, from this point of view, a child 
would want to castrate a penis, rather than desiring one. Secondly, orthodox 
Freudian or not, I think that one of the problems in Ramachandran’s stance against 
psychoanalysis in this instance is his literal perspective, his failure to account for a 
more symbolic or abstract view. Ironically, however, it is a symbol of a limb that 
has physical results. Thus, while psychoanalysis addresses these non-rational 
processes, Ramachandran employs an empirical way of thinking that also seems to 
cloud his reading of psychoanalysis. These statements that demand answers and 
solutions illustrate a form of thought common to the sciences and to Freud’s work. 
Freud and Ramachandran are similar in this sense, as they look to cure pain 
through the mind, and by attending to individuals’ illusions (psychological illusions 
for Freud and the mirror illusion for Ramachandran). Although Ramachandran 
dissociates the mirror-box from psychoanalysis, I suggest that the mirror-box sets 
out to do what, in a different way, psychoanalysis does: to reconstitute the mind 
and body through an illusion. It, like the psychoanalytic exchange, may allow the 
individual to reintegrate her known, unknown, and imaginary notions of self 
through symbolic expression. In this way, while Ramachandran dismisses Freud’s 
theories because they are unconvincing, Freud, like Ramachandran, found that 
illusions and the imagination were vital to understanding pain. However, the 
mirror-illusion takes place through a physical object that can be visualised, and is 
thus more aligned with the empirical sciences, there is immediate proof. 
Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is a longer process that takes place through a 
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linguistic exchange in a private place. It is, moreover, often about self-discovery, as 
opposed to the simple eradication of pain.  
 A dialogue from the Yahoo! Group “Fighting It” exemplifies the scepticism 
towards psychoanalysis. In 2005, a member named Dan voiced his disbelief of 
psychoanalysis, stating that therapy proposes nothing new, that there is no 
progress. He “expect[s] [therapists] to be able to tell [him] what they propose to do 
and how it has helped others.” However, in 2009 Dan describes a positive 
experience in treatment, explaining that he and his analyst developed a theory and 
a story (related to maternal love) as to why he may have the condition, which 
enabled him to live with BIID more “happily.” In “Fighting It,” Dan writes of the 
narrative he developed with his analyst: 
 
All of this, if it is real, happened before I could remember it. That is also a 
time when things we learn become a permanent part of us. It would be 
interesting to know if other people with BIID had similar experiences, but it 
would be hard to find out without some in-depth psychoanalysis. There is 
also the risk that an analyst could create false memories and the whole thing 
is just smoke and mirrors. 
 
A physician named Larry responds to Dan’s post:  
 
“There is also the risk that an analyst could create false memories and the 
whole thing is just smoke and mirrors.” Dan: That is pretty close to what I 
think about the whole of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has never been 
shown to be effective in treating anything (more than controls, for instance). 
Psychoanalysis has been in pretty deep disrepute now for some years in 
academic and scientific medical circles. Further, what you propose is, 
basically, a non-testable hypothesis. 
 
 This dialogue interests me because it addresses many of the issues we have 
been discussing: that a method which sets out to cure BIID does not work, that a 
certain kind of psychoanalytic exploration can help us to understand the condition, 
and that many are not open to treatment due to the importance placed on empirical 
 96 
science. However, it is ironic that the one comment Larry responds to, that the 
“whole thing is just smoke and mirrors,” dramatises exactly what the mirror-box 
does: it makes a whole thing (a whole body) out of mirrors. Thus, although Larry is 
sceptical, it is exactly a mirror illusion that works to treat phantom limb pain. This 
link between the mirror-box and psychoanalysis, therefore, is not only 
metaphorical, but also affective. Rather than asking how psychoanalysis helped, 
Larry rejects it for the false memories it is bound to create. However, if both the 
mirror-box and Dan’s experience in psychoanalysis reduce pain, what, we may ask, 
is problematic about “smoke and mirrors?” I suggest that minimising the need for 
proof, and being open to a non-immediate cure and an imaginative method can 
prove beneficial. And since both PLS and BIID involve a feeling of psychosomatic 
fragmentation, the mirror treatment in PLS can be used to more comprehensively 
understand, not cure, the feelings of rupture and unity experienced by those with 
BIID. Thus, psychoanalysis focuses on the relationship between symbols, the body 
and the mind, while mirror therapy conveys that a symbol can be helpful in altering 
problems with bodily fragmentation and wholeness. By exploring psychoanalysis, 
therefore, we can understand more about the problem with bodily fragmentation 
experienced by those with BIID and PLS. I now want to investigate the 
importance of illusion and symbolism in psychoanalysis in more detail, in order to 
expand our understanding as to how “smoke and mirrors,” and narratives in 
analysis relate to textual works. How does the theory that Dan and his analyst 
developed help Dan, and how does this relate to literature? 
 
What’s the Story? Psychoanalysis and Narrative 
Dan illuminates what rests at the core of BIID and PLS: that they involve physical 
experiences that cannot be completely understood, and that a determinate cause for 
their occurrence cannot be named. Psychoanalysis worked for Dan because he and 
his analyst developed a theory; a temporary story, rather than a specific reason for 
his pain. Although the story of Dan’s childhood may have been devised in 
psychoanalysis, it is exactly this, a story, which proved beneficial.20 Since certain 
                                                
20 This stance on psychoanalysis is closely associated with a “hermeneutic” stance in psychotherapy, 
most prominently outlined in Roy Schafer’s A New Language for Psychoanalysis (1976). In short, he 
suggests that psychoanalysis is the most efficacious narrative in therapeutic terms rather than a 
reconstruction of truth. He is interested in looking toward “a new and fruitful interaction between 
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kinds of psychoanalysis and literature are interested in how stories and the 
imagination constitute the individual, and both BIID and PLS involve an imagined 
and fictional version of the self, I will investigate what psychoanalysis and 
literature, when read together, can tell us about these two phenomena. 
Psychoanalysis and literature, writes Josh Cohen, share “the task of interpreting 
forms of expression whose meanings are slippery and ambiguous” (Cohen 
“Psychoanalytic Bodies”). Perhaps, therefore, they can help us interpret the 
elements of BIID and PLS that the biomedical field struggles to decipher. I want to 
begin this exploration by discussing the links between psychoanalysis and literature 
through the work of theorist Peter Brooks.  
Brooks’ concern lies in “how narratives work on us, as readers, to create 
models of understanding, and with why we need and want such shaping orders” 
(Reading xiii). Why, asks Brooks, do individuals need fictions to shape themselves, 
and how does this work? His question, then, echoes those raised by BIID and 
PLS: the question as to why and how amputees may be driven to reshape 
themselves through a phantom, and why some individuals with four limbs feel 
disturbingly misshapen. In relation to these issues, Brooks is concerned with how 
psychoanalytic and literary studies are interested in how one is shaped through 
narratives, and why it is important to develop this relationship. He writes, 
“[p]sychoanalysis matters to us as literary critics because it stands as a constant 
reminder that the attention to form, properly conceived, is not a sterile formalism, 
but rather one more attempt to draw the symbolic and fictional map of our place in 
existence” (“Idea” 348). In psychoanalysis, a subject’s story can be modified 
through the analyst’s presence, in turn (ostensibly) psychically and somatically 
reshaping the individual. Psychoanalytic narratives, explains Brooks, are not 
stable. They are open, transformative, and capable of producing change, similar to 
certain types of literary narratives. Brooks explains that literature and 
psychoanalysis can create these transformations through symbols. This sheds light 
on how the phantom limb is modified through the mirror-box, as the mirror illusion 
stands for the phantom limb, a fiction of one’s completion.  
                                                                                                                                      
psychoanalysis and all those intellectual disciplines concerned with the study of human beings as 
persons” (Schafer xi). In so doing, he attends to what he calls “action language,” which includes 
psychological activity “that can be made public through gesture and speech … [and] has some goal-
directed or symbolic properties” (Schafer 10). 
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Brooks suggests that the human drive to make sense of oneself in the world 
through stories is related to a desire for wholeness. For Brooks, the desire for 
narrative, writes Harold Schweizer, has its “motivation in the reader’s or patient’s 
fundamental need to counteract his dismemberment with at least a symbolic form 
of presence – even if that presence can only be in language, the presence of an 
other” (Reading 16). The psychoanalytic patient may go to analysis in order to more 
thoroughly understand a feeling of rupture, as a “dismembered” reader might 
experience a symbolic form of presence through a text. Paralleling this concept, an 
amputee’s dismemberment can be counteracted with a symbolic form of presence: 
the mirror illusion (which, as explained in the introduction, is a kind of symbol), 
and in this way, the mirror image is related to language. They can both diminish 
fragmentation with a symbolic presence. While the process of soothing a feeling of 
rupture can be productive in psychoanalysis and literature (though in different 
ways, which I soon develop), the desire to “counteract dismemberment” is painful 
for those with BIID and PLS. Like the literary text, writes Brooks, psychoanalysis 
“reconfirms the presence of the analysand, reveals him – in his state of 
dismemberment – as the subject of a story, through which telling the patient might 
become (temporarily) whole – as whole at least as the story itself” (Psychoanalysis 
17).  
This concerns a kind of storytelling that can be useful in psychoanalytic and 
literary processes; as Brooks contends, they have the capacity to alter the 
analysand or reader. I will later address (particularly in relation to Blanchot’s 
thoughts on literature), how reading is not only a passive experience, but an active 
one; however, I note that reading differs, in that psychoanalysis is concerned with 
healing (which I later discuss). Since they both have the capacity to transform the 
reader or analysand, however, it is important to explore what they convey about 
PLS and BIID. While individuals with these conditions struggle with a drive 
towards wholeness, psychoanalysis and literature often turn away from 
“completion” and towards ambiguity. I will thus be examining psychoanalytic and 
literary theories that are interested in obscurity, an interest which Brooks suggests 
creates a “healthy narrative” (Reading 282), as opposed to that which¾similar to 
the amputees’ drive towards wholeness and the BIID drive for completion¾strives 
towards a definitive and stable original whole. Since the mirror-box breaks up an 
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idea of unity through a symbol (of the invisible limb), it presents a different kind of 
“healthy narrative,” albeit non-linguistic. The “story” of temporary wholeness is 
told through bodily symbols, which, although similar to those open-ended stories in 
some literature and analysis, cannot be comprehended because it does not involve 
language. It is because certain kinds of literature and psychoanalysis use language 
to read how we are shaped by the imagination that these frameworks cast a 
different light upon the conditions. 
In order to further understand the psychoanalytic and literary interest in 
narratives, I turn to Brook’s “Fictions of the Wolf Man” in Reading for the Plot 
(1984). The chapter examines how Freud’s case study of the “Wolf Man,” in “From 
the History of an Infantile Neurosis” (1918) dramatised his switch from aiming to 
find the analysand’s “true history” in session to admitting the inability to do so. 
Although I will soon examine the “Wolf Man” case study in detail, for now it is 
necessary to know that it chronicles the childhood of Sergei Pankejeff, a twenty-
three-year-old who consulted Freud because he had suffered from a physical 
collapse, a gonorrhoeal infection, and an incapacity for independence. The patient 
additionally revealed a childhood ridden with neurotic disorders that led to an 
anxiety dream, which became the subject of Freud’s essay. In this dream, 
Pankejeff’s bedroom window opened of its own accord, revealing an image of six or 
seven wolves with large tails, atop a tree. Frightened of being eaten, Pankejeff 
screamed and woke up. Brooks writes that in analysis, Freud used the dream to 
decipher the patient’s life history. However, this process entailed a more scientific 
account of the imagination, which proved problematic. This analysis, I suggest, is 
reflective of the neurological models currently being applied to BIID and PLS. 
Both methods, in other words, involve a desire to grasp an original meaning. 
Brooks contends that Freud’s case study exhibits a  
 
reality structured as a set of ambiguous signs which gain their meaning from 
a past history that must be uncovered so as to order the production of these 
signs as a chain of events, eventually with a clear origin, intention, and 
solution, and with strong causal connections between each link. (Reading 
270) 
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Through the patient’s dreams, Freud attempted to unearth a more cohesive and 
comprehensible history. However, explains Brooks, the “Wolf Man” case study 
conveys a change in direction as Freud began to realise the impossibility of defining 
Pankejeff’s past. He admits that a biographical story cannot be proved: the “case is 
properly undecidable” (Brooks, Reading 277). As opposed to a specific narrative, 
what Freud unearths is that how “we narrate a life¾even our own life within an 
orderly narrative […] is dictated by desire” (Brooks, Reading 281). Psychoanalysis, 
at this point, became less directed towards empirical science and moved towards a 
more ambiguous framework. For Brooks, this parallels a change in the field of 
literature: a movement away from formalism and towards modernism wherein the 
“insistent past must be allowed to write its design at the same time one attempts to 
unravel it” (Brooks, Reading 282). I will now investigate how this concern with 
unravelling plays out in the analyst’s room and in literature by returning to the 
concept of transference. 
 Transference is the carrying over of all dimensions of previous and 
especially the earliest relationships. It is when the patient sees in the analyst “the 
return, the reincarnation, of some important figure out of his childhood or past, and 
consequently transfers on to him feelings and reactions which undoubtedly applied 
to this prototype” (Freud, Outline 52). In psychoanalysis, this “remembering” is not 
an “attempt to bring a particular moment or problem into focus.” The purpose is 
rather to “recognis[e] the resistances which appear there, and mak[e] them 
conscious to the patient” (Freud, “Remembering” 147). By disclosing repressed 
impulses through a linguistic exchange, the analyst may reduce the likelihood of 
repetition. As noted in the introduction, transference both stands for and re-enacts 
the past, and in this way, affects an individual’s reality, just as literature and the 
mirror-box can involve fictions that can change the way a person feels. This kind of 
fictional re-enactment, suggests Brooks, is also involved in the process of reading. 
He writes that transference and literature present a “perpetually reversing 
counterpoint of self and other, closure and opening, origin and process” (Brooks, 
Reading 283), which counters the attempt to find a specific cause, an attempt 
sometimes problematic in biomedical research. While BIID and PLS demonstrate a 
drive towards wholeness, reflective of several scientific models, the mirror-box 
reflects a more open psychoanalytic and literary endeavour, as it does not aim to 
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find a definitive reason for the phantom; it simply makes it visible. This kind of 
open exchange is integral to certain types of poetry. As Trilling writes, “Freudian 
psychology is the one which makes poetry indigenous to the very constitution of 
the mind. Indeed, the mind, as Freud sees it, is in this greater part of its tendency 
exactly a poetry-making organ” (52). Here, Trilling is alluding to the ambiguous 
vicissitudes of the unconscious mind. Similar to some poetic forms, the unconscious 
is non-linear; its meanings cannot be “known,” it does not contain objective 
answers or “[compress] the elements into a unity” (Trilling 53). In relation to this, 
while BIID and PLS also involve drives to “compress elements into a unity,” mirror 
therapy and certain kinds of literature and psychoanalysis do not. Although the 
mirror-box is curative and literature is not, we will soon develop links between the 
healing possibilities of literature and the mirror-box.  
Although Freud created “coherent, finished enclosed, and authoritative 
narrative[s]” (Elliot 277) for his patients, this began to shift in the “Wolf Man” case 
study, also shifting the entire psychoanalytic project. Throughout the study, Freud 
continually returns to the (previously noted) dream in an aim “to trace memories of 
sexual scenes back to an original trauma, to a defining event in childhood through 
which seductions and symptoms could be put into an orderly structure” (Elliot 17). 
Freud proclaims that in “the course of the treatment we often came back to the 
dream but only arrived at a complete understanding of it during the last months of 
the therapy” (“From the History” 221). Here, Freud expresses both a belief that he 
has arrived at a definite answer, and also uncertainty, as he continually returned to 
and altered his interpretations. Through the process of analysis, Freud came to the 
conclusion that Pankejeff’s trauma may have occurred when “consciousness in the 
child has not yet developed its full range of characteristics and is not yet entirely 
capable of being converted into language-pictures” (“From the History” 292). 
Traumas, then, are not reproduced as memories but are the results of 
reconstruction. Though the child was too young comprehend a traumatic 
experience, she was affected by it and left with incoherent traumatic impressions, 
and thus, it is not the trauma itself, but the memory that is traumatic. Freud’s 
recognition here that we cannot accurately remember all traumas created a shift in 
his focus, as he began to explore the “complex, muddied way in which external 
events are suffused with fantasy and desire” (Elliot 17); science, here, became more 
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ambiguous. Paralleling Freud’s endeavour, the neurobiological field often attempts 
to find answers for BIID, however, from this Freudian perspective, the desire to 
self-amputate may refer to something unknown. PLS differs, however, as the 
trauma is bodily and visible, and yet, the amputee creates a fantasy in reaction to 
this trauma for unknown reasons. This can serve to demonstrate that individuals 
do, in some cases, react to a traumatic wound by developing a fantasy that fills this 
wound. PLS, therefore, is an embodied form of, and a more concrete example of 
the way in which (according to Freud) we develop fetishistic fantasies to replace 
traumatic wounds. For Freud, a wound can be repaired by analysing the psyche 
through a linguistic exchange, rather than by attempting to discover “true” 
experiences (although this wavers throughout his work). As he writes, “psychical 
reality was of more importance than material reality” (Autobiographical 37). 
Psychoanalysis thus moved away from a medical exploration of neurosis and 
towards an analysis of the human imagination; of how early childhood fantasies 
shaped future realities, thoughts, and physical reactions. BIID and PLS, since they 
both involve an imaginary version of one’s completion, must also be studied from a 
model that focuses on the importance of the human imagination. However, since 
the two syndromes, like the traumas and fantasies in the unconscious mind and the 
experiences that occurred before they could be comprehended, cannot be 
completely understood through language, how can we begin to understand them? I 
turn to André Green to explore this question, because, as mentioned in the 
introduction, both of these syndromes have delusional elements, which are 
connected to Freud’s concept of psychosis,21 and while Freud considered psychotic 
patients “unsuitable for psychoanalysis” (Green, “Hallucinatory” 79), Green is 
interested in asking how else we can think about the psychotic mind. Thus, I now 
explore how Green’s theories can open ways of thinking about the delusional 
elements of BIID and PLS, and moreover, what this can convey about the split 
between wholeness and fragmentation that is central to these two conditions. 
 
Negative Hallucination 
Some analysts after Freud returned to the concept of psychosis, theorising that, in 
fact, it may be analysable if perceived through a different lens, one that thinks 
                                                
21 For more on this see Freud’s The Future of an Illusion (1927). 
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about language in a different way. One of these theorists is Melanie Klein, who 
suggested that psychotic states in childhood are central to human development, and 
that this psychical structure correlates with how we use (and cannot use) scientific 
language. “In early infancy,” she writes, “anxieties characteristic of psychosis arise 
which drive the ego to develop specific defence-mechanisms.” Although this does 
not suggest that all infants are psychotic, the “psychotic anxieties, mechanisms and 
ego-defences of infancy have a profound influence on development in all its aspects, 
including the development of the ego, super-ego and object relations” (“Notes” 99). 
Klein’s development of in object relations theory¾which focuses on how symbols 
(linguistic and otherwise) form and inform objective and subjective notions of 
self¾provides a different view of language. For Klein, unconscious fantasies “have 
both psychic and bodily effects [….]. They even determine the minutiae of the 
body language” (Isaacs qtd. in Ellwood). This perspective allowed Klein to return 
to Freud’s “disinclination for tackling psychotics” (Green, “Hallucinatory”124), and 
thus, provides a way for us to understand more about apotemnophilia and the 
phantom limb condition. Although these conditions are not labelled psychotic, they 
do consist of psychotic mechanisms. 
According to Klein, psychotics face an intolerably painful “reality” or an 
over-intensity of instincts, which are echoed in the BIID and phantom limb 
syndromes: both phenomena involve an intolerable feeling, while the drive to be 
complete is intense enough to cause delusions. Klein theorises that infants develop 
psychoses based on the ego’s introjection and projection of good and bad objects. 
The blueprint for this is the mother’s breast, which is a good object when it is 
available, and bad when absent. This bad object both encapsulates a projection of 
the baby’s own aggression, and is also seen as being dangerous. She writes: “[o]ne 
of the earliest methods of defence against the dread of persecutors, whether 
conceived of as existing in the external world or internalised, is that of 
scotomization, the denial of psychic reality; this may result in a considerable restriction 
of the mechanisms of introjection and projection and in the denial of external 
reality, and it forms the basis of the most severe psychoses” (“A Contribution,” 117 
emphasis in original). For Klein, it is essential for the baby to develop good objects 
in order to integrate her ego. This concept of projecting and introjecting objects¾ 
that parts of oneself can be directed onto others through fantasy¾is what founds 
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object relations theory. The theory hinges upon the way in which an infant 
develops its psyche in relation to others, a theory integral to my thesis because it 
focuses on how one is formed through the environment. Wilfred Bion is also an 
object relations theorist, who follows Klein, who added “the innovation of a theory 
of thinking […] at the basis of psychosis” (Green, “Hallucinatory”125), his focus 
centring upon Klein’s model of the fragmented self.  
As Birksted-Breen writes, “[t]he emphasis on the destruction of psychic 
links in the mind has been one of the central contributions of Bion and has been 
studied as a characteristic of psychotic functioning” (“General” 39). Again we are 
reminded of the delusions and rupture involved in BIID and PLS, lending yet 
another perspective on the syndromes’ relation to psychosis. Bion additionally 
writes about the mind’s split, as for him, splitting can lead to further 
fragmentation¾ a concept that is central object relations theory. Specifically, 
object relations theorists are predominantly concerned with how a psychical split 
relates to subjectivity/objectivity, how an individual creates her own personal 
borders, and how she is shaped through somatic and pre-linguistic experiences. In 
relation to this, both conditions concern shaping oneself within the environment, as 
those with BIID wish to physically reshape their bodies, and those with PLS react 
to a change or difference in bodily form, and can be healed by visualising a physical 
shape of bodily unity. These reactions, as stated, cannot be thoroughly understood 
through language, and thus, here, I turn to theorists interested in the way in which 
linguistic and bodily absences are intertwined. I begin with psychoanalyst André 
Green, because he focuses on how language is connected to the split described in 
Freud’s “Wolf Man” case study, the split reflective of that in BIID and PLS. For 
Green, this split is not only central to the mind, but to language itself. To provide a 
little context, Green is aligned with object relations theorists, and developed a 
concept thought fundamental to studying psychosis, called “negative hallucination.” 
Though Freud introduced the term in 1890 (to refer to a lack in perception), for 
Green, negative hallucination is “the representation of the absence of representation” 
(Green, “The Work” 363 emphasis in original), a specific and indefinable lack. 
Since those with BIID feel as though their bodies represent their own absence, and 
the phantom limb is a subjective representation of an absent limb, it is helpful to 
look at the conditions from Green’s perspective. 
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Negation is the term central to Green’s work, which is connected to Bion’s 
and Winnicott’s ideas about how containment and holding found “the symbolic 
matrices of thought” (Green, On Private 139), but different in that he emphasises the 
“silent, invisible, and ‘imperceptible’” (Green, On Private 139). Green is interested in 
a negation that precedes containment; it, negation, is “the theoretical concept which 
is the precondition for any theory of representation, whether it is dreams or 
hallucination which is concerned” (Green, “The Work” 363). Negation fames and 
enables representation, laying the groundwork for thought. In this way, negative 
hallucination has both a negative side (linked to destruction) and a positive (central 
to one’s ability to think and represent). “Periodically, then, everyone may resort to 
the mechanism of negative hallucination without there being any serious 
consequences for their psychic functioning” (Green, On Private 111). For Green, the 
double here (positive and negative) is exemplified in the “Wolf Man’s” 
acknowledgement and denial of castration. To explore negative hallucination, 
Green analyses Pankejeff’s three hallucinations of the severed finger in Freud’s 
case study, which I suggest are also reflective of BIID and PLS.  
In “The Work of the Negative and Hallucinatory Activity” (1999), Green 
reminds us of the three hallucinations and memories the “Wolf Man” recalled in his 
Freudian analysis: in the first the patient hallucinated having cut his finger, but 
could not look at or experience the pain. In the second he claims that this was false, 
that actually in the hallucination the tree shed blood when he cut it with a knife. 
Finally, Pankejeff remembers having a relative with six toes, whose extra toe was 
amputated. To analyse this, Green gathers traces of specific absences within 
Pankejeff’s story: the “void which separates the finger from the hand, the absence 
of pain, the silence, the state of collapse and above all the inability to look” (“The 
Work” 362). By directing attention to absences, and ultimately the extra toe 
memory, Green begins to unpack the more abstract negation that underlies the 
specific silences in Pankejeff’s hallucination. This is clear in the patient’s immediate 
rejection of the first hallucination (in which his finger was cut), because he negates 
the hallucination as immediately as it is described. Pankejeff denies its pain, and 
claims that the memory was false. If the cut is analogueous to castration, suggests 
Green, Pankejeff is identifying with his mother (as Freud believes that the child 
thinks the mother is castrated). However, the patient also instantly rejects the 
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castration, because he denies the hallucination as immediately as it is described. 
In the second hallucination, when the patient himself cuts the tree, Green 
suggests that he identifies with his father because, as Freud believes, the child who 
witnessed his parents’ coitus a tergo thought that the father was cutting off the 
mother’s penis (again, a problematic theory on several accounts). This 
identification, and simultaneous rejection of Pankejeff’s mother and father, 
illuminates a type of “dual logic”: the ambivalence in both recognising and refusing 
castration within the same delusion. The example thus sheds different light upon 
the significance of the mind’s split and how it relates to the apotemnophile. 
Interestingly, he explains, the memory discloses both “[r]ecognition and denial: 
there is indeed a cut connected with a violent bodily amputation, but it leaves 
bodily integrity intact and even makes it more ‘normal’” (Green, “Hallucinatory” 
97). There is an obvious similarity, therefore, with apotemnophiles who also feel 
more intact and normal when amputated. For Green, a similar paradoxical split is 
central to all human thought. He writes, “[i]nstead of bringing about a union, the 
work of the negative separates and obstructs all choice and positive investment” 
(“The Work” 360); the removal of the extra toe, and the desire to remove a limb in 
BIID, both aim towards an idea of unity through destruction. The concept of 
wholeness in both scenarios is predicated upon amputating an excess (as Peter 
removed his “excessive” body parts in the desire for unity). The “Wolf Man” and 
Peter, therefore, both deny and accept fracture, which they have no choice but to 
sustain by creating a specific form of absence. They are constituted through a split 
from which they cannot escape and must maintain through a delusion, one that 
enacts both destruction and completion. In Green’s words, those who cannot 
accept a “yes” or “no” “have preferred to play the role of a prosthesis upholding the 
disavowal of castration, right to the end” (“The Work” 361). Green sometimes 
refers to this position as a borderline (a more psychotic) case: to “be a borderline 
implies that a border protects one’s self from crossing over or from being crossed 
over, from being invaded, and thus becoming a moving border (not having, but being 
such a border)” (On Private, 63 emphasis in original). It protects against identifying 
with the “castrated mother” and the “castrating father,” and from the environment. 
Pankejeff exemplifies this because he, as depicted by the hallucination, carries 
around a split. The BIID and phantom limb individuals are manifestations of this 
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borderline state because they are moving borders. They both obscure and suspend a 
loss, carving themselves out either through (from this perspective) self-castration 
or an imaginary bodily frame. 
Though Green aligns Pankejeff’s borderline example with psychosis here, 
he does not believe the patient to be unanalysable or psychotic because the 
subject’s concept of objective reality “coexists with his psychic reality” (On Private 
230). Thus, analysing the syndromes from Green’s viewpoint is helpful in forming 
an idea of psychosis that does not attempt to reach a certain truth, as we saw Freud 
struggle to do, and as demonstrated in neurologists’ struggles to define BIID and 
PLS. Since Green contends that a fissured state is common not only to psychosis, 
but to other forms of thought, this acts as a starting point to explore the two 
syndromes. He writes: “I would simply point out that structured thought is only 
established in discontinuity and that this structuring discontinuity involves, in the 
spaces, the blank which constitutes any chain of thought” (“The Work” 363). 
However, in psychosis, the blank pre-representational state persists, leaving the 
individual in a more primitive state that hinders the ability to represent, and 
making psychosis possible to study, but difficult to find. Green contends that since 
language is structured through representations, it is a problematic tool for 
exploring psychosis. Perhaps by learning more about how language is connected to 
negative hallucination¾to that fragmentation that precedes representation¾we 
can more adequately approach the psychotic rationale. Green writes that negative 
hallucination “carries out its informative function by making us aware of how its 
object is ‘blanked out’ and leaves a mark by the very manner in which it 
disappears” (Green, On Private 138). It makes us aware that there is a blank that 
must and yet cannot be filled.  
Green found that psychotic patients tend to show linguistic difficulties, and 
must therefore embody an unusually prominent form of negative hallucination. 
Although in analysis, psychotic patients do not recognise and use words in a 
“normal” manner, he argues that psychosis is analysable, but calls for a different 
form of analysis. If the analyst listens to the “blanks” in a patient’s speech, he 
suggests, meaning can be disclosed. To do this, the analyst must “arrange things 
[language] in such a way that it reveals itself spontaneously” (Green, On Private 78). 
The analyst and patient in this scenario use “the negative in their own way; the 
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delirious patient positivises it, the analyst negativises it a second time in order to 
represent not thought, but meaning. A bridge thrown between the two allows them 
to meet mid-way” (Green, “The Work” 366). For example, if the “Wolf Man” 
positivises a negative through the hallucination of a cut finger, the analyst may 
speak in a certain way that brings forth other thoughts, like the relative’s memory 
of the extra toe. Here, both patient and analyst can gather images together in a 
therapeutic setting without promising a cure or explanation, and through this 
dialogue, meaning may be revealed and used to more thoroughly understand the 
patient, and perhaps even decrease the need for psychotic/borderline defences. I 
suggest that this process can shed light on how the mirror-box works to comfort to 
the patient because it, like the analyst in this model, negativises the phantom limb 
delusion a second time. The mirror-box shows the individual’s underlying negation 
through a representation to help her cope with destruction. It allows the amputee 
to see herself through a symbol, which also provides a different way of viewing 
how the analyst in Green’s theory discloses a patient’s hidden representations. I 
want to provide a deeper understanding of these ideas by turning to a case study 
that ties these strands of thoughts together. The study exemplifies how the body 
acts as a carrier for the psyche, how listening to blanks within texts and language in 
order to symbolise hidden fantasies plays a role in helping decrease bodily wounds.  
 
Interrupting Nothing: Psychosomatics and “The Man from Burma” 
In Marilia Aisenstein’s case study, “Psychosomatic Solution or Somatic Outcome: 
The Man from Burma – psychotherapy of a case of haemorrhagic rectocolitis” (1993), she 
writes about her experience with a patient, “Mr. L,” who had a life-threatening 
haemorrhagic rectocolitis (a disease of the colon). Through analysis, she began to 
discover that his body had registered repressed psychical wounds, that his 
“thought-activity was split-off” (Aisenstein, “Man from” 463) and as she began to 
unearth “symbolic meaning” (Aisenstein, “Man from” 468) though a certain kind of 
psychoanalytic dialogue, the patient’s illness subsided. In order to find meaning, 
she listened, not to the words that he was saying (as his language was unusually 
factual and unemotional), but to the deficiencies in his speech. At one point, by 
asking a question about a dream, she discovered that he had repressed a trauma, 
and he began to reveal the split-off part of himself concerning his wife. He was able 
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to access his unconscious fantasies and the somatic illness dissipated. Although this 
method is similar to Freud’s, it differs in that, firstly, Aisenstein attempts to avoid 
the “cohesive” narratives that (as discussed) Freud struggled with. She believed 
that interpretations might only re-traumatise the patient and increase his somatic 
symptoms, and thus communicated with him in a fragmented manner. Aisenstein’s 
study is additionally related to a concept developed by Pierre Marty and Michel de 
M’Uzan, called “operational thinking,” wherein “drive-related excitation that fails 
to find an outlet in the mind through ideational representations and affects is 
discharged by means of behaviour and/or somatisation” (Birksted-Breen 439). The 
concept echoes what Freud called “actual neuroses,” which he deemed unsuitable 
for psychoanalytic treatment due to a difficulty in identifying patients’ emotions. 
However, those in the School of Psychosomatics, of which Aisenstein was 
affiliated, believed that it was possible. Thus, Aisenstein’s study differs from Freud 
in that it takes an interest in the psychotic mind-set, which Freud believed to be un-
analysable. Since, as I have suggested, the phantom limb and BIID involve 
psychotic mechanisms, and cannot be explained linguistically, her study is helpful 
in allowing us to think about both conditions. Moreover, it exemplifies the way in 
which physical wounds may be stored in the mind. As we will see, there is a 
difference between those with BIID and Mr. L, because Mr. L’s wound shows up 
on his body, and those with BIID have more choice (they are driven to destroy 
their body). However, Mr. L acts as an example for the way in which the soma can 
register a psychical wound, and how this can be worked-through by listening to 
language in a certain way. In this reading, I will suggest that Aisenstein’s 
questioning of patient’s “fantasies” (dreams) and her discovery of his “split-off” self 
also reflects the mirror-box therapy, as here, it is an illusion, a fantasy of self, that 
has a similar affect (a fantasy of self-heals a bodily pain). In this way, the mirror-
box is a both a metaphor for the process in this analytic case and an embodiment of 
it.  
 Marilia Aisenstein has “been very influenced in [her] research by the work 
of André Green, on narcissism, destructiveness, and what he calls the work of the 
negative” (Aisenstein “Indissociable” 678). However, her research focuses on 
patients’ physical reactions to psychological distress. She writes: the 
“psychoanalytic treatment of patients suffering from somatic disorders is a return to 
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the very sources of the psychoanalytic quest” (“Indissociable” 668). Her particular 
project centres upon how patients’ fantasies can subdue a bodily illness. In “The 
Indissociable Unity of Psyche and Soma” (2006), Aisenstein explains that in 
practice, she has “been confronted with patients who treat their bodies ‘like a 
foreign land’. The body thus becomes the site of enactments that may be explosive” 
(678). The link to the BIID sufferer here is obvious: the individual feels that her 
(whole) body is alien, and subjects it to violent acts. This chapter began by raising 
the question as to how we can explore the phantom limb and apotemnophilia 
outside the empirical system that has been predominantly employed up to this 
point, which Aisenstein confirms is the case in most psychosomatic situations: “[i]t 
is unusual for patients suffering from a somatic illness to be treated by psycho-
analysis rather than by a strictly medical intervention. This means that the suffering 
body was excluded from the field of psychoanalysis” (“Indissociable” 668). Hence, 
not only has this scientific viewpoint restricted psychoanalytic endeavours in the 
medical field, but it has also stifled studies of the body within psychoanalysis. 
Perhaps this is partially why most psychoanalysis that has been applied to the BIID 
and PLS has not been particularly helpful. Psychosomatic theory speaks to this 
lack in the field, as Aisenstein conveys in looking for a non-scientific and open-
ended “solution” to bodily symptoms. In so doing, she alludes to a problem with 
scientific logic, because, like Larry (the physician with BIID we saw in the earlier 
“Fighting It” conversation¾though to a lesser degree), Mr. L epitomises a 
scientific way of thinking: he is uninterested in any deviation from fact. Closed off 
to abstract ideas, the patient, Aisenstein explains, had difficulties speaking about 
anything non-factual. He read no literature or fiction, indicating his fear of 
absorbing the non-concrete, and was very diligent at performing tasks, indicating a 
preference for physical action over thought. In analysis, Aisenstein initially echoed 
his linguistic patterns. She writes, “I gave him a very ‘scientific’ explanation of the 
mechanisms of nightmare and of the sleep-dream system. I was thereby trying to 
enable him to take an interest, as a scientist, in his mental apparatus, and hence in 
its functioning – a phase which might precede familiarisation with his own mental 
productions” (“Man from” 468). By engaging in the patient’s form of thinking, she 
felt as though she could both understand him more effectively and also engender a 
more comfortable setting. She believed that this would create a safe space that 
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could enable the subject to expose more of to his own psyche and break down his 
defences. As in Dan’s situation, opening up to a reading outside science can be 
helpful in disclosing a cut-off past, whether fictional or not. 
Mr. L’s life-threatening haemorrhagic rectocolitis (which he was about to 
treat through a dangerous surgical removal of a colon and artificial opening in the 
stomach) came about just after he suddenly decided to give up smoking, which 
Aisenstein suggested could be seen as “self-castration.” She alludes to this 
“castration” perhaps because it illustrates the link between the psychical and 
physical: that in this instance he attempts to physically control a lack. The subject 
also had difficulty withstanding silences, which she believed gestured towards a 
desire to control empty spaces. This desire, Aisenstein suggested, may have shown 
up on the body in the patient’s drive to cut open the vacant space in his stomach 
and colon (the surgical removal). The silences that had been erased from Mr. L’s 
speech, in other words, may have needed a place to go, in turn manifesting upon 
the body. Mr. L’s “concrete” form of speaking finally slipped when he said Burma 
instead of Bulgaria (when discussing something mundane), a mistake that opened a 
previously disavowed traumatic history. The more questions the analyst asked in 
relation to this slip, the more she learned about his past, dreams, and less logical 
mental processes. What was primarily revealed was that Mr. L had divorced his 
first wife, after which she went to Burma and was stabbed to death in the stomach. 
He did not want to discuss this however, because it might “reopen old wounds” 
(Aisenstein, “Man from” 468). However, the case study suggests that disavowing 
this memory had painful effects: it caused the closed-off wounds to open themselves 
upon his body. Since he ignored them psychically, the wounds manifested 
themselves physically. However, they also saved him, in a way, by bringing him to 
analysis where he was given the space to formulate a more robust identity. Thus, 
Mr. L’s mental lack was counteracted with a bodily wound, which turns our 
attention to something central to the two syndromes: to how the body and mind 
counteract one another. While the phantom limb is more clearly a psychical 
account of physical pain, BIID (especially in light of this case study) suggests a 
physical record of a mental rupture. In the case of Mr. L, Aisenstein was able to 
engender a more illogical conversation by resurrecting these wounds in analysis, 
and together, they formed a healing factual and fictional history. Mr. L proceeded 
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to reveal problems with his current wife concerning building a house and having a 
child. These problems, she suggested, were also suggestive of his desire to control 
emptiness, perhaps alluding to a hidden trauma. However, Aisenstein continually 
acknowledged her inability to confirm any of these histories, memories, or theories. 
This admission is dramatised in her writing, as she refers to other 
psychoanalysts’ theories throughout the study, often hinting at how they may have 
influenced her own interpretations. In so doing, Aisenstein is attempting to avoid 
the trap that Freud fell into: of allowing a theory to dictate a case, rather than 
creating a mutually fragmented interpretation. For example, in discussing the 
traumatic death of Mr. L’s first wife, Aisenstein speculated that lacks in speech 
were the most significant parts of the dialogue, that the more something had been 
disavowed, the more painful it must have been. She wondered: does this result from 
the patient’s attempt to “reactivate the primal fantasy of seduction of the child by the 
adult and, with it, one of the forms of the threat of castration?” (“Man from” 469 
emphasis in original). Here, Aisenstein acknowledged that Freud’s “seduction 
theory”22 may be applicable, while also recognising that it may not (due to the 
statement’s ambiguity). These questions, she conveys, can never be answered. This 
method of ambiguous writing may also confront the reader with her own tendency 
to draw conclusions, because there is room to question Aisenstein’s references. We 
are thus reminded of the phantom limb sufferer, because the amputee fills a lack 
with a completion that feels true. This notion of filling a lack with unity is ruptured 
in Aisenstein’s study, as she conveys the reader’s, the patient’s, and her own 
proclivity to complete the story. She acknowledges that she will borrow from other 
analysts’ theories to connect Mr. L’s language, body, and fantasies. 
One case study discussed in “The Indissociable Unity of Psyche and Soma” 
(2006) exemplifies Green’s influence, because it revealed how affects are “turned 
into sensory impressions or, rather, into signs in the body” (Aisenstein, 
                                                
22 Between the years of 1895 and 1897, Freud developed a theory that neuroses stem from childhood 
experiences of sexual seduction. However, just as he had begun to question the primal scene’s 
veracity, upon further studying the scene of seduction, he also began to question its truth. In a letter 
to Wilhelm Fleiss he wrote, there “‘are no indications of reality in the unconscious, so that one 
cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect.... Now I have no 
idea of where I stand’” (qtd. in Lebeau, Angels 6). The theory’s veracity was ultimately questioned 
when Freud found that a vast majority of patients confirmed his suggestion that they had suffered 
from sexual seduction, suggesting that he may have imposed this narrative upon them, thus causing 
him to abandon the theory in 1897. 
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“Indissociable” 671). Since the phantom limb and apotemnophilia call for exactly 
this type of exploration (because they are physical problems that words cannot 
fully explain or cure), Aisenstein’s ideas help us think about them differently. 
Furthermore, Aisenstein is interested in the most beneficial ways of using language 
to trace the latent stories behind one’s wounds, which is also conveyed in her style 
of writing (which is fragmented and makes literary references). Her case study 
refers to literature and philosophy, thereby exemplifying the importance of using 
literature and psychoanalysis together. Accordingly, she uses a line from 
Mallarmé’s poem “A Throw of Dice” in “The Man from Burma,” which reads, “‘Un 
coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard’ [‘A cast of dice will never abolish chance’]” (476 
emphasis in original). It is implied that the poem, like the patient, can be 
interpreted ad infinitum: “‘Toute pensé émet un coup de dés’ [‘Every thought produces a 
cast of dice’]” (Aisenstein, “Man from” 476 emphasis in original). By using 
Mallarmé’s language, which, as Maurice Blanchot writes, “does not imply anyone 
who expresses it, or anyone who hears it: it speaks itself and writes itself” (The Work, 
41 emphasis in original), Aisenstein foregrounds the importance of subjective 
language, thus echoing her own experience with Mr. L. This, I suggest, illuminates 
the phantom limb and BIID conditions, as Mr. L’s body carries a loss and is in this 
sense a symbol of loss itself, a symbol that cannot be completely explained through 
language. Rather than attempting to explain (as Freud found problematic in the 
“Wolf Man”), Aisenstein subdues the patient’s physical wounds by unveiling his 
dreams and fantasies, a process that is materialised in the mirror-box, which erases 
pain through an illusion. She suggests that it is not the analyst or patient who has 
the authority, but the expression itself,  
In the analytic exchange, she states, “while the intention was to open the 
way to chains of representations, there was a risk of blocking the process by 
interpretations which, although correct, might be premature and might stoke up the 
instinctual side before the establishment of a representational system” (“Man from” 
473). She is careful not to re-traumatise the patient by confronting him with too 
many interpretations or breaking down his defences too quickly. Aisenstein 
explains that she and Mr. L are both (re)creating the story of his past, and that 
since it is formed through fantasies and dreams, it is partially fictive. They are 
devising a story together through the fantasies and thoughts that emerge from their 
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conversation, in order to help the patient to, in a sense, fill in his blanks without 
closing them off. This raises the question as to how split-off traumas can be traced 
through fantasies, which can be visualised in the mirror-box (as it presents an 
illusion of a foreign part of oneself). Aisenstein was able to shift Mr. L’s trauma 
away from body and towards his psyche through a fantasy. By discussing dreams 
and creating memories of an unknowable past, they were able to access a split-off 
part of the self, a split that resembles a psychotic mind-set that Freud deemed un-
analysable. Aisenstein writes, “I am now convinced that it is no longer possible to 
neglect the concept of splitting in the field of psychosomatics” because it involves “a 
form of anti-thought which is concrete, cut off from its roots of its drives and 
disembodied” (“Indissociable” 678). In “The Man from Burma,” that cut-off anti-
thought is incarnated as a wound. This reading provides a perspective as to why 
BIID and PLS both involve feelings of disturbing bodily alienation, and reactions 
to bodily loss and presence that cannot be sufficiently explained or comprehended. 
In BIID, a psychical wound is made manifest on the body; in the phantom limb 
syndrome, a physical wound is carried to the mind. Similarly, in the mirror-box, the 
somatic wound is carried towards the psyche through a fantasy version of self. 
However, she notes that this process puts the patient at risk of creating a 
psychically delusional solution in place of the previous somatic one, of carrying it 
too far. Although the work was still in progress when she wrote the essay, by 
shifting the traumatic lesion towards the mind, Mr. L’s body felt less pressure and 
the wound was contained. The mirror-box, however, materialises how a 
psychosomatic split can be dispelled through an illusion.  
Thus, Aisenstein’s study, Green’s theory, and the mirror-box suggest that 
conjuring illusions from negative spaces (Mr. L’s gaps in speech, negative 
hallucination, and the mirror-box itself, may remove some of a wound’s pressure, 
whether orientated in the body, as seen in PLS, or the mind, as with BIID). Rather 
than attempting to find the meaning of delusion, Aisenstein works to, as Green 
suggests of the analyst’s role, “arrange things in such a way that it reveals itself 
spontaneously” (Green, On a Private 78). In this way, the analysand’s unknown, 
unconscious self, will, ostensibly, begin to show through; that “internal stranger at 
once disturbingly unlike you and infinitely more like you than you want to 
acknowledge” (Cohen, The Private 20). I will now take a deeper look at what lies 
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within in that foreign part of oneself by exploring literature and psychoanalysis that 
centralise “the double.” 
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Chapter Three: The double 
 
Nur weil dich reißend zuletzt die Feindschaft verteilte 
sind wir die Hörenden jetzt und ein Mund der Natur. 
 
In the end it is only because hatred tore you to pieces 
that we have learnt to attend, and to speak of nature. 
--- Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus (XXVI) 
 
These lines of poetry from Rilke’s Sonnets to Orpheus (1922) might suggest that the 
artist must be torn in order to create her work; that it is in a state of fragmentation 
that the individual is open to expression. In this poem, Rilke is specifically referring 
to the myth of Orpheus, wherein Orpheus’s art condemns him to rupture. When he 
defies the gods by looking into the Underworld, Orpheus’s body is torn to pieces. 
However, he continues to sing through his broken body; he sings when he is not 
one, but many different parts. I turn to Rilke here, because the poem draws our 
attention to the trajectory of this chapter, which looks at psychoanalysis and 
literature that are interested in human ambiguity and rupture. I will, more 
specifically, be looking at doubles within cultural texts in order to analyse the split 
between wholeness and fragmentation experienced by those with BIID and PLS. 
The Chapter begins with Jacques Lacan’s concept of the mirror stage, which is 
followed by Maurice Blanchot’s thoughts on literature and fractured language (as 
discussed through his essay “Orpheus’s Gaze” [1982]), and ends with a cinematic 
analysis of these ideas through Powell and Pressburger’s The Red Shoes (1948).  
Both Peter and Stephen explained that their conditions felt “strange”; for 
Peter, a “strange inner feeling” that he was meant to be disabled, and for Stephen, a 
“strange” and “uncanny” feeling that “your arm or your leg […] is GONE. Yet it’s 
still agonizing you.” These feelings, I noted in Chapter One, resonate with Freud’s 
concept of the uncanny, which involves a feeling produced from simultaneous 
discomfort and a home-like comfort,23 wherein “‘hidden forces’ within me destine 
me to be forever other to myself, to an indelible strangeness within” (Cohen, How to 
Read 70). A feeling of being, perhaps, as BIID sufferer Hans in the documentary 
                                                
23 This derives from Freud’s etymological analysis in “The Uncanny,” wherein he emphasises that 
the meaning of the word unheimlich overlaps with its opposite, heimlich. In this way, the word itself is 
uncanny, it reveals a hidden other. “The unheimlich,” writes Freud, “is what was once heimlich, 
homelike, familiar; the prefix ‘‘un’’ is the token of repression” (“Uncanny,” 15 emphasis in original). 
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“Complete Obsession” states, “in the wrong body.” The uncanny body is, in this 
way, conscious for those with BIID and PLS. It is at once the most familiar and 
foreign place.  
Moreover, the “uncanny is an experience of being after oneself, in various 
senses of that phrase. It is the experience of something duplicitous, diplopic, being 
double” (Royle 16), and indeed, those with BIID and PLS struggle with a division 
between wholeness and unity. They are tortured by a conception of an ulterior 
version of self that differs from their physical realities. While individuals with 
phantom limbs feel that their amputated body is whole, those with BIID feel that 
their physically whole body is ruptured. These experiences of double-ness parallel 
what Jacques Lacan calls the mirror stage, wherein a child is set up with a split: a 
feeling of fragmentation that contrasts the mirror image, an image which is “an 
imaginary anatomy or body phantom” (Grosz 42). In this way, the child 
experiences something similar to that which those with PLS and BIID experience: 
a split between physical and imaginary wholeness and fragmentation. Since, as 
Grosz writes, “Lacan suggests that this desire for a solid, stable identity may help 
explain our fascination with images of the human form” (43), I suggest that Lacan’s 
model will provide insight into the desire for wholeness in those with BIID and 
PLS. 
 
The Mirror Stage 
Lacan proposes that a baby’s sense of self is initially ruptured and helpless: it can 
feel parts of its body that it cannot visualise, and it does not have a sense of 
proprioception. In “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function” (1949), 
Lacan suggests that we are born into the world with a “primordial Discord 
betrayed by the signs of uneasiness and motor unco-ordination of the neo-natal 
months” (3); we are dependent upon the support of others, which he calls the infans 
stage. According to Vicky Lebeau, in “the state of infancy, or infans literally, 
without language, the small child tends to be discovered at the limit of what words 
can be called upon to tell, or to mean” (Childhood 16); the baby is unable to 
comprehend itself and its environment. However, Lacan theorises that when the 
baby is between the ages of six and eighteen months, it recognises its own image in 
the mirror, usually when another individual is holding it, and it will identify with 
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that image. This self-recognition involves a feeling of enjoyment, and from this 
point on, the child forms itself through a split: the fragmented self, and the image of 
unity with which it identifies. This is where the child is introduced into what Lacan 
calls the Imaginary order, which I later expand upon. Lacan’s theory can be used to 
reflect on Freud and Otto Rank’s notion of the uncanny, which also introduces an 
idea of the double as related to the mirror reflection. Freud writes in “The 
Uncanny” that Rank “has gone into the connections the ‘double’ has with 
reflections in mirrors” (234). These perspectives suggest that each human being has 
one image of wholeness and one of rupture, which is central to what follows in this 
chapter. From Lacan’s point of view, this mirror double creates an, as stated, 
“alienating identity, which will mark [… its] entire mental development” (Lacan, 
Écrits 5). 
The infans self, in other words, is set up in relation to its ideal image, 
because it desires to be the impossible (the mirror image), thereby leaving the child 
afraid of returning to its infans state. Forever hidden behind this ideal mirror image, 
therefore, is the fragmented, subjective self, which lurks in the background. The 
infans, which aims towards the illusion of a coherent ego, quietly haunts the 
individual (often through dreams), which in the psychotic structure leaks into 
reality. Thus, the psychotic element is the fantasy of the self’s integrity and 
wholeness, a structure reflective of BIID and PLS. It is the ego, according to 
Lionel Bailly, that “helps protect the individual against the threat of incoherence 
and impotence, and provides a fictitious coherence” (40). The mirror image, 
moreover, becomes “the threshold of the visible world” (Lacan, Écrits 3) that 
assembles the ego, and that forms “the social dialectic that structures human 
knowledge” (Lacan, Écrits 4). Thus, throughout life, individuals (unconsciously) 
strive for a false wholeness that is linked to the way in which they interact with the 
environment. 
Throughout life, therefore, the mirror stage unconsciously remains a part of 
individual, and I suggest that those with PLS and BIID dramatise this stage. 
Although the sufferers did not, presumably, go through the stage (between the ages 
of six to eighteen months) differently than others, the kind of split between the 
fragmented body and illusory cohesion that is outlined in the mirror stage is a 
conscious and painful experience for those with BIID and PLS. Phantom limb 
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sufferers often experience physical feelings of rupture and helplessness that 
contrast a feeling of wholeness, which is reflective of Lacanian mirror “body 
phantom” (Grosz 42). As Stephen Sumner explained, the phantom sensation was 
“bigger that me”; the burnings and electrical shocks “totally beggar words.” The 
description here parallels the infans, wherein the fragmented baby is “at the limit of 
what words can be called upon to tell, or to mean” (Lebeau, Childhood 16). Stephen 
continues, “[t]he first instant that I gazed into a mirror at a sound limb that was 
bending and waggling and all, in place of this epicentre of electrical storms […] I 
was literally suffused with a sense of calm, completion.” Here, Stephen appears to 
be experiencing something similar to the baby in Lacan’s model: a split between an 
obscure sensation of fragmentation and helplessness, and a whole mirror image that 
causes a sense of relief and jubilation. In Peter’s case, the mirror stage is in a sense 
reversed: rather than idealising a whole mirror image, his ideal wholeness is 
associated with a fragmented sensation reflective of the infans. Although reversed, 
the apotemnophile suffers from a feeling of rupture that stands in relation to a 
fantasy of unity. It would seem, from this perspective, that those with phantom 
limbs and BIID are stuck with an exaggerated infans. They are confronted with 
bodily fragmentation that reaches for ungraspable unity, which for most people 
remains hidden in the unconscious. Their imaginary wholeness, in other words, is 
recognised through rupture.  
Consequently, based on this Lacanian paradigm, the ego cannot provide an 
illusory coherence to protect the subject against incoherence in the same way, 
thereby leaving those with the conditions vulnerable. For Lacan, the ego works to 
protect the individual by conjuring phantoms to fill the gaps in between the infans 
and the illusory completion. One’s mirror-image, writes Lacan, “is still pregnant 
with the correspondences that unite the I with the statue in which man projects 
himself, with the phantoms that dominate him, or with the automaton in which, in 
an ambiguous relation, the world of his own making tends to find completion” 
(Écrits 2). The absences experienced by those with BIID and PLS, it would seem, 
are too apparent to be hidden by phantoms, and are instead shown through them. 
Those with BIID feel helplessly ruptured, a feeling related to a phantom concept of 
wholeness. And PLS involves a conscious experience and image of bodily fracture 
that is, rather than being hidden by a phantom wholeness, exacerbated by one. The 
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phantom limb and BIID drives towards unity thus display the ruptured self’s 
(infans’) aim to become its (impossible) illusory mirror image. What is at issue, 
therefore, is that while for everyone, “this fragmented body [… can appear] in the 
form of disjointed limbs, or of those organs represented in exoscopy [it ...] usually 
manifests itself in dreams” (Lacan, Écrits 3), for the those with PLS and BIID, it 
seems to have escaped the realm of fantasy and seeped into reality. The subjective 
other that quietly haunts most individuals comes to life. This is exemplified by one 
member of “Fighting It” who explains that her father was a “monster.” When she 
broke her arm at the age of eight, he was temporarily caring, thus causing her to 
have dreams about becoming disabled. Then, she writes, “[w]hen I was 12, I 
recognized that the dreams became a compulsion […]. My thoughts became so 
intense I nearly couldn't stand it. I wanted to take an axe and cut of my hand.” 
Here, it seems as though dreams of a “fragmented body” and “disjointed limbs,” 
reflective of Lacan’s concept, has spilled over into a reality. For those with BIID, 
moreover, this fragmented body is not visible to others, thus, at times causing them 
to feel increasingly isolated. Those with PLS, alternatively, are visibly fractured, 
and in this way, recognisably “different.” However, the mirror illusion allows those 
with phantom limbs to look complete (through a symbol of the phantom), thereby 
causing a feeling of, as Stephen describes it, “deep comfort,” that mirror-image 
(which additionally, as mentioned, usually involves the presence of another). 
For Lacan, this infans and mirror ideal makes up the “social dialectic that 
structures human knowledge” (Lacan, Écrits 3). It is this social structure, he argues, 
wherein language, signs and perceptions are being organised, that which defines 
the Symbolic order, which contrasts the Imaginary order’s illusory wholeness, and 
fragmentation and loss. Part of this loss, according to Lacan, involves the child’s 
ultimate desire to be the mother’s “Phallus,” which is “a penis plus the idea of its 
absence” (Leader 89), that seems to complete the mother (again, the mother is 
defined through a lack). The idea is that the baby is always searching for what the 
mother desires so that it can be the Phallus. However, since it is impossible to 
completely understand her, the baby interprets the mother with false meaning, 
leaving it to search for what is always beyond itself. The infant’s interpretations are 
thus being formed through yet another double: that the baby can complete the 
mother, and that this is futile. The realisation of this futility (that the baby cannot 
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be the Phallus) is what Lacan calls “castration” (based on Freud’s model), which 
occurs when an object obstructs the possibility of pleasing the mother. This object 
is called the Name of the Father, which takes the Phallus’s place and destroys the 
infant’s illusion. Castration, then, creates the necessary symbolic gap between the 
mother and baby that allows it to develop a sense of independence. The Name of 
the Father can take many different (symbolic) forms throughout life; it is the 
blueprint for symbols and language that structure the unconscious. Thus, language 
can always be traced back to the Phallus, to a specific and ungraspable absence. 
Lacan’s theory of the linguistic system correlates with structuralist linguistics, 
which proposes that, “a word is a word because it is different from other words” 
(Leader 49): the linguistic system is founded upon a lack (a concept soon examined 
through Blanchot’s thoughts on literature). The key here is that symbols and 
language are inseparable from the body and environment. 
For Lacan, therefore, language is primarily “other” to the individual: a 
person’s sense of place in the world is achieved through entry into the Symbolic 
order. It is what the world “says” about one’s image that causes the infans to 
disappear behind social ideals or “norms.” Psychosis is formed when this process 
breaks down. Lacan theorises that this may occur if there is no Name of The 
Father, and the baby is left unable to experience castration and form independence 
from the mother. Here there is no platform with which to symbolise, and to enter 
the linguistic world, leaving the baby structured by a false image of being one with 
the mother, and a difficulty integrating fragmentation ensues. Furthermore, 
explains Lionel Bailly, the baby “cling[s] to its fantasy that it may have the Phallus, 
or even be the Phallus for the mother” (84). Without a sufficient symbolic 
foundation, using metaphors is difficult, causing the individual to create meaning 
through delusions that give order to the world. The psychotic individual may act 
out or hallucinate the desire to be the Phallus or to be “castrated,” because she 
lacks the symbols to do so. 
This scenario can be visualised in the two psychosomatic conditions, which, 
as stated, does not suggest that individuals with BIID and phantom limbs are 
psychotic. However, Lacan’s concept of the psychotic structure may tell us more 
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about the phenomena,2 especially taking into account the limb’s resemblance to the 
Phallus. From this perspective, the phantom limb sufferer cannot be castrated, 
because she has no appendage, no Phallus (not during the Symbolic order, but later 
in life). The BIID individual’s existent arm or leg, alternatively, is not castrated. If 
Lacan believes that the inability to castrate can cause a child to cling to the fantasy 
of being or having the mother’s Phallus (of being complete), the phantom limb 
condition enacts this. It involves a person who clings to the fantasy of an 
appendage that is both there and not there. Those with BIID reflect something 
similar, as most believe that they may eventually attain unity. However, just as the 
baby in Lacan’s theory is unable to appease and complete the mother, the limb 
illusions fail to appease an individual’s desire for wholeness.24 In turn, the sufferers 
seem to actualise the loss instead of symbolising it. Rather than signifying their 
overpowering feeling of rupture, they carry it out in reality, through an illusion.  
I have sought to show that when viewed through the mirror stage, those 
with BIID and PLS are faced with bodily rupture that grasps for an impossible 
wholeness, which for the majority of individuals is concealed within the 
unconscious. Both conditions also enact a predominantly physical, as opposed to 
linguistic, manifestation of felt rupture. It would seem, then, that those with PLS 
and BIID are stuck with a pain resulting from a crisis in psychical functioning at 
the level of the Imaginary, which they cannot return to or make sense of. It is the 
mirror-box phenomenon that demonstrates how an individual may symbolically 
regress to this stage in the present, because by reinserting her whole mirror image 
along with her fracture, the individual repeats the mirror stage. In this scenario, 
one can see one’s whole image, thus decreasing the ego’s compensation for the 
infans’ lack through a fantasy (the phantom limb). Does this, I ask, reveal an 
entrance through illusion to the Symbolic order, wherein a person may reinsert the 
name of Name of the Father? Perhaps, the mirror-box limb presents the 
                                                
2 Having a psychotic structure differs from being a psychotic because a psychotic structure connotes 
an incomplete castration. Though one may have “been able to gain some degree of ‘access to the 
metaphor’ and to understand the existence of a symbolic level of functioning, he has accepted 
neither that he has not got the Phallus” (Bailly 85). 
24 Though many individuals with BIID feel as though they are cured upon amputation, others 
continually feel the need to amputate other body parts, face difficulty and danger in the amputation 
process, and still feel misunderstood post-operation. I am not stating that people who want to 
amputate should not, I am looking at why they may want to, and how experiences involved in BIID 
are explored in other ways. 
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individual’s image of having a Phallus (an illusory appendage that is both present 
and absent), which both appeases a desire to be complete, and also shows that this 
is impossible. If so, can the mirror-box enable an amputee to visualise and embody 
the illusion of symbolic castration (making up for what she was unable to do in her 
infancy at the level of the Imaginary), and thus symbolically reduce the need to 
cling to a delusional one? If in Lacanian thought, a psychotic structure prevents an 
understanding of metaphoric self and world, the attempt to simultaneously sever 
and hold onto one’s body (through the mirror-box symbolic castration and BIID 
amputation) suggests an unconscious attempt to alter a sense of objectivity as it was 
formed through the entry into the Symbolic. A desire for castration, in other words, 
may be connected to a desire for social and symbolic integration. Furthermore, as 
briefly noted, if a word is defined by its differences (it is separated or cut away 
from something in order to be understood),25 the wish to remove one’s appendage 
(illusory or otherwise) demonstrates an embodied form of symbolisation from yet 
another angle. If a word must attain meaning through its demarcation from other 
words, a desired amputation demonstrates how linguistic composition might 
transcend to human action (a concept I will develop more thoroughly in Chapter 
Five). In order to understand more about how the conditions relate to symbolism 
and language, I turn to Maurice Blanchot, whose writings reflect upon linguistic 
rupture, and the relationship between (from a different viewpoint) the imaginary 
and the material. 
 
The words of Blanchot 
Blanchot, like Lacan, conceives of language as being structured through a lack. 
Blanchot suggests that this lack lurks behind the linguistic system, similar to the 
way in which the ruptured infans (“without language”) haunts the individual in 
Lacanian thought. In discussing Blanchot, Paul de Man writes, we “try to protect 
ourselves against this negative power by inventing stratagems, ruses of language 
and of thought that hide an irrevocable fall” (Blindness 73). Echoing amputees who 
develop a phantom in place of their fracture, language involves the non-material, 
which works to hide an underlying void. Literature, for Blanchot, turns towards 
                                                
25 I will shortly return to this, however, I am (generally) referring to the idea that words obtain 
meaning in their relation to other words; they must be removed from ambiguity to be apprehended. 
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this void, or as Leslie Hill puts it, “[l]iterature […] deals in phantoms” (Bataille 17). 
Similarly, those with BIID paradoxically hide a lack: although they desire to 
experience and visualise fracture, they are also driven to contain it. I argue that 
since the linguistic and the somatic are permeable (or, to return to Naomi Segal 
statement, texts “invoke the movement of eye or hand towards something one 
ought to be able to caress” [120]), Blanchot’s literary theory is not only abstract, 
but corporeal, and can lend insight as to how the body is conceived of in BIID and 
PLS. Thus, I am interested in what Blanchot’s thoughts on literature can reveal 
about the desire to contain, perceive, and hide a lack, as exemplified in the BIID 
and phantom limb conditions. What is central to these links is that like a phantom, 
language carries traces of the past, of what is not exactly there. Although it is 
composed of signs and expressed through the body (whether read, written, spoken 
or heard), a word’s meaning cannot be fully understood. Language thus parallels 
the phantom limb at a structural level, because it is a physical and psychical 
experience that cannot be captured or shared, a feeling involving a loss. For de 
Man, “[l]anguage, with its sensory attributes of sound and texture, partakes of the 
world of natural objects and introduces a positive element in the sheer void” (69), 
as the phantom limb, though unseen, is a feeling that replaces a lack.  
To expand upon these ideas and provide a little context as to how 
Blanchot’s writing relates to the two syndromes, I shall begin by exploring his 
thoughts on literature. For him, literature is not confined to a certain philosophy or 
literary group, “it is not a matter of developing a unified theory or encompassing a 
body of knowledge” (Hanson, Infinite xxv). A unified discourse closes off 
knowledge by attempting to answer questions instead of opening knowledge by 
asking them. He aims instead to answer questions with more questions, because the 
“question inaugurates a type of relation characterised by openness and free 
movement, and what it must be satisfied with closes and arrests it” (Blanchot, 
Infinite 13-4). The exemplary question that concerns Blanchot is the question of 
literature which, for him, is outside any discipline that attempts to define it. Leslie 
Hill explains: “any literature that knows itself to be literature, Blanchot implies, is 
by that token no longer literature” (Bataille 19), and this is because literature’s very 
nature is to illuminate what language cannot know. What cannot be known about 
language is its meaning and comprehensive definitions, partially because it is 
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formed through subjective and ambiguous psychical images and perceptions. 
Instead of attempting to define literature through ordinary language, therefore, 
Blanchot “steadily borders on the inexpressible and approaches the extreme of 
ambiguity, but always recognises [words] for what they are” (de Man 62). He does 
not attempt to clarify language but to bring out its ambiguous nature. Thus, 
Blanchot’s writings are difficult to define and interpret: he is “fundamentally 
opaque at the level of comprehension” (Critchley, Very Little 31).  
Blanchot’s nebulous writing dramatises his interest in a reader’s failure ever 
to capture authorial meaning. Moreover, he, following Barthes “The Death of the 
Author” (1967), suggests that in some literature, the work is separate from the 
author and takes on a life of its own: words are exposed as having already been 
formed and coming from outside the individual. As Barthes writes, “literature is 
that neuter, that composite, that oblique into which every subject escapes, the trap 
where all identity is lost, beginning with the very identity of the body that writes” 
(Barthes 2); as language takes over, the author is, in a sense, erased. We are 
reminded here of the Lacanian ego, which, as explained, is formed through an 
image of self as other in the mirror, and of one’s identity having been structured 
through others. Just as, for Lacan, one does not have complete control of one’s 
identity, for Blanchot, once the book has been written, the author cannot control 
the way it is read, or how time and context informs its readings. The work thus 
exists “only by and for itself” (de Man 68), and yet does not exist at all. Hill writes 
that in this way, “[l]anguage becomes perpetually and irreducibly double: it affirms 
the need for discourse, but it also bears witness to that which, within words 
themselves, remains unspoken, unspeakable, and absolutely other” (Bataille15). 
Here Hill refers to the two slopes of literature (as discussed in Chapter One).26 
The first slope (which is sometimes referred to as everyday language) is “that 
meaningful prose, which attempts to express things in a transparent language that 
designates them according to a human order of meaning” (Critchley, Very Little 60). 
It is the word and book which can be read, theorised, and which is part of culture. 
                                                
26 Blanchot’s essay “Literature and the Right to Death” (1947) focuses on these ideas, wherein 
Blanchot suggests that communication negates the “other”; the thing written negates what it 
represents. In Blanchot’s words, “when I speak, death speaks in me. [Speech…] is there between us 
as the distance that separates us, but this distance is also what prevents us from being separated, 
because it contains the condition for all understanding” (The Work 324). 
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The second slope is that which can never be completely communicated, 
understood, or grasped through the word or text, “a form of art that leaves things 
to themselves in some way” (Critchley, Impossible 100). “In some way,” because 
things cannot be completely left to themselves: any representation of a thing 
transforms it to some extent. Thus, the first slope of literature that aims to 
represent is, according to Simon Critchley, “that Sadistic-dialectical labour of 
negation that defines the Subject itself, whereby things are killed in order to enter 
the daylight of language and cognition” (Impossible 60). When something is named, 
it is inscribed with preconceived notions that erase its particularity; in attempting to 
represent an idea, the thing itself is erased.27 Those with BIID manifest this in the 
need to erase part of themselves to be complete. They must cut into their 
incomprehensibly (but felt) ruptured soma to be seen as united, just as the word 
must, in a sense, cut away from its ambiguous origins to form a fictional sense of 
cohesion. In this way, one can only be seen through one’s annihilation, which BIID 
individuals seem both drawn towards and away from. This, I propose, reflects the 
literary writer’s plight as Blanchot conceives it. 
Moreover, it is a well-known idea that writers desire immortality through 
their words, which continue to create meaning posthumously. Ulrich Haase writes 
that “the dread of death is expressed in the dream of writing the definitive book, 
the most outstanding novel which might bestow immortality on its author” (51). 
Here again, we see a bodily and textual double, as the text both can and cannot 
bestow immortality (though the author’s words remain, the author herself is 
separate from them). Something similar is perceptible in the BIID condition, as 
exemplified by the German man (discussed in Chapter One) who froze his toes: 
perhaps an attempt to immortalise the body while simultaneously proving its 
mortality. Though the toes might remain, they represent his death, an absent part 
of himself. Haase continues, but “death cannot be overcome, and the book, once 
written, always disappears in the face of the demand of the work” (51-2). In this 
way, the text both bestows immortality upon the author and reveals the author’s 
absence, and the frozen toes both immortalise the man’s presence (as they are 
preserved), and reveal his absence (as they represent and are formed through a 
                                                
27 Blanchot follows Hegel here, who writes that language “immediately overturns what it names in 
order to transform it into something else” (Hegel qtd. in Blanchot, Infinite, 35).  
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loss). Similarly, the phantom limb bestows immortality upon the once present (in 
most cases) limb, while also acting as a constant reminder that the limb is not there. 
In relation to this concept, Blanchot postulates that we have “two relations with 
death, one which we like to call authentic and the other inauthentic” (Space 155): 
while death can be grasped (the physical body), it cannot be comprehended. Hill 
writes, “[o]n the one hand, death is negation, separation, language […] it founds 
the order of human possibility.” However, death also “escapes negation […] it is an 
obscure constraint that can never be experienced for itself by any living human 
self.” Thus, the only way that it can be addressed is “indirectly, through ritual, 
myth or fiction” (Bataille 182). Death is both what makes us human and keeps us 
from being “complete” (as it cannot be comprehended), and our only way of 
attempting to understand it is through perception, images, and language. In this 
way, the body can only be comprehended through signs or symbols. While most 
may unconsciously experience their mythical or fictional nature, it is painfully 
conscious for those with BIID and PLS. Returning to Lacan, those with BIID and 
PLS echo the psychotic structure: in psychosis “the unconscious is at the surface, 
conscious. This is why articulating it doesn’t seem to have much effect” (Lacan, 
Psychoses 11). However, I ask, is there a way of articulating the soma that may have 
an effect? To explore this question, I will examine Blanchot’s thoughts on how a 
body of text can or cannot be articulated. 
If the body can only be deciphered through a sign, the text holds an 
interesting place because it is both physical and metaphorical; it is a body 
composed of signs. In this way, BIID and phantom limbs mirror the text, because 
they are physical (felt) and symbolic extensions of self. Why, however, is the text 
an acceptable body of incompletion, while the BIID and phantom limb sufferers 
remain an anomaly? Why do we, generally, accept the strangeness of the text’s 
singularity, and question the strange subjectivity within conditions such as these? 
Although this question cannot be answered, I suggest that it is due in part to the 
fact that, while those with BIID and PLS cannot control their syndromes, cultural 
works are at a remove and one has control of one’s experience with it. Trilling 
explains that the poet “is in command of his fantasy, while it is exactly the mark of 
the neurotic that he is possessed by his fantasy” (45). In the phantom limb and 
BIID syndromes, the individuals are possessed by their fantasy. However, a writer 
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may have more perspective or control through a symbolic exchange. Thus, it is a 
symbolic medium in literature that differentiates how fantasy shapes the individual, 
and how she shapes it. The mirror-box also provides this border because it 
encapsulates a space with which to create symbols that can re-shape a static fantasy 
of self. The mirror-box, then, like poetry, from Trilling’s perspective, “leads us back 
to the outer reality by taking account of it” (45-6 emphasis in original). Thus, the mirror-
box, in a way, shows us a manifestation of the overlap between psychoanalysis and 
literature. It allows the individual to lead painful images and feelings back towards 
reality through the very substance of which it is made: illusion. Perhaps, then, 
rational sciences cannot have the same effect as the mirror-box because they are 
more interested in the conscious mind, and the limb conditions are situated closer 
to the unconscious and illusion. It is for this reason that literature may provide 
insight. 
The text’s “strangeness” may additionally be more widely accepted because 
physical differences often create social stigma, as Mitchell and Snyder write: 
“people with disabilities are said to be fated or unsalvageable and, thus, somehow 
stubbornly inhuman. They constitute a population in possession of difference that 
will not respond to treatment, and the resulting stigma […] consequently situates 
the disabled person within the social space of difference” (4 emphasis in original). 
Literature, on the other hand, can “point out social ills, while offering new 
possibilities; it communicates pain and transcends it. Literature speaks powerfully 
and profoundly, as well as subtly, delicately” (Saxton and Howe qtd. in Mitchell 
and Snyder, xiii-xiv). While physical differences are often stigmatised, literature 
may aim to overcome or alter a related problem by engaging with disability and 
pain.  
The way in which physical and literary difference is socially perceived 
additionally applies to the concept of “madness.” In History of Madness (1961), 
Michel Foucault explains that  
 
while it is true that numerous texts from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries talked about madness, it was merely cited as an example, as a 
medical species […]. In itself, it was a silent thing: there was no place in the 
classical age for a literature of madness, in that there was no autonomous 
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language for madness, and no possibility that it might express itself in a 
language that spoke its truth. (517)  
 
What Freud did, he continues, “was silence the unreasonable Logos […]; he 
forced words back into their source, all the way back to that blank region of auto-
implication where nothing is said” (547). Instead of turning away from “madness,” 
Freud attempted to unearth it by investigating that which language cannot express. 
In this way, psychoanalysis was influential in the literary turn that was concerned 
with the non-verbalised aspects of madness. Foucault writes that at the close of the 
nineteenth century (and greatly influenced by the writings of Mallarmé) it was 
“time to understand that the language of literature is not defined by what it says, 
nor by the structures that make it signify something, but that it has a being […] 
that is related to […] the double and the void that is hollowed out within it” (548). 
Therefore, although there is no definitive answer as to why society is more 
accepting of literary than bodily “strangeness,” it is due in part to the kind of 
language that has been used in relation to physical differences, which has been 
predominantly medical and definitive. Some literature, however, that is interested 
in understanding more about the idea of “madness,” and (as Foucault stated) 
“blankness,” is capable of creating changes in regard to the way we think about 
madness and physical differences. The literary exploration of “blankness” and 
“madness” is questioned throughout Blanchot’s work, and since those with PLS 
and BIID often (as demonstrated in Peter’s story) feel “othered” in society, I return 
to Blanchot in order to explore what literature can reveal about madness and 
difference. 
Blanchot’s discussions of literature often play with the questions raised here. 
He is interested in the silence within words, the pre-linguistic, fragmentary, and 
dream-like images. “If madness has a language,” he writes, “and if it is even nothing 
but language, would this language not send us back (as does literature although at 
another level) to […] a non-dialectical experience of language?” (Infinite 201). This 
raises the question as to whether “madness” can be related to what preceded 
language before the word is cut away. Can a person momentarily break the 
Lacanian Symbolic order of social dialectics and feel their “discordant” images and 
gestures? Can we get in touch with what precedes the confines of fantasy wholes? 
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Blanchot touches on these questions by interrupting literary tradition. In attending 
to the false idea that language signifies its referent, he discloses the negation within 
it, to let that infans seep through the cracks. This negation is what Blanchot calls 
the space of literature. Huffer explains that this space “exposes the trap of truth: the 
closer we get to it, the more we lose it, because the only way we can say it is by 
holding up the reflective screen of language, the mirror in which all we see is 
ourselves” (187). This description of the space of literature cannot help but remind 
us of the mirror-box. It holds up a reflection of the phantom that shows its absence 
(the image is not the phantom) through a reflection of the self (the existent 
appendage), and the closer we get to the phantom, the more we see its erasure. And 
it is the space of literature that, for Blanchot, also brings out its negation. 
 Thus far, we have explored how in attempting to reach cohesion to avoid 
facing fracture, a sufferer of BIID or PLS and a writer can face a false dialectic: the 
disturbing double similar to that outlined in Lacan’s theory. By writing in a 
fragmented manner, Blanchot illuminates the way in which a text contains both the 
known and the unknown body of work (the known words and their 
incomprehensible rupture). The mirror-box also shows the image of one’s 
wholeness and simultaneous un-wholeness. Instead of aiming to resolve 
absence¾as seen in everyday language, the phantom limb, and self-amputation 
¾the mirror-box, like Blanchot’s literature, exposes the inability to do so: 
“literature is literature because it lays bare its self-recognition as untruth” (Huffer, 
187 emphasis in original). The mirror-box exposes the phantom’s untruth through 
a symbol of itself. In light of this, the struggles of those with both conditions are 
related to a wider discussion of fragmentation upon which Blanchot’s writings 
hinge. Thomas Carl Wall explains: “[h]e writes fragments, and even writes about 
fragmentary writing […]. Anamorphic, the fragment’s only life is its separation 
from any whole, any narrative, and any history. It cannot be put in place and 
therefore demands from the writer something other than form. It demands 
destruction” (84-5). The mirror-box, anamorphic, distorts one’s body to make it 
look whole from one point of view, and fragmented from another. Unlike the 
phantom limb¾an illusion that can be based upon a historical memory of pain or a 
narrative of normality¾the mirror-box stands alone in a moving present. While it 
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shows the appeasing image of unity, it simultaneously demands something other 
than form: that the individual glance at her destruction.  
It is in the process of writing, according to Blanchot, that a moving hand 
may also reveal one’s annihilation. As he discusses in “Literature and the Right to 
Death” (1947), language only represents its object through its destruction. He 
writes: “[w]hen [literature] names something, whatever it designates is abolished; 
but whatever is abolished is also sustained, and the thing has found a refuge (in the 
being which is the word) rather than a threat” (The Work 329). Though a writer 
may visualise a part of herself on paper when the words she uses shape her 
thoughts, the words also disclose her own erasure: a non-threatening experience, or 
perhaps a desire. Blanchot continues, “literature’s ideal has been the following: to 
say nothing, to speak in order to say nothing” (The Work 324). As suggested in our 
earlier discussion, from a Lacanian perspective, those with apotemnophilia and 
PLS echo unconscious attempts to return to an infant’s fragmented state in the 
present moment and (unsuccessfully) reform themselves as symbols; to be 
“castrated” and free of the mirror image’s critical gaze. If the mirror-box offers an 
alternative way to see oneself as a symbol and break up one’s preconceived notions 
of self, fragmentary writing may offer a similar refuge from the desire “to grasp in 
its entirety the infinite movement of comprehension” (Blanchot, The Work 325).  
De Man explains, “[i]n his interpretive quest, the writer frees himself from 
empirical concerns, but he remains a self that must reflect on its own situation. He 
can only do this by ‘reading’ himself, by turning his conscious attention toward 
himself, and not toward a forever unreachable form of being” (Blindness 77). This 
idea is embodied in the amputees who reflect on their own fracture in the mirror-
box. Here, the amputee, like the writer (from de Man’s perspective), may begin to 
free herself of “empirical concerns” (of the drive to be physically complete) when 
she literally reflects upon her own fissure with the mirror-box; she may integrate 
her rupture through a fictional self-image. Thus, fiction seems the best place to 
further explore these connections, which I now set out to do through Blanchot’s 
essay “Orpheus’s Gaze” (1982). 
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Orpheus’s Gaze 
“Orpheus’s Gaze,” Blanchot proposes, is central to The Space of Literature (1955), 
because it hinges upon that which cannot be grasped, which is an essential 
component to the question of literature. Anne Smock explains in the introduction 
that this space “is like the place where someone dies: a nowhere, Blanchot says, 
which is here” (“Introduction” 10). This, as I have sought to show, can be 
elaborated in terms of BIID and PLS because they involve feelings based in a lack. 
Individuals with BIID feel an absence that is present, and those with PLS feel a 
presence that is objectively absent: sufferers with both conditions, therefore, 
embody a “nowhere, which is here.” I will currently explore these links more 
thoroughly through Blanchot’s essay “Orpheus’s Gaze,” which concerns issues of 
rupture that are also involved in BIID and PLS. Firstly, in content, the story of 
Orpheus reflects these conditions because Orpheus struggles with the dichotomy 
between unity and fracture: he lives forever in a broken body that is simultaneously 
alive and dead. Moreover, in form, Blanchot presents a fragmented language that, 
like Orpheus’s body, holds up a simultaneous presence and absence. In this 
discussion, I want to explore how Blanchot’s literature offers a particular insight 
into the Orpheus myth that can illuminate the struggles experienced by those with 
BIID and PLS. I will examine how a writer’s aim to communicate subjective and 
ambiguous images are related to the BIID and PLS sufferers’ drives towards 
completion, and how the essay dramatises this. 
 “Orpheus’s Gaze” is based on the Greek myth of Orpheus the artist 
(musician and poet), who due to his singing is granted the right to descend into the 
Underworld to bring his wife Eurydice back to life on the condition that he does 
not turn to look at her. However, unable to resist, Orpheus glances back. As 
punishment, he is dismembered and thrown into a river where he continues to sing 
(although Blanchot does not mention this part of the myth in his essay). Orpheus’s 
need to see Eurydice is often used as an allegory for the desire for completion, 
reflecting the BIID and PLS drives towards impossible wholeness. The attempt to 
bring Eurydice back, moreover, is comparable to the writer’s attempts to bring 
understanding to what cannot be known. “His [Orpheus’s] work,” writes Blanchot, 
“is to bring it back to the light of day and to give it form, shape, and reality in the 
day” (Space 171); this shape, for the writer, is the word. Orpheus’s desire to see 
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Eurydice, however, leaves him at a loss, which stands for Blanchot’s belief that 
when something is named, its singularity vanishes. Here, his glance back allegorises 
the literary writer who uses language to “tell finite things in an accomplished 
fashion that excludes the infinite” (Blanchot, Space 144): the writer cannot 
completely convey thought. Through a Lacanian lens, the infans is hidden behind 
the mirror image and, as those with apotemnophilia and PLS show, attempts to be 
complete remain futile. However, it is this loss that defines Orpheus, the writer, 
and those with BIID and PLS.  
Orpheus’s desire to see Eurydice in the light of day and to represent her is 
what makes language and the story of Orpheus possible, yet it is also what renders 
it impossible (because it is founded upon the paradoxical impossibility of 
representation). Without a physical loss (for those with PLS) or feeling of loss (for 
the BIID sufferer) the sufferers would, presumably, not form an (consciously) 
ungraspable form of unity. Therefore, the Orpheus myth and the two conditions 
are consecrated through their erasure; or as Blanchot states, the “work is Orpheus 
but it is also the adverse power which tears it and divides Orpheus” (Space 226). 
The two conditions thus reflect Orpheus’s gaze and the text, in that they involve a 
need to materialise one’s existence by making one feel complete, while destroying it 
to reveal one’s rupture. Again we are faced with an absence, which, for Orpheus, is 
represented by Eurydice.28 Eurydice, moreover, is a specific absence, which 
parallels the BIID and PLS suffers, because they are tortured by a specific void. 
Those with BIID want the limb cut in a specific place, while amputees’ phantoms 
are often frozen in place. As a member of “Fighting It” writes, “[m]any of us have a 
line of demarcation- a specific point where the body image map ends.” For 
phantom limb sufferers, “about half of them” writes Norman Doidge, “have the 
unpleasant feeling that their phantom limbs are frozen” (184). It is implicit that 
while an ambiguous absence can be hidden in the unconscious, a specific one may 
cause discomfort, and in these situations, enough discomfort to create a noticeably 
false reality, a kind of delusion. This reminds us of Lacan’s take on the psychotic 
structure, in which one is stuck with an incomplete Castration (a specific absence) 
that results in a difficulty structuring oneself through language. Orpheus and those 
                                                
28 This analysis of the Orpheus myth reads Eurydice as a metaphorical absence, rather than a 
“female” lack. 
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with BIID and PLS parallel this in their struggle to represent a specific negation.  
Hassan writes that in Blanchot’s essay that this specific loss (of Eurydice) 
“represents the silence that Orpheus must, and can not attain” (Dismemberment 19). 
By glancing back, Orpheus illustrates a desire to see “the dissimulation that 
appears,” to see “Eurydice in her shadowy absence” (Blanchot, Space 172). 
However, this glance ruptures the possibility of perceiving the unknown. Thus, she 
“is the instant when the essence of night approaches as the other night” (Blanchot, 
Space 170). This “other night” differs from “the night” because while the night is the 
opposite of the day (Blanchot, Space 167-8), the other night is part of it, like the 
unconscious that always resides silently in consciousness. The other night is that 
fragmentation that rests within the individual’s comprehensible wholes, similar to 
that infans which precedes the mirror image. We see this embodied in those with 
BIID, as rupture is not the opposite of wholeness; wholeness can only be achieved 
through rupture. In this way, rupture and unity are inseparable, and thus fictional 
concepts. Similarly, the phantom limb is only (subjectively) present because the 
individual is amputated; rupture and wholeness are intertwined, creating a false 
dichotomy that, nonetheless, feels real. The mirror image, however, presents the 
inextricability of rupture and wholeness: though an amputee may remove the 
phantom, she is still lacking a limb. Similarly, the other night “is always the other, 
and he who senses it becomes other” (Space 169). In the other night, “the void is 
[…] coming toward him [he who approaches the other night]” (Space 169). By 
glancing back at Eurydice, Orpheus turns towards the void within the day, and 
thus senses his simultaneous absence and presence; he, echoing amputee who sees 
herself as four-limbed in the mirror and releases her phantom, is other to himself. 
In this moment, he wants to see nothingness, that side that is other, and this, for 
Blanchot, defines the artist. Orpheus, then, stands for the literary writer in 
Blanchot’s thought, who is concerned with what language veils, with that which 
cannot be grasped. In this way, the literary work confirms the irreducibility of lack 
and ambiguity. The mirror-box, I propose, materialises these thoughts because like 
the word, it shows the amputated individual what is barely there: a space wherein 
the individual exists only through images. By glancing into this other (whole) self 
to see nothingness as it is (the absence behind the mirror image), the individual 
echoes Orpheus’s glance into the Underworld.  
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Furthermore, Orpheus’s glance comes from an unknown part of himself, 
and the BIID and PLS sufferers’ aim to resolve finitude stems unknowable origins. 
Orpheus is, writes Blanchot, “seduced by a desire that comes to him from the 
night” (Space 174), which relates to the writer’s calling. “No one begins to write, 
Blanchot says, who is not already somehow on the verge of this ruinous look back, 
and yet the sole approach to that turning point is writing” (Space 15). Here, art 
stems from a desire to perceive the night or “madness” veiled within “day”; and in 
this way, the artist is haunted by a void. When Orpheus glances back to see 
Eurydice, she disappears. If a certain kind of literature allegorises this 
impossibility, so does the mirror-box: in glancing at one’s phantom, it disappears. 
Thus, in writing (as Blanchot conceives it), Orpheus’s glance, and the mirror-box, 
the desire to see a specific absence negates that absence, and this is partially due to 
a movement (whether it be writing, reading, glancing back, or fictively moving a 
phantom). Wall explains that Blanchot’s writing involves “movements, or spaces 
[that] are precise and anamorphic insofar as they cannot be interrogated, or even 
properly experienced or narrated” (101). Since the act of writing or reading 
involves a continual movement, its meaning cannot be completely grasped, and 
thus, like Orpheus, the writer (or in this case reader) “himself is absent” (Blanchot, 
Space 172). In a similar way, the moving image in mirror therapy erases one’s 
phantom, and exposes the absent limb, revealing that “death without end, the 
ordeal of the end’s absence” (Blanchot, Space 172). What, I ask, does this 
connection illuminate about the mirror-box? To begin, Blanchot believes that an 
individual can be exposed to her fracture in the movement of reading, because she 
is also being affected by the words at hand. Therefore, as the mirror-box alters the 
phantom feeling, the text affects the reader. Here, the reader and the amputee 
become other. The “‘I’’, writes Kevin Hart, “becomes a ‘he’ or a ‘one’; and […] 
enters the realm of the fragmentary which is also the space of community” (17): if a 
reader loses part of her self in the act of reading, she, in a sense, becomes language 
(and the symbols within language). 
In this textual interaction, “there is no exact moment at which one would 
pass from night to the other night” (Blanchot, Space 169) because one is always a 
symbol, one’s identity always an illusion, the imaginary is always within. In this 
way, the text does not literally transform the reader into a symbol, but rather, 
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reminds her that she is, in a sense, composed of them. Here we are reminded of 
Lacan’s theory that the individual has been inscribed by others, that the infans 
disappears as her identity is formed through others’ definitions. It is in the 
movement of reading that, from a Blanchotian point of view, the individual may be 
able to glimpse beyond those imaginary and symbolic formations from which she 
has been constructed. If literature, for Blanchot, brings this to light, so too does the 
mirror-box. By moving one’s limb in the mirror, by, as Stephen wrote, “looking, 
moving, and imagining,” you can “touch the pain,” and “eradicate [almost] 
everything.” Wall explains (referring to the reader), if “I can ‘imagine the hand that 
writes them,’ I will only find myself face-to-face with a gaze that does not regard 
me, that dispenses with me” (103). In being dispensed of in this way, Blanchot 
suggests, one may be free of oneself, “outside oneself, ecstatic, in a manner that 
cannot leave the ‘oneself,’ the proper, the essence, intact” (Sallis 97). In facing one’s 
erasure, the intrusion of one’s (falsely) whole self can perhaps be partially lifted. 
Orpheus’s gaze, explains Blanchot, “is thus the extreme moment of liberty, 
the moment when he frees himself from himself and, still more important, frees the 
work from his concern, frees the sacred contained in the work, gives the sacred to 
itself, to the freedom of its essence, to its essence which is freedom” (Space 175). 
Freedom is approached partially because Orpheus defies the authoritative gods 
who told him not to look. He transgresses the law, and in so doing takes authority. 
It is this action, however, that also causes Orpheus’s death, indicating that in order 
to take authority of the text in the act of reading, and to approach this freedom, one 
must “die” (in relation to, for instance, Barthes’ “The Death of the Author”). 
However, instead of falling into the Underworld and dying completely, Orpheus 
remains in a space between life and death: he is forever broken. Orpheus’s glance 
backwards, therefore, only reiterates his (to return to Blanchot’s statement), “death 
without end, the ordeal of end’s absence” (Blanchot Space 172). In a similar, yet 
concrete sense, the mirror-box presents an amputee’s endless fragmentation; the 
phantom movement effaces the felt limb. Here, the amputee may be able to 
experience a feeling of completion in being torn (as Stephen described it: a “sense 
of calm, completion”). The mirror limb, like the literary work, allows the absence to 
exist as absence, contrasting those with PLS, those with BIID, and, as Blanchot 
calls it, everyday language. Furthermore, the gaze that condemns Orpheus to 
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eternal rupture and the gaze into the mirror-box that erases the phantom limb are 
predicated upon a transgression of the (common) law. The mirror-box defies 
rational thought: the way in which it alleviates pain exceeds empirical thought; it 
cannot be understood through “everyday” language. “Orpheus’s Gaze,” and the 
gaze into the mirror-box thus convey how seeing one’s fracture through a symbol 
of one’s simultaneous absence and presence may engender a release wherein one 
has “no self-identity to obey” (Hassan, Dismemberment 19).  
 A literary writer, explains Haase, “must advance into this impersonal 
language and allow it to speak in her place” (64). By embodying a symbol of one’s 
phantom in the mirror-box, the felt weight (or excess) of one’s phantom decreases, 
just as the “weightless gaze of Orpheus” (Blanchot, Space 176) frees his desire to 
see Eurydice. Like Blanchot’s concept of literature (as Foucault describes it), the 
mirror-box  
 
no longer […] a power that tirelessly produces images and makes them 
shine, but, rather, a power that undoes them, that lessens their overload, 
that infuses them with an inner transparency that illuminates them little by 
little until they burst and scatter in the lightness of the unimaginable. 
(Foucault, Aesthetics 152-3)  
 
This kind of writing is, for Blanchot and Foucault, associated with “madness,” as it 
is concerned with representing and turning towards madness through a certain 
kind of (fragmentary) literature. Thinking about language in this way, therefore, 
may open avenues to understanding apotemnophilia and PLS. The mirror-box, 
then, presents to the individual what she was unable to perceive, as literature, 
according to Blanchot, opens new thoughts. Instead of tirelessly shaping absence to 
a false whole, both the mirror-box and literature can show one’s “inner 
transparency” to unravel the “weight” of pain, so that an individual can “unti[e] 
himself with his own hands” (Foucault, Aesthetics 162). The phantom self that is 
constructed through social and historical events may be disrupted (a thought 
expanded upon and exemplified in Chapter Five), as the mirror reflection can undo 
the phantom appendage. Reading and writing literature in this way is thus 
allegorised in Orpheus’s eternal position between life and death, love and loss, 
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fragmentation and wholeness, which the mirror-box concretises. Here, one may, as 
Stephen remarked, “look, move, and imagine” one’s phantom to approach an 
alleviating sense of absence. I now want to turn to the question: what happens if a 
person cannot enter this space? What if the individual who sees an absence she is 
drawn to represent is consumed by the impossibility to do so? What if she is 
haunted by the desire to escape the grasps of death? I will explore these questions 
through an analysis of Powell and Pressburger’s The Red Shoes (1948). 
 
The Red Shoes 
Powell and Pressburger’s seminal film follows the life of ballerina Vicky Page, who, 
haunted by her desire for love/art and life/death, retreats into an illusion, which is 
represented by Vicky’s role as Karen in The Red Shoes ballet. In the ballet, the red 
slippers control Karen’s body, which resonates with those with BIID and PLS, 
whose bodies remain alienated. This similarity raises questions about rupture, 
illusion, and freedom in rupture. Vicky’s opening dialogue with the ballet 
impresario Boris Lermontov sets the tone for the film when he asks her why she 
wants to dance, and she replies, “[w]hy do you want to live?” He states, “I don’t 
know but I must.” “That’s my answer too,” (The Red Shoes). Impressed by her 
vigour, Lermontov casts Vicky as the prima ballerina in The Red Shoes, after which 
she becomes famous and marries composer Julian Craster. When Lermontov 
discovers their affair, he forces her to choose between “the comforts of human love” 
and being “the greatest dancer the world has ever known” (The Red Shoes), which 
causes her to leave Julian for the ballet, and consolidates her choice of art over life. 
Shortly thereafter, a force strikes, as the red shoes overpower her body and carry 
her off a balcony, echoing The Red Shoes ballet that made her famous. It is Julian 
who finds her, gathers her in his arms, takes off her red shoes, and she dies.  
 The initial frame story is based on the Hans Christian Andersen fairy tale by 
the same name, which is about a little girl (Karen) who is given red shoes that will 
not stop dancing until she finally has her legs cut off by an angel. While the shoes 
continue to dance without her, Karen is sent to Heaven. The Red Shoes ballet within 
the film (a seventeen-minute segment) proceeds from this original tale, wherein 
Vicky plays Karen, yet the ballet takes on a surreal effect in which Vicky’s 
performance coalesces with her fantasies. The segment begins with an evil 
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shoemaker who sells Karen—who is accompanied by her male partner—red ballet 
slippers. The shoes progressively carry her away from her partner, as he is 
transformed into cellophane. Left lost, alone, and haunted by the shoemaker’s 
shadow, Karen attempts to return home to her mother, only to be stopped by the 
shoes. At this point, the shoemaker’s shadow returns and is refigured into the 
apparitions of Lermontov and Julian. Karen then falls to the Underworld and 
dances with a sheet of newspaper, which temporarily takes the shape of her 
partner. When the shoemaker reappears, he guides her through the Underworld, 
until finally, a priest removes her red shoes and she dies.  
The ballet is portrayed as being a hallucinatory rendition of what takes 
place in Vicky’s mind, gesturing towards her psychological decline and 
disappearance into Karen, her “other self.” This descent, I suggest, is triggered by 
Vicky’s erasure in life, because throughout the film, her role as a dancer shadows 
her identity. I now want to read this portrayal of one’s other self with Blanchot’s 
idea of literature (the word that is always haunted by its double), the mirror stage 
(the mirror image that is preceded by its infans), and Orpheus’s loss of Eurydice, to 
trace how these co-ordinates may provide further insight into apotemnophilia and 
PLS. Throughout the film, Vicky is often relegated to being an “object”; unable to 
have her own life, she is passive to the demands of other men. Although she asserts 
herself at times, and her psychological processes are foregrounded, Powell and 
Pressburger also allude to her progressive erasure. Her initial choice of art over life 
foreshadows this, as she is pressured to conform to (predominantly patriarchal) 
roles (of a “housewife,” Lermontov’s mentee, and a famous dancer). As her fame 
increases, she progressively fades behind these roles. We see this in a scene in 
which Vicky first discovers that she will be the prima ballerina, and Julian wonders 
“what it feels like to wake up in the morning and find oneself famous.” She 
responds, “you’re not likely to know if you stay here talking much longer” (The Red 
Shoes): a statement indicative of one’s effacement behind a public name (similar to 
Lacan’s Symbolic). At this moment, a newspaper that features an interview about 
The Red Shoes ballet brushes Vicky, foreshadowing the newspaper dance in the 
performance in which she is visibly obscured by language; she is lost behind an 
image (which I will soon discuss). 
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Vicky’s personal relationships with both Julian and Lermontov cement this 
loss of identity. When Julian and Vicky have their only intimate moment, he says, 
“one day when I’m old, I want some lovely young girl to ask me ‘where in your long 
life Mr. Craster were you most happy?’ And I shall say, ‘well my dear, I never 
knew the exact place … I was with Victoria Page.’ ‘What,’ she’ll say, ‘you mean the 
famous dancer?’ And I will nod, ‘yes, my dear, I do. But then she was quite young. 
We were very much in love.’” Here, Vicky is again defined though her absence (her 
death), their love only structured by art. Definitively, Lermontov tells her: “great 
superiority is only achieved by agony of body and spirit. What do you want from 
life? To live?” and she replies, “to dance” (The Red Shoes); she is only free within art. 
Like Orpheus, Vicky turns away from life. She does not choose death, but the 
agony of the body and spirit, the decay and darkness within life.  
This similarity between Orpheus and Vicky gives way to a variety of others, 
which I will now draw out, to demonstrate how they both illuminate and are 
illuminated by the BIID and PLS. First, the film and essay feature artists who are 
driven to pursue art and death over life and love, and who are consequently left in a 
state of physical rupture. Second, both pursue the impossible task of relinquishing 
their desire for completion in the “other.” Thus, they reflect the state of the those 
with PLP and BIID, who strive for an impossible sense of completion through a 
state of physical rupture. Furthermore, as Orpheus “unknowingly [...] moves 
toward the work” (Blanchot, Space 174), Vicky moves towards art’s darkness by 
continually choosing death over life, as allegorised in the ballet. Ultimately, both 
characters are haunted by a double that stands for their fragmented self (Orpheus 
by Eurydice, and Vicky by Karen), which resonates with the PLP and BIID 
sufferers who are haunted by their double (impossible wholeness). 
 Since furthermore, it is the body that haunts Vicky, how can this, I ask, 
shed light on the BIID individual who amputates her own alienated body? Just as 
Karen (Vicky’s Other) is only released when her shoes are removed (she can finally 
escape the tortures of life through death at this moment), and Vicky’s pain only 
ceases when she dies, the BIID sufferer’s “mind is at peace” (Mensaert 19) when 
the limb is amputated. One sufferer explains: “I was given my amputation not 
because I wanted it, but because that was the only way to stop me from wanting it” 
(Mensaert 19), thereby echoing Vicky’s dilemma. Moreover, in the Hans Christian 
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Andersen story, although the community warns Karen not to wear them, “Karen 
thought only of her red shoes” (4). However, despite the community’s 
condemnation, the protagonist is not portrayed as being mentally ill but confused 
and alone, a sentiment echoed in both the film and the ballet within. Similarly, 
although BIID sufferers, as Peter demonstrated, may be perceived (or afraid of 
being perceived) as mentally ill, their dialogues generally convey that they feel 
misunderstood. If we return to Lacan’s thoughts, we are reminded that for him, 
everyone is formed through a lack (a desire for “the Other”), and lives through an 
illusion. However, if the lack is too large, so is the illusion, thereby forming the hub 
of psychosis (delusion). From this point of view, Vicky, like those with alienated 
limbs, exemplifies a loss, which in Lacanian theory relates to a desire for a paternal 
Other.  
Accordingly, in The Red Shoes ballet, it is the male shoemaker who seduces 
Karen into wearing the shoes, and who shadows her throughout the segment. 
Remaining indistinct and anamorphic throughout, the shadow/shoes resemble 
Lacan’s concept of the hommelette29 that is silently part of the individual.30 
Moreover, the shadow in the ballet morphs into Julian and Lermontov, again 
calling up Lacan’s concept of the psychotic structure, in which the individual is 
haunted by a missing Name of the Father. As Lacan’s theory suggests, it is the 
desire for an ungraspable Other that consumes Vicky, as it is Eurydice’s allure that 
calls Orpheus into the “other night.” Lacan writes: “we have, in Eurydice twice 
lost, the most potent image we can find of the relation between Orpheus the analyst 
and the unconscious […] the unconscious finds itself, strictly speaking, on the 
opposite side of love” (The Four 25). Eurydice depicts how the unconscious is 
present as a discontinuity; it always leaves the individual with a loss. “To flee it [the 
other night]” Blanchot writes, “is to be pursued by it. It becomes the shadow which 
always follows you and always precedes you” (Space 169). The unconscious cannot 
be outrun because it exists within, which Vicky illustrates in her endless flight 
                                                
29 “Lacan imagines lamella [hommelette] as a version of what Freud called ‘partial object’: a weird 
organ which is magically autonomized, surviving without a body whose organ it should have been, 
like a hand that wanders around alone in early Surrealist films” (Žižek, How to Read 62) 
30Although both the shadow and the shoes haunt Vicky, the shoes represent that physical torture we 
have been discussing in relation to the two syndromes, while the shadow, as Naomi Segal writes, 
“privileges a visual relation to the object” (“Living” 262). Again we are reminded of the 
inseparability between the visual, psychic and physical, and how this is represented in the film.  
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away from life’s pressures and towards death; and Karen, from her shoes/shadow.31 
This indicates that although many have shadows from which they cannot escape, 
some individuals’ desires for the “other” may cause them to conjure up illusions 
from darkness. Apotemnophilia and PLS demonstrate that, while this may 
engender creativity for some, for others, it may take over reality. Their shadows 
transgress the objective and seep into a psychical and physical experience. The 
limbs, like embodied shadows, present an absence of reflection (as counterbalanced 
by the mirror-box reflection). 
If the ballet segment provides insight into Vicky’s psychological state, it 
suggests that Vicky’s desire for the “other” has caused her to create a fictional 
whole. This is particularly illustrated in a scene in the ballet when, just after 
Karen’s partner disappears, she descends to the Underworld. Here, she first 
appears translucent, only to become opaque when she is encircled by a sheet of 
newspaper. The scene’s opening thus seems to suggest that she is only resurrected 
through words, through her representation. Once opaque, she leaps towards the 
newspaper, which is transformed into the image of her partner, as her white dress 
becomes obscured by indecipherable words. Although the words resurrect her, 
therefore, they also veil her, thus dramatising the paradoxical nature of language 
we have explored through Blanchot’s work. “Speech,” he writes, “has a function 
that is not only representative but also destructive. It causes to vanish, it renders 
the object absent” (The Work 30).  
Vicky’s delusion reflects the writer’s desire to bring forth the unknown, an 
inclination to communicate through a “phantom [which] is meant to hide, to 
appease the phantom night […] we dress it up as a kind of being; we enclose it, if 
possible, in a name, a story and a resemblance” (Blanchot, Space 163). Dressed in 
words and dancing with a phantom of language, Vicky hides behind her story 
(behind Karen), in the Underworld, away from the light of day. Thus, Vicky and 
Karen, like those with phantom and BIID appendages, are chased by a trauma that 
drives them into the arms of fiction; suggesting that here, illusion is fundamental to 
                                                
31 Powell and Pressburger exhibit their own experience with this, as Powell’s autobiography A Life in 
Movies (1986) reveals, “The ballet demands body and soul from its practitioners” (656). However 
Powell and Pressburger, unlike Vicky, are not consumed by the illusion: “The movies were purely 
representational” (656). 
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expressing feelings of rupture. Similarly, a text shapes fiction from absence. 
However, as Blanchot argues, language cannot completely communicate fracture. 
Literature that (as discussed) exposes this ruse of completion parallels Vicky’s 
illusion, which reveals a sense of underlying fracture. The two conditions 
demonstrate how this is embodied. These links suggest, therefore, that by creating 
an illusion to escape from reality, an individual may only be faced with its 
impossibility. 
 When she dances with her partner in the Underworld, Karen illustrates 
how linguistic expression may not be enough. She attempts to bring life to absence 
through language to (in Blanchot’s words) “gain control over things with satisfying 
ease. I say, ‘[t]his woman’, and she is immediately available to me, I push her away, 
I bring her close, she is everything I want her to be’” (The Work 322). The partner 
in the ballet, hidden behind indecipherable words, is Vicky’s creation, suggesting 
that language can be used to control the other. However, the blanketed partner is 
not real and cannot be grasped, he fades away at her touch: the Other cannot be 
understood through words. Although Vicky and the man embody language, it is not 
language, paradoxically, but the body and dance, through which they 
communicate. The scene thus illustrates those themes central to the first slope of 
literature: that language is created to withstand absence, yet it is not capable of 
establishing complete communication. If the movement shows that Karen is only 
able to dance with her partner when covered in an indecipherable language in the 
Underworld, Powell and Pressburger allude to an existence beyond words, a 
communication that takes place through the body and imagination. 
Beyond everyday language, therefore, their dance, like Blanchot’s notion of 
literature, brings out “the trembling, pre-linguistic darkness of things […] this 
second slope is not satisfied with [sic] bringing Eurydice into the daylight, negating 
the night, but rather by [sic] wanting to gaze at her in the night, as the heart of the 
essential night” (Critchley, Very Little, 63-4). The dance, therefore, like the second 
slope of literature “becomes concerned with the presence of things before 
consciousness and the writer exist; it seeks to retrieve the reality and anonymity of 
existence prior to the dialectico-Sadistic death drive of the writer” (Critchley, Very 
54-5). If Karen is haunted by death, this non-linguistic (yet not without language) 
scene offers a moment of relief, a retreat from pain, where rather than helplessly 
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dancing away from her absence, she dances with it. Thus, it is through an image of 
language (words), rather than the meaning of words, that Karen is able to let go.  
Put another way, might this image not demonstrate Lacan’s notion of the 
mirror stage, that pre-linguistic state of the infans? When Karen’s fall away from 
the light of day and into the Underworld erases her public presence, and Vicky’s 
art erases her identity, both characters hide in an imaginary world. Karen’s dance 
with an imaginary double thus resembles the moving, ruptured, and non-linguistic 
infans: although Karen moves through a ruptured body, she does so through an 
illusion of being with the other through language.32 If, as previously discussed, the 
individual unconsciously desires to function at the level of the Imaginary, Vicky’s 
dance as Karen illustrates this desire. Her fall to the Underworld may connote a 
lapse into a pre-linguistic state, also resembling Blanchot’s space of literature. If we 
return to Leslie Hill’s statement that the space of literature is a “nowhere that is 
here,” and apply it to the film, we see how Karen is in the Underworld (a visible 
nowhere), and only exists in the imagination of Vicky (who is also a figure of 
absence). Orpheus, too, is in the Underworld through a fragmented body, and the 
infans always exists just beyond grasp. These links thus convey a different view of 
those themes perceptible in both limb conditions¾ the BIID appendage that 
belongs nowhere, and the imagined phantom limb. If, as earlier discussed, this 
nowhere that is here may offer a feeling of freedom, how, I shall now ask, can this 
be seen in The Red Shoes, and what can this reveal about the mirror-box? 
The newspaper scene ends when Karen falls towards her partner’s arms, he 
returns to a sheet of paper, her dress returns to white, and she peacefully drifts to 
the floor (the only moment of rest). This movement, for me, resembles the 
(previously discussed) writer who (to return to de Man) “frees himself from 
empirical concerns” (77). By shedding her linguistic veil, Karen’s gestures and 
movements arise more naturally and freely. Here, something within words, not 
words themselves, allows for a mutual dialogue where (returning to Hart) “‘I’ 
becomes a ‘he’ or a ‘one’” (17), where the individual becomes (in a way) a symbol. 
Powell and Pressburger allude to the idea when Julian tells Vicky, “and when 
you’re lifted up by the dancers, my music will transform you!” To which she asks, 
                                                
32 If for Lacan, psychoanalysis “is about accompanying the patient towards his/her subjective truth” 
(Bailly 35), this reunion between Karen and her partner may also signify a reunion between the 
objective self, and the subjective hidden other, that shows through in analysis. 
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“into what?” “A flower swaying in the wind, a cloud drifting, a white bird flying … 
Nothing matters but the music” (The Red Shoes). In forgetting representation, Vicky 
is free of herself. Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1872) may provide more insight 
here because it discusses another double¾ the Dionysian (associated with music, 
disordered and undifferentiated reality and death), and the Apollonian (associated 
with art, order and a differentiation). In becoming other to herself (a white bird 
flying) through music, Vicky falls into the Dionysian, and because she gives herself 
to “this noble illusion, tragedy may now move its limbs to dithyrambic dance and 
surrender itself without a thought to an orgiastic feeling of freedom, which it is 
allowed to flourish as music in itself, thanks alone to this illusion” (Nietzsche 113-
14). In dancing, Vicky moves away from the Apollonian realm of order, and enters 
the Dionysian “dissolution of the individual and [her] unification with primordial 
existence” (Nietzsche 27). The ballet lures her towards a Dionysian state wherein 
she, as Blanchot writes of Orpheus, “loses [her]self” in the “song” where she is 
“infinitely dead” (Space 173). For Orpheus, this leap towards erasure “lifts concern, 
interrupts the incessant by discovering it” (Blanchot, Space 175), analogueous to a 
writer who may also express her own notions of self. In dancing, Vicky is free of 
Julian and Lermontov; she can rest when her shoes overtake her, falling into an 
image of herself, which produces a kind of freedom. In the mirror-box, this idea 
becomes actual and more immediate: becoming a symbol engenders a physical 
freedom from a false sense of unity. One individual with a phantom limb writes, “at 
the point the ‘effect’ occurs with the mirror, there is usually an overwhelming 
release of emotion that is not unpleasant. After this initial effect, the person feels 
pleasantly different” (“Phantom Limb Pain”). The mirror image here empties out 
the phantom feeling. Part of the individual is erased through the mirror symbol, 
which has physical results. In this way, the more abstract ideas discussed through 
various cultural texts take on a different kind of “reality” in apotemnophilia and the 
phantom limb phenomenon.  
The Red Shoes blurs the lines between fact and fiction, between Vicky and 
Karen. Towards the end of the film, Karen overshadows Vicky’s actions, as 
portrayed most clearly when Vicky’s shoes possess her by carrying her body off the 
balcony’s edge. Although “the exceptionally sanguinary nature of Vicky’s demise 
upset many critics” (McLean 42), perhaps Powell and Pressburger gesture towards 
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a release, as foreshadowed by Karen’s dance. Ian Christie’s analysis of the film, 
which focuses on the “explicit and veiled” nature of Vicky’s death, suggests that, as 
quoted earlier, in Vicky’s final leap to suicide, “Powell illustrates death not only by 
an ellipsis but also by an eclipse of the body […]. Her body [is] in free fall, her 
flesh and the tulle of her dress cross the frame, merging together, out of focus and 
disordered. A strange suspension gives the illusion of weightlessness” (235). The 
image here is not of pain, but of freedom¾to return to Julian’s remark¾“of a 
white bird flying.” If Karen’s fall into the Underworld involved a dance with her 
own absence, which indicated a self-release and moment of rest, does Vicky’s death 
not also depict a similar kind of freedom? And if so, how does this illuminate the 
death of the phantom limb in the mirror-box? How does Vicky’s death resemble 
the mirror image that simultaneously animates and annihilates the phantom limb? 
First, by submitting to her rupture through dance, Vicky, like the 
individuals using the mirror-box, releases a painful pressure of being caught 
between life and death (she becomes Karen). And just as Karen’s fall to the 
Underworld is not precisely death, Vicky’s fall in the film’s closing scene is not 
precisely suicide, but an ambiguous death (which Michael Powell confirms in his 
autobiography, A Life in Movies [1986]). In dying, then, Vicky submits to her own 
absence, which, I want to suggest, is what allows her dance to live on (like the feet 
that move without Karen in the Andersen tale). We see something similar in 
Orpheus, whose song exists through his infinite fissure, as Vicky’s dance lives on 
after her death, as allegorised in the film’s final moment when the ballet continues 
without her. To clarify, Vicky’s death occurs just before the performance, leading 
to a chilling scene in which Lermontov decides to continue the play with a spotlight 
in her place, clinching her role as being a figure of her own negation. Paradoxically, 
however, this scene also finalises the impossibility of Vicky’s absence; because she 
is an artist, her death is unending. Vicky, like language as Blanchot conceives it, is 
only a figure of her negation. And it is this last scene that, reflective of (Blanchot’s 
concept of) literature, acknowledges this underlying void. The spotlight, paralleling 
Orpheus’s gaze, “consecrates the song,” because in order to produce art, “one has 
to possess the power of art already [… to] write, one has to write already. In this 
contradiction are situated the essence of writing, the snag in experience, and 
inspiration’s leap” (Blanchot, Space 176). Thus, Orpheus and Vicky are driven from 
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elsewhere to sacrifice life and leap into the darkness, to fall into a kind of existence 
suspended between life and death. When read alongside BIID and PLS, the drive 
to perceive and experience this life/death presence derives from a feeling of rupture 
that is linked to a desire for unity. However, in submitting to a simultaneous 
existence and non-existence, a re-dying, by becoming a symbol in the mirror-box, 
one is momentarily free of oneself. I now want to turn our attention towards how 
Vicky’s rupture can be linked to film’s viewer, and the medium of the film itself, 
and how this connects to PLS and mirror therapy. 
To approach this, I will analyse three ideas in conjunction: that the 
cinematic experience reflects the experiences conveyed within the film, that the 
spotlight in Vicky’s place echoes the phantom limb and mirror-box, and that the 
film itself allegorises the mirror-box. I contend that in observing Vicky’s struggle 
with fragmentation, the audience may unconsciously identify with Vicky, albeit 
from the safe distance of the film’s images. Ian Christie writes that in The Red Shoes, 
“death is foreseen, that is to say articulated as a possibility, for the spectator it 
nevertheless remains unthinkable […]. The character on whose presence the story 
is based, and in whom they [the viewers] invest their emotions, cannot die” (234-
5). This suggests a disavowal of annihilation,33 which echoes that of the phantom 
limb sufferer, whose body denies an absence. The final scene wherein Vicky is 
represented by a spotlight, continues Christie, challenges the viewer with a 
“violence […] of a confrontation between the presence of the body and its absence 
in the place it should occupy” (Christie 236). The spotlight reflects, in other words, 
Vicky’s phantom, and in watching it, the viewer sees Vicky’s presence and absence 
at once. Thus, those within the film who are viewing the ballet, particularly 
Lermontov, cope with Vicky’s absence through a phantom of her presence, another 
fetishistic disavowal reflective of the phantom limb and the mirror-box (as they 
both involve a simultaneous denial and recognition of a lack). This scene spills over 
into the cinematic experience, as it too may act as a coping mechanism in the wake 
of the Second World War. It may (from Christie’s perspective) cause observers to 
                                                
33 It is worth noting that the film was made just after the Second World War. Powell explains: “we 
had all been told for ten years to go out and die for freedom and democracy, for this and for that, 
and now that the war was over, The Red Shoes told us to go and die for art” (Powell 653). Thus, the 
audience’s possible suppression can also be related to a general post-war trauma. Though I will not 
expand on this, it is connected to the foundations of this thesis, which will be elucidated in Chapter 
Five. 
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disavow (Vicky’s) annihilation, while allowing them to simultaneously visualise it. 
It is the mirror limb that embodies this simultaneous presence and absence through 
an image, which echoes the film itself: a reflection of images which, in this case, 
may appease spectators’ fears without denying them. Thus, the ballet, film, and the 
mirror-box all demonstrate forms of relieving and attempting to relieve absence. 
And although the cinematic experience may not be seemingly physical, as the 
mirror-box demonstrates, a particular kind of image can have a psychosomatic 
effect. In sum, then, the phantom limb and mirror-box phenomena are reflected in 
Vicky’s character, which the spectators (both in the film and those viewing the 
film) might identify with, albeit, at a removal. By depicting, rather than denying a 
lack, these artistic mediums (dance and the film) may work to alleviate one. In this 
way, a particular kind of art, and, related to this, the mirror-box, can allow an 
individual (amputee or spectator, in this case) to look into the “internal world of 
our thought and [… enable] us to ‘understand’ something in the external world, to 
foresee it and possibly alter it” (Freud, Outline 53).  
Literature and psychoanalysis, as I have aimed to show, can have a similar 
effect. Peter Brooks explains that literature aims to discover, but not resolve 
uncanny feelings and experiences: “[i]f the motive of poetry is an attempted 
recuperation of an otherness, often that otherness is our own body” (Body Work 2). 
The mirror-box shows the body as a sign with which the individual can perceive 
her rupture and reduce the urge to physically re-experience it. Furthermore, a 
particular kind of literature, like the mirror-box, may engender a reincorporation of 
the unknown. As Blanchot states, “language’s power consists in making the 
immediate appear to us not as the most terrible thing, which ought to overwhelm us 
[…] but as the pleasant reassurance of natural harmonies or the familiarity of a 
narrative habitat” (Space 41). Here, literature’s (an implicitly art’s) “power” is to 
bring forth that unfamiliar “other” that engenders tormenting feelings. Blanchot 
indicates that in so doing, the narrative can help reshape the foreign body into a 
home-like one; it can make the uncanny more familiar. This chapter’s discussions of 
literature, film, and psychoanalysis have¾in its examples of how one plagued by 
fragmentation may retreat to delusion¾ provided insight into an alternative route. 
If, as stated in the introduction, “we constitute ourselves as human subjects in part 
through our fictions” (Brooks, “Idea” 341), the mirror-box concretises this, as it 
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demonstrates how fictional images of self and self-as-other can change realities. The 
possibility of causing the unfamiliar to become more pleasantly familiar is also 
central to the process of a psychoanalytic working-through, which I now explore in 
Chapter Four through the work of D.W. Winnicott. 
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Chapter Four: Breakdown 
 
Hi, I attempted to amputate my left hand in 2005 and it was 
reconstructed […]. Now that time has passed I am ready to definitively 
amputate the hand. I am open to traveling within N. America to stage 
the accident and am looking for someone to corroborate the “story line.” 
Having been there once before I kind of know what I’m getting into and 
what to expect and “not do again.” […] anyone interested in sharing my 
journey? (“Fighting It”) 
 
This man with BIID reflects the struggle of a certain kind of traumatised individual 
outlined in Winnicott’s “Fear of Breakdown.” The writer of this email expresses a 
desire to (re)experience fracture, create a fictional story to do so, and to be 
supported in this endeavour. In Winnicott’s model, traumatised individuals might 
experience something similar, albeit in various different forms: in order to control a 
feeling of loss, they may attempt to relive a certain type of accident or rupture. 
They may do so, he suggests, through dangerous self-destructive acts. However, 
they may also be able to experience fracture in a healthier and more productive 
way, through a particular kind of relationship. Specifically, the theory is that if an 
infant endured a traumatic loss, its body and mind would be left unintegrated, and 
its security in the environment faulty, causing the individual to remain with an 
unconscious fear of and desire to fall apart and re-experience the initial trauma. 
The individual is, in turn, left dependent upon the environment, and, echoing the 
desire for a, as quoted above, “definitive amputation,” she may be driven to define 
herself through a false sense of unity; thus, I suggest, reflecting those with BIID 
and PLS. This chapter will explore these connections in greater detail, beginning 
with a brief summary of Winnicott’s theories, which will be followed by a more 
expansive discussion of trauma within “Fear of Breakdown.” The patients’ 
reactions to the trauma and how this connects to PLS and BIID will then be 
examined and developed through Quentin Tarantino’s Death Proof. 
D.W. Winnicott was a psychoanalyst and paediatrician trained by Melanie 
Klein, one of the cofounders of object relations theory. Thus, several of her ideas, 
including those about play, pre-oedipal developments, “internal” and “external” 
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objects, and babies’ subjective experiences of their bodies, were integral to his 
work. Klein’s notion of the depressive position was additionally foundational to his 
concepts about unity and independence; however, he was more invested in how 
one’s emotional development related to the external world. As Klein explains in 
“Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946), Winnicott, like her, theorises that 
an infant’s carers are responsible for the state of one’s ego being integrated, 
healthy, and complete (as opposed to split and dispersed); however, she focuses on 
how the baby integrates the mother’s “good” and “bad” breast, and Winnicott 
explores the process through maternal handling. His theories centre upon how 
individuals form subjective and objective notions of self, how they develop in 
relation to others, and how patterns of growth are formed through the early 
environment. These patterns, he suggests, are developed in connection with 
maternal care and psychosomatic integration, which is essential to his essay “Fear 
of Breakdown.” The essay is one of his most famous partially due to his belief that 
the fear of breakdown (and implicitly psychosis) is to a degree, universal. He 
writes: “there must be expected a common denominator of the same fear, indicating 
the existence of universal phenomena” (“Fear” 103). Since “Fear of Breakdown” 
outlines what Winnicott calls “a reversal of the individual’s maturational process” 
(“Fear” 88), I begin by summarising his theories of human development.  
For Winnicott, a baby comes into the world dependent on and inseparable 
from its mother, 34 and continually learns to exist as a separate individual. This 
occurs as the mother adapts to the baby and slowly removes her support, thus 
allowing it to cope with absences and mend the gap between self and mother, until 
the child becomes less dependent on others for survival. If, however, the mother 
“fails” (for example, by causing the child to wait too long for her return), the 
continuity of the mother/child relationship will be compromised, and the child will 
feel psychically and physically “dropped.”35 The resulting blank (which involves a 
feeling of falling) becomes part of the child’s physical and psychical makeup, 
obstructing the infant’s development, and causing any number of problems 
                                                
34Although the role may apply to other carers, Winnicott typically refers to the mother.  
35 This idea of a “failing” or “good/not good-enough” mother is problematic, as, first, the mother is 
not the only person responsible for the baby. Second, the demarcation for being “good enough” is 
imprecise: for Winnicott, a mother can be too present or too absent; and third, it is important to note 
that there is no “perfect” mother. 
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including: a fear of feeling dropped again, pain related to this fear, and the 
possibility of forming psychotic tendencies to defend against this pain. He writes 
that traumatised babies are those 
 
who have been significantly ‘let down’ once or in a pattern of environmental 
failures (related to the psychopathologic state of the mother or mother-
substitute). These babies carry with them the experience of unthinkable or 
archaic anxiety. They know what it is to be in a state of acute confusion or 
the agony of disintegration. They know what it is like to be dropped, to fall 
forever, or to become split into psycho-somatic disunion. (“Psycho-
Analytic” 260)  
 
Dropping, therefore, (both in reality and symbolically) is part of what constitutes a 
trauma, and to avoid causing the baby to suffer from trauma, the carer must hold, 
handle, and present the child with objects at the right speed. He writes: if “the 
mother is away more than x minutes […] [t]he baby is distressed, but this distress 
is soon mended because the mother returns in x+y minutes. […] But in x+y+z 
minutes the baby has become traumatised” (Playing 131, emphasis in original). 
Winnicott suggests that this separation between mother and infant involves a 
dialogue between the body and mind, because the baby is shown how to physically 
grasp objects and survive through the mother’s example, and must form mental 
links to do so. The infant’s independence and health therefore, depends upon 
psychosomatic integration, because it ostensibly allows the infant to “feel real” and 
“live creatively” (Abram 45). Winnicott writes, “[f]eeling real is more than existing; 
it is finding a way to exist as oneself, and to relate to objects as oneself” (Playing 
158). In a traumatic occurrence however, the subject may feel a dissonance 
between her mind and body and thus feel less united. Though Winnicott believes 
that independence is never completely reached, a person becomes increasingly 
defined as she uses objects in the environment to represent and express her 
feelings, so that they can be shared and more thoroughly understood by both 
herself and the outside world. Since this covers a large scope, I will expand upon 
some of the specifics to ground the connections that follow.  
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Childhood Development and Breakdown 
When a baby enters the world and is dependent upon its surroundings, Winnicott 
argues it is only a bundle of fragmented senses with no psychical understanding of 
itself and what is around it, because it is too young to differentiate one thing from 
another. In this state, there is “not yet a conscious and an unconscious […]. What 
is there is an armful of anatomy and physiology, and added to this a potential for 
development into a human personality” (Winnicott, “Communication Between” 
70). Here, the infant feels the sensations that accompany the needs necessary to 
survival, such as hunger. Due to its disordered fragmentation and underdeveloped 
skills of comprehension, however, the baby cannot satisfy those bodily needs and 
must rely on another human being to stay alive. It is only “a belly joined on to a 
chest and has loose limbs and particularly a loose head: all these parts are gathered 
together by the mother who is holding the child, and in her hands they add up to 
one” (Winnicott, “Physiotherapy” 568). This stage is called “absolute dependence,” 
wherein the baby believes it is one with the mother, and that the objects given to it 
are its own creation, what Winnicott calls the “illusion of omnipotence.” It is 
through this fantasy that the baby begins to build its security, confidence, and sense 
of self in the world. It can only feel like a “whole and mature human being” 
(Winnicott, The Child 88), therefore, through those who hold and satisfy its bodily 
needs. Thus, as previously noted, Winnicott states that “there is no such thing as a 
baby” (The Child 88). A baby cannot exist independently of the other, because there 
is only a relationship, as opposed to a complete individual.  
This relationship sets the stage for the ego, the baby’s physical and psychical 
sense of self in the world. 36 Alessandra Lemma explains that the “it is in part 
through identifying with the image the m(other) has of him that the child develops 
a sense of himself” (Under 755). Moreover, explains Jan Abram, “at the very 
beginning she [the mother] is the baby’s ego” (158). The ego is what allows the 
                                                
36 The psychosomatic ego put forward here is not unique to Winnicott’s thinking. Freud famously 
stated that “[t]he ego is first and foremost a body ego” (The Ego 26). Melanie Klein suggests, 
“[i]ntrojection and projection [of the breast] are from the beginning of life also used in the service of 
this primary aim of the ego” (“Notes” 101). The ego for her is physical, similar to Winnicott’s idea, 
because the first object the baby projects and introjects is the mother’s breast. Jacques Lacan also 
believed the ego to be physically composed, though for him, the baby “has no experience of 
corporeal or psychic unity” (Lemma, “Being Seen” 756). Didier Anzieu’s concept of the ego 
correlates more closely with Winnicott’s. He suggests that “the ego is primarily structured as a ‘skin 
ego,’” so the baby’s experience of his body is “mediated by what he experiences as the mother’s 
relationship to his body” (Lemma, “Being Seen” 756).  
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child to defend against environmental impingements, which remains strong if the 
baby is “sufficiently” cared for. This stage in the infant’s life, Winnicott contends, is 
registered as a part of the child, however, since she was not yet an individual at the 
time, it cannot be accessed, remembered or understood. This silent (pre-linguistic) 
stage, he writes, “belongs to being alive. And in health, it is out of this that 
communication naturally arises” (“Communicating” 192). Though it can never be 
comprehended, the fragmented self remains within, and founds the structure upon 
which the individual will grow. This early state, he contends, is the place where 
spontaneous gestures are primitively felt, it leads to one’s future creativity. 
Although it “forms an intermediate space through which the individual and the 
world communicate” (Jacobs 40), it can never be completely expressed (as it was 
pre-linguistic), and it is this core that comprises what Winnicott refers to as the 
“True Self,” which “is the beginning of a feeling of existing and feeling real, and 
depends upon what he refers to elsewhere as ‘a basic relation to the experience of 
omnipotence’” (Phillips, Winnicott 133). For the illusion of omnipotence that founds 
the baby’s “core” self to be secured, the mother must provide a facilitating 
environment by adapting to the baby and satisfying its needs. By bringing it 
desired objects, a “good-enough mother” gives “the infant the illusion that there is 
an external reality that corresponds to the infant’s own capacity to create” 
(Winnicott, Playing, 12 emphasis in original). She does so through the way she “in 
the fullest sense, ‘holds’ the child, which includes the way the child is held in the 
mother’s mind as well as in her arms” (Phillips, Winnicott 30), so that it does not feel 
traumatically dropped. However, if the baby is left too long, or the carer imposes 
her own needs and gestures upon the baby, it will form a “False Self.” In turn, the 
child will have trouble finding, expressing and appeasing her needs. As the baby 
proceeds from absolute dependence towards “relative dependence,” it must learn to 
separate from the illusion of omnipotence, which occurs slowly, as it does not 
continually receive the objects of its desire. Over time, the baby learns to trust that 
the environment will not leave its needs unmet, allowing it to withstand absences 
and learn to obtain objects independently. 
This movement involves what Winnicott refers to as transitional objects. 
These objects are thought to mediate between the baby’s physical desire and its 
correlating object in the world, standing in for the gap between the two when the 
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desired object is not immediately present, and occupying a space between the 
subjective and objective (“me” and “not-me”). Since they take up the space between 
an indescribable desire and its satisfaction, transitional objects stand for a 
paradoxically simultaneous presence and absence of subject/mother unity and the 
baby’s body, they are “not part of the infant’s body yet are not fully recognised as 
belonging to external reality” (Winnicott, Playing 3). When the baby is not being 
held, transitional objects help the infant to cope with absence; in place of the carer, 
the baby can hold, for example, a “bit of cloth,” “wool,” or engage in linguistic 
“babble” (Playing 5). These objects bridge or hold up the void between the baby’s 
felt desires and their connection to the physical world, founding the psychical link 
that carries the baby from its indecipherable wishes towards the world. Thus, the 
more sufficiently the child learns to use transitional objects, the stronger her 
psychosomatic integration and ego will become. Since these objects engender a 
simultaneous sense of whole omnipotence and absence, the baby’s healthy physical 
understanding is organised through a paradoxical object. If an infant is not 
sufficiently supported and cannot learn to use transitional objects, however, a split 
will remain between the child’s mind and body, her sense of unity and separation, 
subjectivity and objectivity. By integrating the mind and body through transitional 
objects therefore, the child is always gathering together the world around her to 
build her own support system, handle environmental losses, and separate from her 
dependence on the environment. 
In this process, suggests Winnicott, she may act aggressively towards the 
environment to ensure that it survives her destruction. He describes this through 
the game “I’m the king of the castle- you’re the dirty rascal” (“Psycho-Somatic 
Disorder” 112), a playful illustration of how the child separates from the 
environment. “With good-enough mothering and a facilitating environment,” 
explains Abram, “aggression in the growing child becomes integrated. If the 
environment is not good enough, aggression may manifest itself in a (self)-
destructive and/or antisocial way” (Language 89). In an insufficient environment, 
the child may become inappropriately aggressive towards her self or others, 
reflective of those with BIID. As one sufferer explains in “Fighting It”: “I find it 
very difficult to cope. Honestly- it’s on my mind all day and it sucks. I’m getting 
real close to having a shotgun party in the desert. Accidents do happen” (“Fighting 
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It”). Here, a desire for bodily fragmentation invades his mind; there is an invasive 
feeling of loss. In light of Winnicott’s concept of physically registering a trauma, 
which I soon expand upon, perhaps this man’s drive to suicide indicates that the 
only way to destroy the mental imprint of a felt absence is by killing his body. 
Linguistically, his ironic tone indicates a simultaneity of seriousness and humour: 
his reference to suicide as a “shotgun party” makes light of a serious situation, just 
as the word “accident” makes light of his drive to suicide. This humour could be 
read as a psychological distancing from a physical reality. By mocking his possible 
death, the man may be protectively separating himself from torment. Additionally, 
his use of the word “accident” is paradoxical, because it is not an accident if he 
takes it into his own hands. Perhaps he unconsciously wonders if he is the accident. 
Has he mistakenly been left in a position that causes him to feel fragmented, as 
though he wants to kill himself?  
When read with Winnicott’s model, the accident here may refer to having 
been “dropped” by a neglectful carer. As we will soon see in “Fear of Breakdown,” 
Winnicott believes that early traumatic experiences which are not remembered or 
understood, but which are unconsciously registered throughout life, are deathlike. 
The traumatised individual thus grows with an inexplicable felt emptiness and 
unintegrated ego. He contends that the individual left in this state may desire to 
return to the deathlike moment of being dropped in infancy in order to re-
experience, survive, and lessen its impact, which may lead to a solution through 
suicide. “The patient who compulsively looks for death,” writes Adam Phillips, “is 
reaching in this way to a memory of a previous death” (Winnicott 20-1). Left with 
an indefinite feeling of physical rupture, the aforementioned BIID sufferer may, in 
this light, be attempting to pursue his accident of being psychically dropped in 
order to control and make sense of the past. He may be driven to self-amputate or 
commit suicide in order to experience and survive his continually felt primitive 
trauma, he may be drawn to recreate the accident that happened to him before he 
could remember.37 This may also account for his pluralisation of the word 
                                                
37 To clarify, although Winnicott refers here to a specific loss in infancy, trauma can occur in 
different gradations throughout life, as “holding” is not specific; it applies to a variety of gradual 
environmental experiences. As he writes in “The Theory of the Parent-Infant Relationship” (1960): 
“[t]he term ‘holding’ is used here to denote not only the actual physical holding of the infant. […] 
[I]t refers to a three-dimensional or space relationship with time gradually added” (589). Thus, I do 
not suggest that those with BIID have necessarily suffered from a specific trauma; perhaps they 
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“accident,” which suggests that he constantly feels the accidental, traumatising 
“fall”; and that this imposing feeling of annihilation may be driving him to recreate 
it. Winnicott’s “Fear of Breakdown” hinges upon this type of a traumatic 
occurrence, which thus resonates with PLS and BIID. 
As illustrated above, individuals with BIID demonstrate feelings of 
psychosomatic dissonance: though they appear whole, they feel incomplete. 
Similarly, though those with PLS subjectively feel physically present, they are 
physically amputated. In “Fear of Breakdown,” Winnicott outlines a similar state of 
psychosomatic splitting. For him, it is in the pre-linguistic state of absolute 
dependence in which the blueprint for further development is most distinctly 
drawn, rendering it most integral to one’s ego construction. The essay centres upon 
this stage, because he believes that if something traumatic happens to an infant 
here, it will develop throughout life without a strong “ego root,” with a gap between 
the body and mind. Here, if something goes wrong in the carer’s ability to hold, 
handle, and present the infant with objects, the child ostensibly feels “annihilated, 
dropped and falls forever” (Newman 342); the infant is self-defined through a lack. 
Due to a traumatic drop (which can occur over a long period of time), the infant 
cannot learn to develop independently through the use of transitional objects, 
thereby leaving the individual to be structured through a void that comprises what 
Winnicott refers to as a primitive agony. 
Though he lists these agonies in various ways throughout his writing, they 
represent the bodily loss that stems from the mother’s failure to hold the child. In 
“Fear of Breakdown,” Winnicott lists the anxieties as  
 
1. A return to an unintegrated state. (Defence: disintegration.) 
2. Falling for ever. (Defence: self-holding.) 
3. Loss of psychosomatic collusion, failure of indwelling. (Defence:  
depersonalization.) 
4. Loss of sense of real. (Defence: exploitation of primary  
narcissism, etc.) 
5. Loss of capacity to relate to objects. (Defence: autistic states,  
                                                                                                                                      
have, whether concretely or metaphorically, been unable to consciously digest an experience of loss 
or trauma, and may be thus driven to re-experience it.  
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relating only to self-phenomena.) 
And so on. (89-90) 
 
Due to the nature of the trauma, therefore, these agonies relate to feelings of 
fragmentation, annihilation and fusion with the environment/other.38 This 
structural emptiness leaves the individual “all the time on the brink of unthinkable 
anxieties” (Newman 60), which brings us to the crux of Winnicott’s theory. The 
“fear of breakdown,” he writes, “is the fear of a breakdown that has already been 
experienced” (Winnicott, “Fear,” 90 emphasis in original). The subject is left 
perpetually afraid that her falsely constructed ego will break down and send her to 
the state of primitive agony that she was too young to comprehend.  
Like the traumatised subject in Winnicott’s model, those with BIID and 
PLS embody a painful and incomprehensible lack. While the BIID sufferer 
illustrates this through a desire to physically express a feeling of fragmentation, 
those with PLS cannot come to terms with it. Individuals with a phantom limb or 
BIID are, echoing the traumatised subject, structured through a false ego and, from 
this perspective, defined by an illusory bodily ego: they are unable to represent 
certain feelings of rupture. In all three examples (BIID, the phantom limb and 
trauma), this pain can be attributed to a split between wholeness and rupture, 
psyche and soma. There is a metaphorical and lived element to Winnicott’s theory 
here, because while he discusses specific patients, he additionally considers 
breakdown to be more ambiguous and (as stated) universal. Thus, the parallel I 
draw here is not exact (particularly for those with PLS who have a physical lack). 
It provides a useful way to more thoroughly comprehend what might be involved in 
apotemnophilia and PLS; a certain experience of fracture. As discussed in relation 
to Peter in Chapter One, Winnicott’s viewpoint raises the question as to whether 
those with BIID are aiming to re-experience an embodied “death.” Winnicott’s 
                                                
38 This is similar to Klein’s account of what happens to the schizophrenic’s early ego, as explored in 
her essay “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946). She writes, “the early ego lacks 
cohesiveness and [… a] tendency towards integration alternates with a tendency towards 
disintegration, a falling into bits” (100). In Klein’s model, the subject has destructive and 
cannibalistic feelings that sometimes become part of the ego, thus causing the ego to internally 
disperse. Klein explains: “this falling to bits appears to underlie states of disintegration in 
schizophrenics” (101). In Second Thoughts (1967), Bion follows Klein’s model of the fragmented ego, 
suggesting that it can lead to self-cutting, which can cause one to project one’s conscious awareness 
of internal and external reality outwards, leaving one in “a state which is felt to be neither dead or 
alive” (38). 
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ideas regarding the ways in which individuals might react to a felt void lend insight, 
which I now discuss. 
 Nothing is Happening 
I have noted that for Winnicott, an individual may be driven to re-experience or 
“remember” agony or death, to survive it and restructure herself. The subject, in 
other words, is unconsciously driven to go back and learn how to use transitional 
objects in order to build a stronger ego. She could then, ostensibly, relearn how to 
hold herself up, integrate her body and mind, and release the pain of emptiness. 
Problematically however, since “the original experience of primitive agony cannot 
get into the past tense” (Winnicott, “Fear” 91), the patient is unable to re-integrate. 
Although “the experience has happened,” she was only a fragmented bundle, and 
thus, “the patient could not experience it” (Caldwell 199). She is helplessly trapped 
between the fear of experiencing and the desire to experience annihilation, just as 
those with BIID and phantom limbs reveal a fear of experiencing and desire to 
experience the fragmentation by which they feel they are structured. Those with 
PLP want to remove the phantom and experience a physical absence, but also veil 
the loss with a delusion; and those with BIID pursue feelings of fragmentation in 
the hopes to feel complete. 
Thus, the phantom limb individual’s drive to conceal fracture, gives 
concrete form to Winnicott’s suggestion that the traumatised victim may protect 
herself against environmental impingements through a false (empty) ego. Similarly, 
in desiring to sever one’s limbs, the BIID drive to fragmentation dramatises 
Winnicott’s theory that one may unconsciously desire to return to the primitive 
agony (the lack of maternal holding) to re-experience and survive the loss. BIID 
additionally conveys a protection from the world, because one takes the loss into 
one’s own hands. Winnicott refers to these kinds of protections as a “defence 
organisation relative to a primitive agony” (“Fear” 90). Though these defences may 
take many forms, he proposes that they all hinge upon the organisation of “a 
controlled emptiness” (“Fear” 94). It is in the act of controlling loss, he suggests, 
through which traumatised individuals feel as though they can survive. Grasping 
control of their own erasure may allow them to hold up the false identity that keeps 
them together. This empty ego, suggests Winnicott, is organised through an illusion 
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of whole omnipotence. Recall that in the phase of omnipotence the infant feels that 
it is one with the world. The function of the transitional object is to “give shape,” 
which will “start each human being off with what will always be important for 
them, i.e. a neutral area of experience which will not be challenged” (Winnicott, 
Playing 14). Interestingly, the phantom limb and BIID conditions reflect this kind 
of organisation, because their subjectively felt losses correlate with a specific part of 
the body. The majority of BIID sufferers know exactly where they feel that their 
limb is “absent.” “Many of us have a line of demarcation,” explains one sufferer, “a 
specific point where the body image map ends” (“Fighting It”). The phantom limb 
is also specified to a place on the individual’s body; the sufferer often feels pain in 
the exact place her appendage should be. When read in this light, the specificity of 
the delusional limbs indicates a desire to create a transitional object: a specific area 
that cannot be challenged.  
Winnicott’s essay focuses on two specific forms that this defensive reaction 
may take (one positive and one negative), which may also provide insight into the 
BIID and phantom limb syndromes. The positive form is reflective of the phantom 
limb delusion of a presence that satiates the lack, while the negative echoes the 
BIID sufferer’s desire for removal. Winnicott refers to the positive version as a 
“concept of one-ness” (“Fear” 95), which he compares to the notion of an afterlife. 
The idea is that the traumatised individual attempts to control her emptiness by 
explaining it, by intellectualising the way her death will take place. Like the 
phantom limb sufferer, this individual’s fragmentation is outlined through a 
strained narrative, which is impossible to validate. By envisioning an image of 
absence as a part of her whole being, the individual may be attempting to control 
her unknowable death to save it from taking over. An example of this positive one-
ness, states Winnicott, is of those who “ruthlessly fill up by a greediness which is 
compulsive and which feels mad” (“Fear” 94). If the previous example is a 
psychological aim to substantiate one’s absence, this example reveals the physical 
aspect of the same project. To keep from falling into chaotic agony, one’s ruptured 
body is kept intact, its nothingness solidified and materially controlled.39 Reflective 
                                                
39 Joyce MacDougall also discusses a pattern of addiction (substances, relationships, sex) as 
“magical attempts to fill the void in the inner world, where a representation of a self-soothing 
maternal figure is lacking.” These responses are termed “transitory objects”: a perverse form of 
Winnicott’s transitional objects (McDougall 82). 
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of the phantom limb phenomena, therefore, both physical and psychical narratives 
work to repair the traumatised person’s mind/body gap. Though the defence may 
work to keep the Winnicottian individual’s fracture in place, her brittle self-image 
remains dissonant from the environment, causing her to feel unintegrated and 
dissatisfied.  
Winnicott describes yet another form of controlled emptiness that has been 
“negated” in “an attempt to counter the personal tendency towards a non-existence” 
(Winnicott, “Fear” 95), which, I contend, takes shape in those with BIID. If the 
positive one-ness covers an ambiguous lack by filling it with a specific and 
ungraspable defence, the negative also counteracts non-existence, albeit through an 
emptying out, rather than a filling in. The “negated” reaction, then, additionally 
aims to control the lack. Winnicott connects this process to the existentialist who 
definitively decides that there is no afterlife. Here, the individual contains her 
annihilation by taking it into her own hands. Similar to the previously discussed 
narrative of greed, this negative form may also become physical. For instance, an 
individual may organise her emptiness by “not eating or not learning” (Winnicott, 
“Fear” 94), causing a felt void to be projected onto the world to make it to feel real. 
If not eating (for example in anorexia) or not learning can be visualised by others 
through social interaction or bodily weight, others may notice and verbalise the 
loss, thus reflecting back one’s empty identity to validate its existence. The BIID 
subject’s attempt to control rupture by bringing it towards the world (through the 
body) thus exemplifies this theory. However, as stated in the introduction, unlike 
most with anorexia, individuals with BIID acknowledge that their bodies are 
healthy; they convey a different form of defining and controlling absence. And, as 
Winnicott’s paradigm can take several forms, I do not suggest that PLS or BIID 
are exact parallels of his model. However, Winnicott’s theory brings out a core 
relationship between BIID and PLS (psychosomatic integration in relation to 
bodily rupture, and how individuals may react to a felt loss).  
One form that Winnicott also discusses in the essay is suicide. He asks if 
this attempt to physically realise one’s excessive rupture can take a more extreme 
form, if she will “find a solution by suicide” (“Fear”93). The trauma sufferer may, 
in other words, destroy her body to control her emptiness and release the agony of 
her painful state. However, since the felt trauma has been stored indecipherably in 
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the mind, Winnicott suggests that the subject is “sending the body to death which 
has already happened to the psyche” (“Fear” 93). The solution of bodily rupture, 
for Winnicott, does not successfully repair the psyche/soma split because it does 
not allow the traumatised individual to experience, survive, and mentally integrate 
the trauma to express the pain and feel better. What is at issue, then, is that 
“negated” wholeness and suicide may reflect an unsuccessful desire to physically 
experience fragmentation in order to release the mental need to do so.40 From this 
standpoint, BIID sufferers’ attempts to experience and integrate their felt rupture 
are not completely successful (although they do not usually attempt suicide, as seen 
in Peter’s case, Winnicott’s theory here illuminates the drive towards self-
destruction). Although they may keep the subject safe from “environmental 
vagaries” and protect the ego, those with BIID and PLS remain divided from the 
world: though the phantom limb sufferer feels whole, others see her amputated 
body. The BIID subject’s perception of self as fragmented also remains dissonant 
from others’ perceptions of her completion. She literally cuts herself off from the 
world, possibly causing others to think her mentally ill or psychotic (as revealed in 
Peter’s case).  
Winnicott’s definition of psychosis is a “defence organisation relative to a 
primitive agony” (“Fear” 90), which is “shown to be disintegrated, unreal, or out of 
touch with his or her own body, or with what we observers call external reality” 
(Winnicott, “Psycho-Neurosis” 64). Although the sufferers of BIID and PLS are 
(as discussed in the Introduction) not clinically psychotic, they do involve some 
psychotic mechanisms as outlined by Winnicott: they are both preoccupied with an 
imaginary wholeness, remain distanced from “external” reality, and feel partially 
unreal. The question raised here is how Winnicott’s suggestion as to how the 
psychotic patient’s pain may be alleviated links to BIID and PLS, and mirror 
therapy. I want to examine this question by turning to an email written by a BIID 
sufferer that responds to a woman’s attempt to self-amputate: 
 
                                                
40 Alessandra Lemma’s view of this physical removal or erasure is similar. She suggests that an 
individual with a difficult childhood, often characterized by a maternal deficit, also aims to extract a 
body part to be saved from further rejection. The individual, she suggests, may seek out “‘surgery’ 
¾a literal cutting off¾as the alternative to thinking and so integrating painful, ‘ugly’ feelings 
towards the self and object” (Lemma, Under 760). 
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God, can I relate to that! I know your agony; I've been there many times. I 
don't mean to encourage you, but be prepared- have a tourniquet (your 
belt?) and a cell phone with you- preferably with GPS for them to find you. 
And don't be too far from a road for access. Your femoral artery is about the 
same diameter of your fifth finger- you could bleed to death, so the 
tourniquet is very important. Know your risks, study your anatomy. LIVE 
as an amputee- don't die in the attempt. Be careful! (“Fighting It”) 
 
It seems that this man is stuck with a repetitive agony (“I’ve been there 
many times”) similar to the traumatised individual in Winnicott’s model. Rather 
than deny the torment however, the individual in this email shares his pain, 
acknowledging that the recipient is not alone. The author of this post helps the 
recipient find physical protections including a tourniquet, a phone, and an 
accessible road; there must be a possibility that she can be found in order to ensure 
survival. The email, furthermore, encourages her to study her risks and anatomy, to 
know herself. How, I ask, might this connect to the traumatised individual’s desire 
to “go back” and learn how to use a transitional object to reintegrate, decrease the 
pain of the unknowable trauma, and feel more real? One BIID sufferer expresses 
the concern: “[c]an we,” he asks, “find a way to live with this simple, but important 
and good feeling of being ourselves also when we keep our limbs ‘intact’?” 
(“Fighting It”). 
Winnicott suggests in his essay that this may be approached through 
psychoanalysis. He asks if one can be saved from physically annihilating what has 
been registered in the psyche by re-experiencing psychical death to alleviate the 
pressure of its threat and temptation. Can a person, he wonders, commit suicide 
“for the right reason” (“Fear” 93)? Can the analytic exchange provide a space for 
one to re-experience primitive agony in a safe way, so that it can be psychically and 
physically integrated, thus reducing the drive to self-harm? To approach this in 
psychoanalysis, the patient must “experience this past thing for the first time in the 
present, that is to say in the transference. This past and future thing then becomes a 
matter of the here and now, and becomes experienced by the patient for the first 
time” (“Fear” 92). Since the patient cannot remember the trauma, the analyst must 
recreate it by acting as the carer who supports and fails her, though this time 
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slowly, re-teaching the patient to hold herself up. The patient, then, learns to build 
transitional objects by “[gathering] the original failure of the facilitating 
environment into the area of his or her omnipotence” (“Fear” 91). This, Winnicott 
explains, “is the equivalent of remembering, and this outcome is the equivalent of 
the lifting of repression that occurs in the analysis of the psycho-neurotic patient 
(classical Freud-ian analysis)” (“Fear” 92). 
As one BIID sufferer explains, she fears “fall[ing] in the trap where [she 
questions her] own feelings and desires instead of accepting them, welcoming 
them” (“Fighting It”). Winnicott wonders if in the traumatised patient, this kind of 
a welcoming may be approached in analysis: if “the patient is ready for some kind 
of acceptance of this queer kind of truth, that what is not yet experienced did 
nevertheless happen in the past, then the way is open for the agony to be 
experienced in the transference, in reaction to the analyst’s failures and mistakes” 
(“Fear” 91). He suggests that the analyst who stands in for the carer must create a 
secure environment for the patient to enable her to “return” to the trauma, to break 
down. To do so, the analyst and patient must create a new memory together, a 
reconstruction of the ego based on transitional objects that do not aim towards a 
false sense of unity and truth.  
In this way, the psychoanalytic exchange is a kind of transitional object in 
its own right; it is a space for the patient to rebuild herself through another’s help. I 
suggest that the mirror-box also acts as a transitional object that stands in for carer 
who holds the baby. More specifically, the mirror-box and this kind of 
psychoanalytic exchange, like the transitional object, paradoxically symbolises 
mother/subject unity and its lack, create a space that is both illusory and real, and 
are simultaneously part of the body and not. In psychoanalysis, the analyst/patient 
relationship can shatter the illusion of omnipotence (and mother/baby unity) to 
allow the patient to begin accepting loss. The mirror-box, I contend, also conveys 
the impossibility of unity: an individual appears to be concurrently whole and 
missing, both held and dropped by arms that belong both to herself and the 
(physically whole) self she is not. Although psychoanalysis ostensibly allows the 
baby to “go back” to its trauma, this is also an illusion because the trauma was 
never experienced and thus cannot be re-experienced. Analysis is, in this way, a 
fictional re-enactment. However, it is also composed of lived moments and things: 
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the patient and analyst’s previous experiences, the dialogue being created between 
the two, and the room itself; thus echoing the simultaneously illusory and material 
composition of the mirror-box. Both processes, moreover, involved a sense of 
release through physical movements.  
Winnicott’s method of psychoanalysis focuses on this particular aspect, 
because he believes that the patient’s movements in analysis may reveal some 
primitive gestures that were lost when she was traumatised. He proposes that the 
psychoanalyst must work with the patient’s actions, or as Adam Phillips states, a 
“characteristic of the analytic setting for Winnicott was not exclusively verbal 
exchange” (Winnicott 138). By supporting the patient both psychically and 
somatically, the analyst can allow the individual to more thoroughly integrate her 
mind and body. The mirror-box, similarly, exists between the mind and body, links 
somatic fragmentation to the psyche, and can alleviate pain. In this way, it is a 
concrete demonstration of the transitional object. It suspends one’s physical loss 
long enough to allow for a psychosomatic integration by mediating the loss through 
an illusion of its presence. Thus, the analytic exchange and the mirror-box can be 
conceived of as kinds of transitional objects that create a space for the individual to 
experience fragmentation without feeling “dropped” or “annihilated,” thus allowing 
her to begin accepting the reality of her fracture through the illusion of its lack.  
Since, as Winnicott states, the transitional object is also foundational to 
cultural experience and artistic creativity, I now turn to a cultural object, a film, in 
order to trace its relation to “Fear of Breakdown.”  
 
Death Proof 
Quentin Tarantino’s Death Proof (2007) deals with ideas similar to those seen in 
Winnicott’s theory of trauma, breakdown, and healthy independence, and thus, 
accordingly, apotemnophilia and PLS. To elaborate these ideas, I will be looking at 
how the protagonist, Stuntman Mike, represents the primitive agony and fracture 
that haunts the traumatised subject in Winnicott’s model, and how the women in 
the first half of the film represent the traumatised subject. For me, the car accident 
in the middle of the film parallels Winnicott’s concept of the breakdown that occurs 
in therapy, and the second half of the film exemplifies his notion of healthy 
independence that is sought out through psychoanalysis. Central to these ideas is 
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that both the girls and stuntman reflect, and thus help us to understand the subject 
who has a psychotic structure, because the characters protectively distance 
themselves from others to simultaneously pursue and hide from death. I will 
analyse how the film’s second half, in which the characters survive the crash 
presents a fictional recuperation. Moreover, through the film’s form (which sets out 
to revisit a previous genre of film), a space is opened for the audience to 
reconstruct preconceived notions (of self and other) and feel traces of their own 
related emotions. I argue that the characters in the film reflect the struggle of 
psychosomatic rupture explored throughout this thesis, and this cinematic analysis 
will open pathways towards understanding how the ruptured subject copes with 
feelings through a particular form of fiction. More specifically, I investigate how 
the film represents and embodies a transitional space, reflective of the mirror-box. 
Death Proof was released as part of a double feature that revisits American 
exploitation films. It chronicles the story of a “psycho serial killer” (Death Proof) 
named Stuntman Mike, who chases down women and kills them in staged car 
accidents. I want to discuss how he exemplifies the traumatised subject, because he 
appears to be physically and psychically structured through fragmentation, he 
clings to a false and empty identity, and he seeks to both experience and remain 
safe from death by staging controlled and deadly car accidents. Furthermore, like 
the fracture that pursues the traumatised individual, Stuntman Mike pursues the 
women in the film. Recall that in “Fear of Breakdown,” one reacts to a lack of 
support by creating a falsely whole (and thus brittle) ego and identity to hold 
oneself up, and consequently embodies a split between emptiness and cohesion. 
Stuntman Mike characterises this figure because he too embodies fragmentation: 
his face is divided in two by a scar and he clings to a false identity, as indicated by 
his real name being synonymous with his stage name. If by definition, a stuntman 
takes an actor’s place and constantly faces possible death, Stuntman Mike, like the 
traumatised individual, embodies a ruptured identity that stands in for his “true” 
self.  
If this falsely integrated ego replaces a maternal lack, it is physically 
manifested in his death proof car, as suggested by the car’s connectedness to female 
desire, and to his mother. Since the car is riddled with photographs of the girls he 
stalks, it can be seen as a replacement for a missing female figure. Moreover, Mike 
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refers to the car as his mother’s car when convincing a victim of its safety: “do I 
frighten you?” he asks, “is it my scar?” “It’s your car,” the girl answers, “sorry,” he 
replies, “it’s my mom’s car” (Death Proof). This perhaps indicates that Mike believes 
that his mother has left him driven to cause fear and pain, reflective of Winnicott’s 
theory that an infant that has been dropped is driven to psychotic tendencies. Just 
as the traumatised individual replaces her feeling of loss with a form of controlled 
nothingness, Mike’s car also encloses him, acting as a figure of false unity that 
stands in for the wound left by a missing figure of support. If the traumatised 
sufferer’s false unity leaves her feeling ruptured and thus fearing and desiring to 
physically experience her fracture, Mike’s actions illustrate similar desires. As 
visualised by the phantom limb sufferer who hides her fragmentation, Mike avoids 
death. His identity is paired with a “death proof” vehicle: a body that encloses, 
protects, and makes him feel falsely supported. Like the two limb delusions, it 
keeps him safely cut off from the world and environmental impingements. 
However, it is also within this protected defence against rupture that Mike 
attempts to experience and have proof of his death, as the BIID sufferer aims to 
survive her own fragmentation. Accordingly, Mike explains to his first victim that 
he owns a “death proof” stunt car he can drive “into a brick wall doin’ 125 miles an 
hour, just for the experience” (Death Proof). But “to get the benefit of it honey, you 
really need to be sitting in my seat” (Death Proof).  
Reminiscent of the BIID sufferer’s (previously mentioned) statement that 
“accidents do happen” in reference to his own suicide, Mike attempts to control and 
experience death by making “accidents” happen: by preplanning the car crashes 
that kill his victims. Stuntman Mike’s actions thus characterise those of the BIID 
and traumatised sufferer, who may be, to return to Winnicott, “sending the body to 
death which has already happened to the psyche” (“Fear” 93), and must continue to 
kill in order to survive a rupture that may not be in the body, but in the mind. Just 
as this fragmentation haunts traumatised subject, Stuntman Mike lingers unknown 
and unseen in the women’s environments in the first half of the film. From this 
perspective, Mike represents the trauma that haunts these women because he 
magnifies their hollowness, which is emphasised by their false identities, 
problematic father figures, and relationships. Reflecting the state of dependency 
outlined in Winnicott’s model of trauma, these women are removed from their 
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“core” identities and cling to false ones, referring to one another by fake names 
such as “Butterfly,” and “Jungle Jane.”  
If these identities indicate a felt void, it takes shape in the emptiness of their 
relationships, for which they compensate through physical interaction. “Fear of 
Breakdown” states that the traumatised subject’s ego “organises defences against 
breakdown of the ego organisation,” a defence that the women illustrate by 
avoiding intimacy, a brittle “ego organisation that is threatened” by Stuntman Mike 
(88). Butterfly exemplifies this when she kisses someone she just met under strict 
conditions: that the two cannot show physical intimacy such as cuddling, or kiss for 
more than six minutes. Stuntman Mike recognises her vulnerability and lures her to 
give him a lap dance by threatening her identity in two ways. First, he tells her that 
she looks “wounded” because men haven’t pestered her, and offers to repair that 
wound with his sexual attention, thus standing in for her missing support. 
However, she is not completely persuaded to give him a lap dance until he 
threatens her identity by claiming that if she refuses, he will write her name down 
in his book as a “chicken shit” (Death Proof). This suggests that her identity is so 
bereft of meaning that she must make it meaningful by appeasing his wish for 
physical affection. Like those with BIID and PLS, therefore, Butterfly is driven to 
take physical action in order to make her identity feel more whole.  
If a lack of care in Winnicott’s model is responsible for this empty ego, the 
girls’ difficulties with paternal figures,41 and with their own friendships, gesture 
towards a similar scenario. In one scene, Shanna explains that her father is 
attracted to her friends, including Jungle Jane, who flirts with him. To this, Jungle 
Jane responds that Shanna is jealous of their flirtatious relationship because it does 
not include Shanna. Though it seems obvious that Tarantino is playfully 
referencing Freud’s Oedipus complex, the interaction also relates to Winnicott’s 
model. It reveals a lack of parental support, as manifested both in the women’s 
friendships with one another, and their dependence upon meaningless male 
attention to keep their identities intact. This dependence is further alluded to by 
Jane’s comment that she calls Shanna’s father by his first name, because she is not 
                                                
41 Although Winnicott does not focus on the role of the father in containing and holding the child, 
the father is a carer, and thus additionally responsible. For more on this see Michael Jacob’s DW 
Winnicott (1995), Gillian Wilce’s Fathers, Families and the Outside World (1997), and Judith Trowell 
and Alicia Etchegoyen’s The Importance of Fathers: A Psychoanalytic Re-evaluation (2005). 
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a child, and the following statement that she does not want to be dependent upon 
their male friends. Here Jane depicts a struggle with dependency, which she 
unsuccessfully handles by continually vying for male attention. Since one of the 
girls later refers to Stuntman Mike as a father figure, he again resembles a ruptured 
stand-in for the wound left by a lack of care. The women, in this light, are driven to 
repeat the actions that leave them broken, as represented by the scene (to which I 
later return) in which the psychotic stuntman destroys them. 
The girls and Stuntman Mike, therefore, protectively cut themselves off 
from others to both pursue and hide from their rupture, reflective of the kind of 
self-protection described of the traumatised individual, and those with BIID and 
PLS. Interestingly, moreover, both Tarantino’s film and Winnicott’s essay 
reference poems about death. In the film, Mike recites a stanza from Robert Frost’s 
Stopping by the Woods on a Snowy Evening (1923) to Butterfly: 
 
The woods are lovely, dark, and deep, 
But I have promises to keep, 
And miles to go before I sleep, 
Did you hear me, Butterfly? 
And miles to go before you sleep. (Death Proof) 
 
What interests me about this poem is that it involves a desire for death (of 
self or other), or according to literary critic William H. Shurr, “a major tradition of 
interpretation” is to see Frost’s poem as a “deathwish, however momentary, i.e., 
that hunger for final rest and surrender that a man may feel” (585). In “Fear of 
Breakdown,” Winnicott also references a poetic death wish, this time quoting 
Keats: “[w]hen Keats was ‘half in love with easeful death’” explains Winnicott, “he 
was, according to the idea that I am putting forward here, longing for the ease that 
would come if he could ‘remember’ having died; but to remember he must 
experience death now” (93). Both Winnicott and Tarantino, therefore, illuminate 
the significance that poetry can bear in relation to expressing a desire to die. 
Poetry, and particularly Romantic poetry (with which both Frost and Keats are 
affiliated) is concerned with the experience of death, emotion, and movement. 
Poetry, in this way, reflects the transitional space that bridges the gap between self 
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and other, between one’s subjective feelings of annihilation and their ability to 
communicate and feel integrated with the environment. Moreover, the Romantic 
poetry featured in the film and essay signals a transition between Romantic writing, 
which aims towards meaning and unity, and towards that which dramatises 
fragmentation. I turn to Thomas MacFarland for clarification: he states, 
“[i]ncompleteness, fragmentation, and ruin […] not only receive social emphasis in 
Romanticism but also in a certain perspective seem actually to define that 
phenomenon” (MacFarland 7). Furthermore, Christopher Strathman (through the 
thoughts of Maurice Blanchot) emphasises Romantic poetry’s influence in the 
transition from writing with an aim for cohesion towards an acceptance of rupture. 
He explains, it “is as though, for Blanchot, writing, in order to be what he calls 
fragmentary writing, must be purified of the excessive self-awareness of 
consciousness that inhibits romantic poetry; the subject of the ego must be 
obliterated or burned off so that the writing of the fragment, as fragmentary 
writing, can begin” (Strathman 23). Winnicott and Tarantino’s use of Romantic 
poetry highlights these inhibitions, as well as those changes brought forth in the 
discourses to follow (such as poststructuralism). 
A poetic or literary lack of cohesion may, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
provide a partially fictional space for a reader to safely experience a sense of 
rupture, thereby reflective of the transitional object or maternal holding. According 
to Bollas the “uncanny pleasure of being held by a poem, a composition, a painting, 
or, for that matter, any object, rests on those moments when the infant’s internal 
world is partly given form by the mother since he cannot shape them or link them 
together without her coverage” (32). For Winnicott, therefore, the poem can be a 
kind of a transitional object that holds an individual in the carer’s absence, as can, I 
suggest, a film. Like the analytic exchange put forth by Winnicott, a certain kind of 
art form that lacks answers can ostensibly create a space for one to regress towards 
fracture in the present and experience some of the feelings involved, without 
“falling.” While this kind of an experience can be healing in psychoanalysis and 
mirror therapy, these forms of art do not cure pain; however, they may allow the 
individual to withstand a feeling of fragmentation, and even be, as Bollas writes, 
“pleasurable.” In viewing a film, moreover, the spectator “may identify with the 
characters on screen as transitional objects, already invested with a part of himself 
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and a part of the spectator’s own story” (Konigsberg qtd. in Kuhn, 43). In Death 
Proof, then, the spectator may identify with the psychotically inclined and 
traumatised subjects, and in this way, the film may allow for a safe experience of 
own rupture that may otherwise be disavowed (reflective of BIID and PLS). 
The film may have this effect due in part to its fractured content and form. 
While its content depicts a pained subject, the film also structurally leaves the 
individual with feelings of fracture, because it switches suddenly from black and 
white to colour, cuts out reels, and ends scenes midway through. Though I am not 
claiming that Tarantino’s movie replaces an analyst’s role, he explains, “the 
audience is there to be tortured” (Tarantino). The spaces between the cut 
reels¾like those between the words of a poem and the patient/analyst 
exchange¾momentarily confront the individual with a lack of cohesive meaning, 
with “that ‘nothing’: the image not seen, the look that does not happen” (Lebeau, 
“Arts” 37). Here, perhaps “[s]omething troubles, something agitates; sometimes ‘in’ 
the image, sometimes in the space that opens up between one image and another” 
(Lebeau, “Arts” 39). Through these cut reels, a space is opened for disturbing 
reactions (thoughts, images, physical feelings) to arise. Rather than using some 
figure of illusory unity to stand in for a loss (as the girls use men, Stuntman Mike 
uses his car, and the BIID and PLS sufferers form delusions), perhaps the viewer 
can be, in a sense, suspended within the medium’s ambiguity. Therefore, viewers 
may experience feelings of fragmentation through a psychical return to trauma, an 
idea magnified in the scene that divides and connects the first and second halves of 
the film.  
If the first half of the film represents Winnicottian trauma and psychosis, 
the middle scene represents the breakdown that occurs in therapy. Here, Stuntman 
Mike abruptly drives his vehicle into the girls, causing their gruesome bodily 
rupture. Though the scene is initially presented too quickly to comprehend, the 
crash is repeated more slowly from different angles, allowing the viewers time and 
space to psychically integrate the accident. First, the cars collide in just an instant, 
as Shanna’s body flies into the air and falls to death; a visualisation of Winnicott’s 
model of the infant’s bodily fall that happened too quickly and ambiguously to 
comprehend. The scene is immediately followed by a slower replay of the crash, 
this time focused on shattered windows and an empty shoe, bodies remaining 
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indecipherable in the chaos. This version calls forth the traumatised subject’s 
remaining pain, the helpless emptiness with which she has been left due to a fall. 
The scene is then shown from a different view, focusing in on the victims’ 
expressions of shock and fear as the stuntman approaches. Suddenly, the window 
dismembers a leg and it falls onto the road, Butterfly’s open eyes, from this 
perspective, indicative of a transition into acknowledging rupture. In this scene, we 
can visualise the physical feelings of fracture that may stem from an environmental 
lack, a return to the infant’s annihilation. Since in our reading, this fracture 
illuminates that of the BIID and phantom limb individuals, the crash illustrates a 
sense of fragmentation similar to that which we have been discussing: an 
uncontrollable feeling of bodily rupture. Moreover, the scene itself reflects the 
mirror-box, and accordingly, Winnicott’s model of psychoanalysis (and hence, a 
transitional object), because it presents a traumatic rupture from several different 
angles, wherein the viewer may be begin to digest the loss.42 This is not to say, 
again, that the cinematic experience can heal a traumatised subject, but rather, that 
the film, similar to mirror therapy and a certain kind of literature, can suspend a 
loss that may allow the observer to withstand disturbing thoughts of (in this case) 
physical fracture and annihilation.  
Since in Winnicott’s theory, breakdown leads to a (partially fictional) 
reconstruction of an individual’s identity by fracturing her previously structured 
ego, it can also be linked to the second half of the film, in which another group of 
women survive the Mike’s intent to kill. Here, the viewers are presented with a 
different fiction to repair the loss of the other characters. Contrary to those in the 
former half, these women demonstrate a movement away from dependence because 
they support one another, while also establishing their own independence. This is 
illustrated, primarily, in how identities appear to correlate more closely with their 
“core” selves, the most courageous character being a stuntwoman named Zoë Bell 
both in the film and in life. Also differing from the other girls’ more meaningless 
physical interactions, these characters have relationships that may lack physical 
                                                
42 Although the “idea of the mirror,” writes Vicky Lebeau, “has been central to the encounter 
between psychoanalysis and studies in visual culture” (“Arts,” 35), I will not expand upon this 
theme in the thesis. However, for more on the gaze, psychoanalysis and cinema, see the work of 
Laura Mulvey, Annette Kuhn, Vicky Lebeau, Agnieszka Piotrowska, Joan Copjec, and Slavoj 
Žižek. 
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contact, but carry a more meaningful core. For example, a girl named Abernathy 
explains that she refuses to kiss someone she likes, but allows him to massage her 
feet and give her a mixed tape, which as opposed to a “burned CD,” is the “test of 
true love” (Death Proof). Abernathy appears closer to her ego’s primitive actions 
through a lack of compensatory physical contact. Instead, “true love” is approached 
through gestures, partially made meaningful because they are a return to the old (a 
tape instead of a CD). This is also reflective of Winnicott’s model, where one’s 
sense of being real is brought forth as the therapist and subject return to the past to 
repair a loss, when the patient “experience[s] this past thing for the first time in the 
present” (Winnicott, “Fear” 92). Interestingly, a return to the past also drives the 
entire narrative of the film’s latter half. Firstly, it revisits the accident from the 
beginning of the movie in a different form. Secondly, the accident is shaped by 
Zoë’s desire to relive an old movie: to drive the car featured in the 1971 film 
Vanishing Point. The girls set out to test-drive the car oblivious to Mike’s existence, 
and Mike sees his opportunity to annihilate them. However, this time, the car is not 
driven to their deaths, but towards a vanishing point. The women drive just for the 
experience of it, as Mike did; however, they do not experience a sudden trauma, as 
they did in the first half of the film. These women are equipped to withstand the 
threat of trauma, as they chase Stuntman Mike in order to assert their own 
independence and to survive. Winnicott’s idea of regressing towards the baby’s 
state in therapy aims to break down false notions of wholeness and recreate a new 
identity by restructuring the past. And these characters break down Mike’s 
protected position and restructure the past by which they have been built (and 
implicitly, the media that has formed them).  
Another scene representative of this encounter with primitive agony is when 
(prior to the car chase) Abernathy explains that she and Zoë were at a party that 
was blindingly dark. When Zoë wanted to take a photo of her, states Abernathy, 
she instructed her to step back, until Abernathy ended up at the edge of a “seven-
foot ditch” (Death Proof). Though Abernathy stepped away from it, Zoë fell in and 
survived. If she had fallen in instead, exclaims Abernathy, she would have broken 
her neck. Zoë is consequently called “agile” like a “cat,” and talented in this regard; 
to which she strangely responds, “I resemble that remark” (Death Proof). Zoë is 
perceived as being strong because she is, just as her character in the film resembles 
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who she really is: stuntwoman Zoë Bell. This scene can be related to Winnicott’s 
model, wherein an individual who is afraid of falling to her death is able to survive 
this fall, and thus have more robust resources to enable her survival. If Zoë 
exemplifies this independent figure, her strength later enables Abernathy to drive 
more safely towards her own possible death with the girls’ support.  
This scenario unfolds as (before the women take the car on a test-drive) Zoë 
persuades her friend Kim to drive “Ship’s Mast” with her, meaning sit on top of the 
moving car. Though Kim primarily refuses, Zoë convinces her by promising to 
“crack her back,” “give her foot massages,” and “put moisturizer on her butt” (Death 
Proof). Reminiscent of the way a carer may treat a child; these women only agree to 
face their possible deaths because they have promised to support one another both 
physically and psychically. They even refer to Abernathy as the mother of the 
“posse” who lends her belt to strap Zoë to the car, and silently sits in the back seat 
as they drive. The image here reminds us of the BIID email previously discussed, 
which advises the correspondent to have a belt with him when he self-amputates. 
In both examples, one individual offers a way to physically and psychically help the 
other survive. These mechanisms of support are also seen in psychoanalysis, as the 
analyst, in Winnicott’s thought, must allow the patient to feel supported enough to 
carry her through a catastrophe, as demonstrated in the way these women support 
one another enough to do the same. Just as the traumatised subject gathers the 
“original experience of primitive agony […] into its own present time experience 
and into omnipotent control now (assuming the auxiliary ego-supporting function 
of the mother [analyst])” (Winnicott, “Fear” 91), these women experience rupture 
while supported by one another, as they chase the psychotic stuntman and slowly 
break his car and body. Thus, these characters reflect traumatised patients in 
Winnicottian analysis because they face fragmentation and reconstruct the past 
with a new awareness, thereby becoming more independent. I will soon look at 
how the mirror-box mechanism brings out an alternative way of seeing this process, 
because like the film, it too projects an image of surviving bodily fragmentation 
(when the box is removed, the limb is re-amputated through an illusion, which is 
this time less painful because it does not leave the individual with a lingering 
phantom). 
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Thus, the film may allow the viewer to undergo a similar process for several 
reasons. First (as previously addressed) the poems in Winnicott’s essay and 
Tarantino’s movie, as well as the film’s structure itself (through its cut reels and 
sudden deaths), may have the effect of confronting the viewer with a sense of loss. 
Additionally, Death Proof represents a return to the past, because the second half of 
the movie reconstructs the first, or in Tarantino’s words, “the film reaches its 
conclusion in the middle, and then just, starts over again. And you actually see the 
same film again … but now you have different information” (Tarantino). If 
according to “Fear of Breakdown,” “it can be said that only out of non-existence can 
existence start” (“Fear” 95 emphasis in original), perhaps the first part of the film had 
to end in non-existence in order for the women’s independence in the second half to 
begin. The film, therefore, provides the audience with an opportunity to see the 
characters with a new awareness. It is also a return, because it reconfigures 
American exploitation films and allows the viewer to revisit preconceived views of 
film.43 The movie additionally reflects the traumatised ego’s therapeutic 
reconstruction, because it combines fact and fiction (most prominently seen in Zoë 
Bell), as we also see in the narratives formed in analysis and in the mirror-box 
(where the phantom limb is based on the existent one). Finally, the audience is 
always in suspense, reminiscent of the suspense between words in psychoanalysis, 
which help a person slowly fall through primitive agony.44 
It is the deadly car accident that particularly magnifies the viewer’s 
experience of breakdown, I suggest, as it echoes the healthy, albeit painful, 
breakdown in Winnicottian analysis. Just as the infant’s primitive trauma could not 
be comprehended, the first visualisation of this disturbing scene occurs too quickly 
to digest. However, as it is repeated slowly, though it may be disturbing, the 
spectator must acknowledge the details of this annihilation. Similarly, in the mirror-
box, the feeling of moving the phantom may be disturbing (as some with phantom 
limbs have reported); however, with practice, they are able to integrate the loss. 
When linked to the patient’s experience in analysis, the viewer may begin to 
                                                
43 An example of this is Tarantino’s alteration of female roles, which he does to point out female 
objectification in American exploitation films.  
44These concepts of reparation can also be linked to Winnicott’s idea of the mirror-mother, wherein 
“the precursor of the mirror is the mother’s face” (Winnicott, Playing, 111 emphasis in original), however, I 
will not expand upon the link between the mirror-box and the mirror role of the mother at this time. 
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integrate the emotions involved, and piece together what happened through her 
own thoughts, or (as quoted above) “identify with the characters on screen as 
transitional objects,” (Konigsberg qtd. in Kuhn, 43). Although this repetition may 
force the viewer to acknowledge the gruesome details of bodily fragmentation, it 
may ultimately decrease the shock. Similarly, in Winnicott’s concept of analysis, a 
reconstruction of one’s unknowable trauma is “very difficult, time-consuming and 
painful” (“Fear” 91), because the analyst must help the patient acknowledge her felt 
rupture in a safe place. If, however, as Tarantino’s title suggests, the subject must 
have proof of her death to accept and survive it, and proof against its impact, how 
can an analyst carry the individual through a fall? If the subject is structured by a 
brittle ego, and in the painful and defensive position of desiring and fearing death, 
how can the analyst avoid sending her to agony? 
Winnicott proposes that in order to break the ego without recreating the 
trauma, an analyst must be aware of the patient’s defences. Though the proposed 
methods of how to do so remain ambiguous and multifarious, they hinge upon the 
analyst’s need to acknowledge that she does not know, so as not to impose a 
specific narrative upon the patient that threatens to re-traumatise her. The analyst 
must not be “a seductive imposter of the omniscient mother,” but rather an 
“attentive but unimpinging object” (Phillips, Winnicott 142), and must avoid 
“colluding” with the subject. In this way, the analyst and patient form a mutual 
dialogue that breaks up the patient’s known history and reality, to leave room for 
new thoughts. Here, both the patient and analyst create a partially fictional trauma, 
a reconstruction of the ego through its deconstruction. Death Proof depicts a similar 
process, however, while here, the trauma is devised through a fiction, in analysis, a 
fictional restructuring arises out of a traumatic experience. The film may bring out 
trauma for the viewer because it prolongs the moment, permitting her to repeatedly 
“remember” the bodily fracture through a different fiction each time. Here we are 
presented with a different version of the therapeutic exchange, which provides a 
comfortable space for a patient to witness and recreate an accident from several 
angles, and allows for its psychical integration. And in mirror therapy, the amputee 
can recreate her phantom, while also recognising its fracture; she can fictionalise 
her illusion to gain more control over it. Thinking about psychoanalysis, mirror 
therapy, and fiction in this way, provides a new understanding as to how we 
 177 
engage with feelings of psychosomatic fragmentation through social or artistic 
mediums, and how this can have an impact. 
For Winnicott, it is through this analytic process that the patient begins to 
trust that the analyst will not let her fall, and may slowly release her fear of and 
desire for annihilation. By learning to find her own objects of desire, the analysand 
may form a strong enough ego to integrate and withstand the analyst’s (inevitable) 
failure or refusal to appease the patient. Thus, it is through the analyst’s example 
that the patient may alter her self-definition, learn to reach towards the 
environment, and begin to decrease the pressure of the breakdown “that is carried 
round hidden away in the unconscious” (Winnicott, “Fear” 90). In this way, the 
analyst acts as a transitional object: a combination between illusion and a physical 
reality that disillusions the subject from her False Self and towards a more united 
bodily ego. One member of “Fighting It” suggests the importance of having a space 
to open a dialogue about fracture. He states, “being able to talk about it with people 
who know exactly how you feel is usually a huge relief. You are not alone” 
(“Fighting It”). Winnicott’s model and Tarantino’s film, therefore, offer nuanced 
views regarding feelings of psychosomatic fracture in BIID and PLS, and why and 
how the mirror-box is healing. What I have sought to show here is that the mirror-
box is an alternative kind of transitional object that can have a similar effect of 
integrating the psyche and soma. As Marike Finlay states, “psychoanalysis, for 
Winnicott, by recreating […] a transitional zone and mirroring can recuperate that 
sense-of-being-as-a-subject” (66), and mirror therapy recreates one’s whole and 
fractured body to recuperate one’s (physical and mental) sense of being. Thus, the 
mirror-box demonstrates a physical form of a theoretical concept. I now want to 
turn to an example of one individual¾Georges Perec¾who begins to cope with 
feelings of fissure through a different, though related, act of self-definition and self-
reflection: writing. I will focus on how this is embodied and signified within his 
semi-autobiography W or The Memory of Childhood (1975).  
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Chapter Five: Almost artificial limbs 
 
He hollowed out a part inside of himself for nothing to be there 
--- Ariana Reines, The Cow (40) 
 
These themes of emptying out, exposing, and holding in nothingness involve 
struggles central to the two conditions that we have been discussing throughout 
this thesis. Georges Perec’s novel W or The Memory of Childhood (1989)45 exemplifies 
a working-through of these difficulties, which I shall relate to the conditions in 
order to learn more about both. W opens with the words:  
 
In this book there are two texts which simply alternate; you might almost 
believe they had nothing in common, but they are in fact inextricably bound 
up with each other, as though neither could exist on its own, as though it 
was only their coming together, the distant light they cast on each other, 
that could make apparent what is never quite said in one, never quite said in 
the other, but only said in their fragile overlapping. (No page) 
 
Through gaps, memories, fragments, facts and fiction, this semi-autobiography 
embodies a reconstruction of the author’s childhood. The book is composed of two 
parallel texts, one of which, he tells us in the above-quoted sentence, is bound to 
the next; each only exists through its other. The story of Perec, in other words, 
must only be told through something outside itself. If (as I sought to show in 
Chapter Four), a process of reflecting through another may help an individual, W 
exemplifies this process. Through language, fiction, and what I will argue is a 
psychoanalytic process, W traces Perec’s desire to tell his story, and in so doing, to 
reconstitute his past, present and¾like the phantom limb sufferers who place their 
limbs in the mirror-box¾the way he feels. The following chapter will explore the 
author’s journey and its affinity to apotemnophilia and PLS, beginning with a brief 
account of Perec’s life. 
 
 
                                                
45 I will be referring to the book as W throughout the chapter. 
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Behind the Text: Perec’s Life and Work 
Georges Perec was born in 1936 to Jewish immigrants Icek Judko and Cyrla 
Szulewicz Perec. David Bellos points out in his biography A Life in Words (1993) 
that the name was at one time Peretz, which in Hebrew means to “break forth.” His 
name is thus inseparable from his work, which concerns the ways in which identity, 
history, and language itself are structured through a break, through something 
unknown. As I discussed in Chapter Four, the traumatised subject is also formed 
through fracture (stemming from the mother’s inability to adequately hold the 
child), suggesting an affinity between Perec’s way of perceiving and representing 
the world, and that of the traumatised subject. Those with PLS and BIID are also 
defined through a break; however, here it is not symbolic (a name), but physical. 
What I explore in this chapter is how his rupture is not only symbolic, but seeps 
into the physical: it not only stands for the author, it is a part of his body and work. 
I will be unpacking these thoughts through his semi-autobiography, because here 
he explicitly attributes rupture to the traumatic loss of his mother and father in 
World War II46 when he was a child, which he was too young to remember. W, I 
will argue, traces Perec’s way of working through trauma, which cannot be 
separated from his experiences in psychoanalysis. To explore these thoughts, I will 
provide an overview of Perec’s life and work, followed by a discussion of how 
trauma is figured in his writing and personal life. Next, I will look at how he copes 
with trauma through fictive familial and linguistic wholes, moving on to how 
psychoanalysis is involved in fracturing these wholes, and how it plays a role in the 
author’s life and writing. In so doing, I will focus on how the psychoanalytic 
exchange is allegorised in W, and finally, I will focus on how literature is involved 
in the author’s search for and reconstitution of the self. Since psychoanalysis is 
foundational to Perec’s personal and literary journey, I will begin here. 
Perec began analysis at a very young age because he was plagued not only 
by physical illnesses throughout childhood, but by psychical ones, as indicated by a 
                                                
46 Although W hinges upon the experiences and effects of the Second World War, I will not be 
focusing on the Holocaust in this chapter because it is not central to the link I am making between 
psychoanalysis, the phantom limb, and BIID. However, it is essential to Perec’s novel, because this 
is what generated the personal and familial traumas in discussion. While several other writers have 
concentrated on the crucial relationship between Perec and the Holocaust (such as Joanna Spiro, 
Eleanor Kaufman, Lawrence D. Kritzman, Susan Rubin Suleiman and Andrew Leak), I am 
choosing to explore the psychoanalytic and somatic experiences Perec faced in a post-war context. 
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sketchbook his cousin found. Since the sketchbook was composed of drawings of 
fractured athletes, weapons, and vehicles (which would later provide the 
foundation for a fictional island called “W” featured in W), his cousin grew worried 
and sought out a psychotherapist (a fact that Perec had forgotten, but learned later 
in life). In 1956, he took up psychoanalysis three times a week with Michel de 
M’Uzan, and in 1971, with J.B. Pontalis,47 ending his sessions in 1975. “How did 
Perec himself determine that his analysis was complete?” asks Bellos. “His 
judgment must have been connected with the composition, the publication, and the 
reception of W, but in ways that can perhaps never be entirely elucidated” (A Life 
562). Perhaps Bellos is referring to the fact that W, as we will soon discover, 
indirectly charts and enacts his experience in psychoanalysis. However, as Bellos 
points out, psychoanalysis only parallels (is not to be conflated with) his writing: 
“[w]riting was not a substitute for psychotherapy, he declared wisely, nor was 
psychotherapy a prerequisite for good writing” (A Life 193). However, it influenced 
not only his work in several ways, but also his life, engendering beneficial effects, 
such as offering him the “permission” to pursue his dream to write. His texts, 
therefore, cannot be separated from his psychoanalytic growth, both of which 
reflect a space of unanswered questions and infinite puzzles that acknowledge this 
uncertainty, while also aiming towards cohesion. 
Paul Schwartz sums it up clearly: “The fictional universe of Georges Perec 
yearns for completeness. The not yet completed Perec puzzle strives to order its 
pieces, to eliminate the cutmarks, in order to recapture an Edenic, virginal 
wholeness” (Schwartz 113). It is this aspect of his writing that I will be linking to 
the BIID and PLS conditions because they show us a different¾physical and 
immediate¾yearning for completeness through fictional means: a desire to 
eliminate a feeling of fragmentation through an image of wholeness. Contrary to 
those with BIID or PLS, however, he writes his incompleteness, he shares the cut 
marks through his work by breaking up linearity. Through “[l]ost traces, 
fragmentation, the obsessive ordering of time and space” (Schwartz 112), he plays 
with language to disclose its underlying negation and meaninglessness. Thus, 
                                                
47 Michel de M’Uzan focused on psychosomatics and for him, “the role of the mother as the 
facilitator of the capacity to represent shows indebtedness to the influence of Winnicott and Bion, 
the respective development of notions of holding or reverie and containment […] influencing the 
work of André Green and Pontalis” (Birksted-Breen, Reading 34). 
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reading Perec can be a truly puzzling experience, wherein the reader is faced with, 
and thus partakes in, the author’s own literary and personal discoveries. Indeed, 
this self-reflexive act of writing through erasure is not unique to the author, but is 
characteristic of the postmodern movement in which he is often included. 
However, his work resists categorisation, aside from his involvement in the Oulipo 
group: a gathering of writers and mathematicians interested in using constrained 
writing practices (in which the writer restrains herself from using a certain 
element).48 In so doing, Perec magnifies the mundane and trivial occurrences of 
everyday life, things, and thought, highlighting many assumptions such as space, 
time, hierarchy, and social/linguistic structures and binaries. Reflective of both 
conditions, his text conveys the fracture behind assumed wholes, which W suggests 
stems from his own feelings of fragmentation. However, while those with BIID and 
phantom limbs unintentionally have psychosomatic disturbances involving false 
unity and rupture, Perec begins to write himself out of pain. He states, “literature is 
not an activity separated from life. We live in a world of words, of language, of 
stories” (“Robert Antelme” 250): in writing trauma through forms of literary 
rupture, the author is part of language. This concept is central to W: the author and 
characters’ identities and bodies often collapse into their names and linguistic 
representations.49 In elucidating these connections, he asks that both he and the 
reader question what language means and how we construct meaning. He writes: 
“[w]e don’t have to disengage from the world or want it to elude us simply because, 
in given circumstances, in a history that is ours, we may happen to think we will 
never be able to grasp it” (“Robert Antelme” 261). In fact, this is what can make 
literature so important: it can speak to the inability to know. Moreover, can 
                                                
48 These methods are most evident in two of Perec’s most prominent novels: La Disparition or A Void 
(1969), and La Vie mode d'emploi or Life A User's Manual (1978). In the former he omits the letter “e,” 
accomplishing many things aside from the sheer linguistic acrobatics: the creation of a new 
catalogue (of words without the letter “e”), a metaphor for the Jewish experience during World 
War II (in many readings), a representation of absence that productively engenders the novel’s 
language and narrative, and finally, since Georges Perec’s name is full of “e’s,” the letter’s deletion 
points towards the author’s own erasure. Life A User’s Manual traces the lives and ideas of individuals 
in an apartment block in Paris, the writing composed of lists, word play, and several other 
constraints. 
49 To clarify, I am not suggesting a conflation between persons and literature in Perec’s writing of 
trauma: Perec is not interchangeable with the text. The danger in this collapse (especially in light of 
Holocaust writing), is best illuminated by Amy Hungerford, who raises questions regarding the 
ethics of theorists who imagine “texts as traumatic experience itself, thus transmissible from person 
to person through reading” (Hungerford 20). I am not arguing that the text itself is traumatic for 
Perec or for readers. I am looking at how Perec uses the text to reconstitute himself.  
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literature, Perec wonders, help transform one’s understanding of self, the world, 
and history? W hinges upon this question because here the author writes his 
traumatic past through literary rifts; he can only alter his past and self by 
acknowledging that he can never grasp what happened to him. As a result, his 
physical and psychical wounds are drawn out of his body and into text, the most 
prominent being that of his mother’s departure.  
It is this loss that founds W, which chronicles the author’s journey towards 
self-discovery. The semi-autobiography represents and materialises his attempt to 
remember the immemorial trauma of his parents being taken away in World War 
II. Since he was too young to understand the loss that continues to haunt him, the 
author attempts to capture traces of the past, which he continually modifies and 
toys with, raising the question as to how this process may alter his identity and 
feelings. In using fragmented language, he also coerces the reader into breaking her 
own preconceived representations of self and other. W, therefore, takes the reader 
on a journey of self-definition through self-erasure, as Perec attempts to write his 
past by exposing its impossibility. The novel is divided into two parts, separated by 
and connected by a parenthesised ellipsis. Each half follows two stories that 
alternate chapter by chapter. The first is a fictional story of Gaspard Winckler, a 
young boy who is lost at sea. This is written alongside an account of fictional and 
factual traces of Perec’s past and that of his parents, told through stories, 
photographs, and memories. W’s second half describes a fictitious dystopian island 
named “W,” governed by an Olympian, competitive, and tortuous system; which 
runs parallel to a continuation of the author’s imagined past. 
 Since we will be creating links between these stories, psychoanalysis, 
literature, phantom limbs, and BIID, I want to provide a slightly more detailed 
description of the narrative, starting with the story of Gaspard Winckler50 (semi-
fictional version of Perec).51 In Part I, an unknown doctor contacts the narrator 
Gaspard Winckler, who tells him that the body of a sick boy with his name was lost 
                                                
50 The name Gaspard Winckler was inspired by Paul Verlaine’s “Gaspard Hauser chante,” a poem 
based on Kaspar Hauser (a German youth who grew up in the isolation of a darkened cell). In 1973, 
before completing W, Perec had engaged in a project to transform this poem, “as if, by rewriting it, 
Perec could at last shed the lyric of the unloved orphan” (Bellos 524).  
51 I will be referring to the narrator both as Gaspard and Perec, because there is a necessarily 
blurred boundary between the identity of the Perec in the book (also called Gaspard) and the Perec 
writing the book.  
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in a shipwreck. The narrator is called upon to help find the boy because when he 
deserted the army he was given the boy’s identity. I will later argue that Gaspard 
(both the boy and narrator) represent his uncanny doubles, and the doctor, an 
analyst. What is at stake here is that Perec/Gaspard has been established through a 
fictional identity he is struggling to break down. 
Based on one of his childhood drawings, the fictional island “W” features 
sport as its singular goal, an ideology implemented by government officials. 
Athletes must win battles to work their way up a social hierarchy and ultimately 
survive. This social structure is founded upon a vision of common unity, enforced 
by figures of authority: “the Laws of W […] wanted to give the impression that 
Athletes and Officials belonged to the same Race, to the same world; as if they 
were all one family united by a single goal” (Perec, W 153). We will soon revisit 
this notion of false familial unity, and although it will be discussed in relation to 
Perec’s own memories, its presence on the island highlights the inseparability 
between social and personal perception, action, and reaction. The BIID and 
phantom limb phenomena also depict how illusory notions of unity structure the 
self in relation to the environment in a real-world (as opposed to literary) scenario. 
However, this real-world scenario is also brought out through the metaphorical 
island, which suggests that the type of ideology outlined here (based on “unity”) is 
dangerous. The system on “W” is run by binaries (with divisions between superiors 
and inferiors), which is doubly fortified through the island’s physical geography (its 
villages are divided between winners, losers and outcasts), thus emphasising the 
relationship between physical and social position. Like the phantom limb and BIID 
individuals whose bodies mismatch a communal concept of unity, on “W,” physical 
and bodily structures are informed by the social world. Though the winners 
predominantly govern these rules, the educational system also plays a role in 
shaping individual mind-sets through (often physical) punishment (which we see 
echoed in Perec’s own memories of school). What is central here is that psychical 
moulding is inseparable from the physical, or as he writes, “life, here, [on “W”] is 
lived for the greater glory of the Body” (W 67). This initially utopian world, we 
soon discover, is actually a dystopian one that allegorises the World War II 
concentration camps. Since in a very different way, the limb scenarios also 
elucidate how societal bodily ideals can hide underlying destruction (although I 
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stress that I am not comparing apotemnophilia and PLS to the concentration camps 
or the author’s traumatic war experience, but merely elucidating a link through his 
novel), this chapter will explore ways in which communal symbols/ideas/wholes 
bear physical affects, and how this is connected to the theme of trauma in W. 
 
Falling Through Trauma 
As previously noted, W traces how Perec’s childhood in a war-torn world without 
parents left him feeling physically and psychically wounded and lost. I now want to 
examine how the way he talks about trauma (and emphasises his bodily reaction to 
loss) parallels the trauma described by Winnicott and the BIID and phantom limb 
individuals. To begin this exploration, I want to briefly retrace some fundamentals 
of trauma as figured in a Freudian framework. “Properly speaking,” writes Kristy 
Guneratne, “the origin of trauma is in the body” (36). Freud explores this idea in 
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920), which examines why individuals repeat 
unpleasant experiences, and why they unconsciously desire something (the 
nightmares of war neurotics, for example, or people in psychoanalysis who repeat 
painful mistakes). In this regard, he describes a child he saw playing what he calls 
the “fort-da” game, wherein the child causes a reel to disappear and reappear, each 
time it disappears saying “o-o-o-oh,” which Freud reads as “fort” (gone) and 
joyfully shouting “da!” (there) when it reappears. According to Freud, this 
simulates the child’s desire to control the mother’s departure and return. The 
unpleasant experience of the reel’s/mother’s disappearance, in other words, is 
repeated for the joy over its reappearance, and furthermore for “bringing about his 
[the child’s] own disappearance” (Freud, Beyond 3).  
It is this kind of early experience that Freud suggests is carried into 
transference. Like the child, the patient “is obliged to repeat the repressed [painful] 
material as a contemporary experience” (Beyond 3), a “compulsion to repeat.” W, I 
contend (which repeats the story of Perec’s mother’s departure), can be connected 
to the reel/transference, wherein a new scenario supplants a loss. Additionally, 
Freud focuses on the physical nature of this painful and paradoxically satisfying 
recurrence, which the “fort-da” game also raises, because it is a bodily experience. 
And finally, the hide-and-seek aspect of “fort-da” is portrayed in the text’s ability to 
both hide the author’s past (as it opens with the statement: “I have no childhood 
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memories” [Perec, W, 6]), while also seeking his memories throughout. These 
notions will later be unpacked in relation to what the BIID and PLS sufferers’ 
drives reveal about the author’s experiences. Just as W plays hide-and-seek, so too 
does the phantom limb sufferer, whose limb is unseen, though the pain involved 
can be discussed; and the BIID individual, whose appendage is conceived of as 
being absent, and yet is thought by others to be present. What I am interested in is 
the question: how does W illuminate their bodily erasure? To begin exploring this 
question, I will draw some comparisons between Perec’s traumas, and those of the 
individuals with PLS, and proceed to expand upon these links. 
Guneratne writes, “what Perec produces in W is a shift from mind to body 
in the idea of remembrance” (35), an “idea of the remembrance” perhaps because 
there is no true memory. The phantom limb and BIID scenarios share this project, 
albeit non-linguistically. They too shift a psychical idea of wholeness to the body, 
based upon an “idea” of remembrance (“wholeness” is formed through images from 
the environment, whether that means a memory of pre-amputation, those 
congenital phantoms that seem to be purely based on others, or an idea of self that 
is formed in relation to both disabled and able-bodied others). The author’s 
memories, in a similar way, must be based upon other people’s memories, and 
memories of other people. What is at stake here is that the text, BIID, and PLS all 
involve attempts to name the ambiguity of bodily pain, to remember the past 
(subjectively) in order to subdue feelings of loss and trauma. Though I will unpick 
this comparison soon, I first want to discuss how W describes physical memories 
through images that involve parachuting, a skiing accident, Gaspard Winckler’s 
lost body, and a broken arm. To introduce these ideas, I will briefly describe the 
metaphors I will be exploring, and proceed to elaborate them through Winnicott’s 
model, apotemnophilia, and PLS. 
Three times in the novel, the narrator mentions a parachute in conjunction 
with the moment he last saw his mother. In the first he explains, my “mother buys 
me a comic entitled Charlie and the Parachute: on the illustrated cover, the 
parachute’s rigging lines are nothing other than Charlie’s trouser braces” (W 26). 
The second: “[s]he bought me a magazine, an issue of Charlie, with a cover showing 
Charlie Chaplin, with his walking stick, his hat, his shoes and his little moustache, 
doing a parachute jump. The parachute is attached to Charlie by his trouser braces” 
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(Perec, W 54). Lastly, the memory is altered from an image of Charlie to one of 
Perec himself jumping:  
 
in 1958, when, by chance, the military service briefly made a parachutist of 
me, I suddenly saw, in the very instant of jumping, one way of deciphering 
the text of this memory: I was plunged into nothingness; all the threads were 
broken; I fell, on my own, without any support. (Perec, W 55) 
 
The passages above portray a connection between the metaphorical and 
physical, the fictional memory and the real impact it had upon the author (Georges 
Perec was a military parachutist). As Eleanor Kaufman puts it, “a physical 
sensation reflects his inner experience of plummeting without support through the 
war years” (2), and also reflects the impact of his mother’s disappearance. Falling is 
again brought forth in the narrator’s description of an accident. He explains that as 
a child, he once injured another boy’s face by dropping a ski, and the boy, in turn, 
scarred the narrator with his ski pole. This, the author states, became an identifying 
characteristic: it physically marked his individuality. A defining somatic wound is 
also represented through the lost disabled child Gaspard Winckler, who represents 
Perec’s immemorial childhood. Finally, he repeats a memory of breaking his arm, 
which I now want to look at more closely. 
In the first version of leaving his mother, the narrator remembers having his 
arm in a sling. However, it is later revealed that, according to his family, this 
memory may be false. The next memory reads:  
 
The Red Cross evacuates the wounded. I was not wounded. But I had to be 
evacuated. So we had to pretend I was wounded. That was why my arm 
was in a sling. But my aunt is quite definite: I did not have my arm in a sling 
[…]. On the other hand, perhaps I had a rupture and was wearing a truss, a 
suspensory bandage. (Perec, W 54-5) 
 
The final passage explains that when the narrator was knocked over by a sledge, he 
broke his scapula, causing his right arm to be bandaged behind his back. Although 
his family has no memory of this accident, the author asked an old friend if he 
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remembered, who responded that in fact, it was not Perec, but the friend himself 
that had “an accident identical in every way” (Perec, W 80). If we return to the two 
conditions, we find a self-conception that closely resembles the author’s. The 
narrator, phantom limb, and BIID individuals have integrated a simultaneously 
broken and whole appendage, indicating a split between mind and body, a feeling 
of physical fragmentation that cannot be comprehended. To mend this fracture, 
those with BIID, PLS, and the author employ a completely subjective image that 
embodies a wound, a fictive version of self that both replaces and reproduces 
rupture. In this way, both Perec and those with the conditions in conversation feel 
subjective pain that mismatches objective reality.  
The author’s wounded arm stems most prominently from a maternal loss. 
“In his commentary,” writes Guneratne, “Perec suggests that this intervention 
represents the breaking of something else, presumably his contact with his mother” 
(34). This calls up the Winnicottian paradigm of trauma that connects maternal and 
physical loss. In “Fear of Breakdown” the child facing a traumatic absence has also 
“internalised” an unknowable feeling of rupture. If for Winnicott, this rupture 
relates to the mother’s touch, what can the notion of self-holding reveal about the 
broken feelings expressed by Perec and brought out by PLS and BIID? Why, 
moreover, do the fractured limbs exemplified in these situations exist alongside a 
false notion of unity? Though we have already touched on how those with phantom 
limbs and BIID, and the traumatised individual in Winnicott’s account convey this 
paradoxical self-construction, I now want to explore how the narrator’s rupture 
also speaks through images of false cohesion. Central to these links is the fictional 
version of self-as-whole that was developed non-linguistically in relation to trauma, 
which is why I want to begin with a “memory” wherein Perec was a (pre-linguistic) 
baby. It is based on “more or less on statistical details” but is also, he writes, 
“probably ascribable to the quite extraordinary imaginary relationship which I 
regularly maintained with my maternal branch” (W 30). The memory is as follows: 
 
I was born in the month of March 1936. Perhaps there were three years of 
relative happiness, no doubt darkened by baby’s illnesses (whooping cough, 
measles, chickenpox) […] a future that boded ill. War came. My father 
enlisted and died. My mother became a war widow. She went into mourning. I 
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was put out to a nanny [.…]25I seem to remember she injured herself one day 
and her hand was pierced through. (W, 32 footnote in original) 
 
This is followed by the first description of the last encounter with the narrator’s 
mother, who was on the train holding a Charlie Chaplin magazine. Already Perec 
draws a clear connection between familial loss and a physical disability (both his 
sickness and his mother’s wounded hand), indicating that his own injuries are 
inseparable from hers. Here I am alluding to the split that in Winnicottian thought 
results from a lack of maternal holding (as discussed in Chapter Four); that 
physical and psychical rupture stemming from the mother’s inability to hold the 
child in her mind and arms. Both this theory of trauma and Perec’s memory thus 
convey a struggle with creating a cohesive identity in the world, which those with 
BIID and PLP enact. By writing these reactions however, the author slows down 
the process, allowing us to perhaps learn more about how it unfolds. 
From a Winnicottian perspective, the narrator has experienced an 
environmental breakdown (mourning and the loss of both parents) that has left him 
with an ungraspable feeling of illness, a kind of “primitive agony” that we have also 
related to BIID and the phantom limb. In the above passage, the narrator’s 
mother’s hands were pierced (she was unable to hold him), and his future thus 
“bodes ill” (consequently perhaps, he could not learn how to sufficiently hold 
himself). This connection between maternal and personal injury is further 
emphasised in the footnote within the above passage (numbered 25 after “baby’s 
illnesses”). To clarify, throughout the book, the author uses footnotes to add 
alternative stories and details to memories, layering new thoughts that modify the 
past, perhaps indicative of repressed experiences creeping closer towards 
consciousness. It is implied that Perec, like a patient in analysis, is beginning to 
acknowledge his repressed memories in fictional forms. To return to the footnote 
(25), from the above-quoted passage, he writes: 
 
I still have, on most of the fingers of both my hands, on the second knuckle 
joints, the marks of an accident I must have had when I was a few months 
old: apparently an earthenware hot-water bottle, which my mother made up, 
leaked or broke, completely scalding both my hands. (W 40) 
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If the first passage did not elucidate that the narrator was injured from an 
environmental deficiency, surely this one does. An increase in clarity here also 
indicates that when Perec added the footnote, he was more conscious of his injury 
having been caused by a maternal loss. Paradoxically, however, its fragmented 
prose and ambiguity suggests that when the footnote was written, the author more 
thoroughly understood the impossibility of completely remembering what marked 
his body. What his novel is bringing out, therefore, is the text’s role in representing 
and constructing the immemorial. For me, in this imagined memory, the author did 
not know how to “make himself up” because his mother did not know how to 
“make up a water bottle,” leaving him wounded and without sustenance. Since the 
falsified memory in the book enacts his journey to make himself up, the novel in a 
way stands in for the broken water bottle. It enables the author to go back and 
reconstitute himself because he was never given the chance to do so as a child. 
However, the process is not easy. If we return to Winnicott, the child who does not 
know how to hold herself through a transitional object is left to reproduce a falsely 
cohesive version of self. The passage above suggests an embodiment of this fictive 
unity because the water bottle “completely” scalded his hands: for him, the rupture 
had to be “complete.” In this context, in other words, the word “complete” suggests 
a traumatic splitting, in which the experience of fracture is buried in the 
unconscious, which the conscious mind appears to know nothing about; reflective 
of the BIID and phantom limb individuals’ traumatic splits. Thus, the Perec writing 
the text may be gesturing towards a traumatic split embodied by the Perec of the 
novel. Moreover, the split described here is not only psychical, but also physical, 
which is indicated in another story of his bodily fracture. 
 
The author writes that he was knocked over by a sledge when ice-skating:  
I fell backwards and broke my scapula; it is a bone that cannot be set in 
plaster; to allow it to mend, my right arm has been strapped tight behind my 
back in a whole contraption of bandages that makes any movement 
impossible, and the right sleeve of my jacket flaps emptily as if I had really 
lost an arm. (W 79) 
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Again, a feeling of rupture that remains stuck in one of unity alludes to the author’s 
difficulty with self-holding¾ with holding up his trauma, his past, and his body. 
This passage also conveys how the struggle with false wholes extends to Perec’s use 
and conception of language (which I will return to later); but for now, I look at 
how¾similar to the author’s “completely” scalded hands¾his paralysed arm was 
strapped in a “whole” contraption of bandages. Put another way, the paralysed 
memory has been strapped into a “whole” self-narrative (that in writing W, his past 
is finally acknowledged as a semi-fiction¾a concept I will also soon return to). 
Although similar to the water-bottle scene wherein the narrator cannot hold 
himself, I suggest that the broken arm memory involves a step towards 
independence. Here, the appendage is strapped and bandaged: although the boy is 
injured, his arm is held up by something. The jacket flaps emptily “as if” he had 
really lost an arm, revealing a growing awareness that Perec’s hands are not 
completely scalded and that his fingers are not missing, but that his arm does exist, 
and could begin to heal.  
Indeed, this image of a flapping empty sleeve bears a resemblance to both 
limb syndromes, it being a limb that is not there. The BIID limb even depicts an 
embodiment of this image: the BIID appendage feels separated from the body like 
the narrator’s paralysed arm. In a different way, the flapping sleeve shows us a 
phantom arm, because the limb exists only through an outline of its absence. And 
furthermore, the memory itself is a kind of phantom: although he felt the pain of a 
rupture, it did not objectively exist. Is the author then, in a way, writing his 
phantom/BIID limb, his fracture? Recall that in Chapter Four we looked at an 
email written by someone with BIID, who claimed that he was going to cause “an 
accident” by cutting off his own limb. When read next to the passage above, is the 
author not also causing himself an accident, albeit through the past instead of the 
future, and through his book? Instead of cutting a limb, is he writing its removal? 
It seems as though, like the those with phantom limbs or BIID, Perec feels broken 
and wants to see this absence, which he approaches through writing. In so doing, 
he suspends those frustrations with feeling fissured that BIID and PLS 
demonstrate in a physical form. W is not only metaphorical, then, but penetrates 
the physical, which is conveyed in one passage that draws out the bodily feelings 
experienced in the author’s trauma, which, I suggest, reflects Winnicott’s 
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description of “primitive agony.” 
To begin unpacking this thought, I will develop how the author’s memories 
can be related to primitive agony: 
 
1. A return to an unintegrated state. (Defence: disintegration.) 
2. Falling for ever. (Defence: self-holding.) 
3. Loss of psychosomatic collusion, failure of indwelling. (Defence:  
depersonalization.) 
4. Loss of sense of real. (Defence: exploitation of primary narcissism,  
etc.) 
5. Loss of capacity to relate to objects. (Defence: autistic states, relating only 
to self-phenomena.) (“Fear” 104) 
 
These traits, I propose, are all present in Perec’s memories. He is 
unintegrated because he is fractured; depersonalised, because his mind 
misremembers his bodily experience; he has lost a sense of the real because his 
memory is fictive; and he repeatedly refers to an experience of falling. It is this 
experience of falling that I want to explore for the moment, beginning with the 
previously mentioned parachute fall. For Winnicott, this fall is linked to a maternal 
loss, which is at the core of primitive agony. Thus, when read together, the 
parachute fall reflects a return to the primitive state of absolute dependence, or as 
Kritzman writes of W, “the falling into nothingness without support suggests the 
inability of the child to separate from the mother” (Kritzman 196). We have also 
seen that although individuals with apotemnophilia and PLS do not specifically 
suffer from a maternal loss, their bodily rupture physically illustrates a primitive 
agony (of not being sufficiently held up). Perec, on the other hand, describes a 
primitive agony through a metaphor that centralises the body¾illuminating 
paradoxical feelings of weight and weightlessness similar to those described in 
“Fear of Breakdown.” Winnicott writes that without “good-enough active and 
adaptive handling the task from within may well prove heavy, indeed it may 
actually prove impossible for this development of a psycho-somatic inter-
relationship to become properly established” (“Ego Integration” 61). In other 
words, the weightlessness of falling and not being held is heavy. Carrying one’s 
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broken body is a traumatic experience that Perec’s image of parachuting also 
depicts, because parachuting entails a loss of psychosomatic control (the individual 
is directed by gravity), closeness to death, and a feeling of heaviness. As Schnitzer 
writes, “[n]ormally considered a life saving device, which we often conceive of as 
floating gently in the air, here the parachute appears as a heavy burden to carry” 
(111). Again, the BIID and PLS syndromes reveal a physical outcome of a 
traumatic rupture analogous to this parachute falling: those with BIID are weighed 
down physically by an extra limb, and yet, feel its absence. Those with PLS are 
physically free of the extra limb and yet psychically weighed down by its invisible 
presence. These phenomena, therefore, exemplify how individuals may (in a 
different way) unconsciously carry paradoxical notions of self in reaction to 
fragmented feelings. Thus, sufferers of apotemnophilia and PLS show us an 
immediate and bodily demonstration of those ideas laid out in Perec and 
Winnicott’s more theoretical works. Up to this point, we have discussed the links 
between the narrator’s experience of trauma, “Fear of Breakdown,” BIID, and the 
phantom limb. I now want to expand upon these connections through an image in 
W that opens a different reading as to how the author copes with the desire for 
cohesion, specifically through family and language. 
 
Enwombed in Familial Fiction 
Perec writes, 
 
I am three. I am sitting in the middle of the room with Yiddish newspapers 
scattered around me. The family circle surrounds me wholly, but the 
sensation of encirclement does not cause me any fear or feeling of being 
smothered; on the contrary, it is warm, protective, loving: all the family – the 
entirety, the totality of the family – is there, gathered like an impregnable 
battlement around the child who has just been born (but didn’t I say a 
moment ago that I was three?). (W 13) 
 
This passage takes place among several other fragmented memories, which he 
admits to having altered through imaginary details. Why, I want to ask, is this 
“memory” fictionalised in this way? Does this ideal familial unity gesture towards 
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the author’s need to grasp onto something whole as a starting point for his 
imagined past and its reconstitution? Adam Phillips writes that, “the beginning of a 
feeling of existing and feeling real […] depends upon a basic relation to the 
experience of omnipotence” (Winnicott 133). The image above shows precisely this: 
the narrator is born into existence by creating a complete memory in rewriting his 
experience of childhood. Perhaps this works to reform an illusion of omnipotence 
that had never been fully developed. Lam-Hesseling writes of this scene: “[t]his 
intact family functions as a sign of reassuring wholeness, providing a subject with 
an idea from which it can derive feelings of cohesion and safety” (94). When read 
with Winnicott’s model, the image of Perec as protected and safe is necessary to 
establishing his development. However, this stage takes place when the baby was 
one with the mother, in which “the infant takes from a breast that is part of the 
infant, and the mother gives milk to an infant that is part of herself” (Winnicott, 
Playing 8-9). Thus, the ideal moment is underpinned with fear (of returning to that 
state), which this passage also conveys.  
“The family was gathered,” Perec writes, “comme un rempart infranchissable,” 
“like an impregnable battlement.” Although this conjures an image of cohesion, a 
sense of being safe from intrusion, when followed by the word battlement, there 
lurks a sense of danger. Thus, discomfort seeps through the pages of this 
comfortable illusion, happy omnipotence is always frustrated by its impossibility. 
This kind of contradiction does not stand alone. Recall that in the first part of the 
passage, the author writes that the sensation of wholeness does not frighten him; 
however, if fear did not factor into the equation it would not have to be stated. 
Unity, then, obscures something frightening, and it is almost as though by 
discreetly signalling these dangers, the writer warns the baby (allegorising his 
forgotten past) of the upcoming trauma. Here Perec juggles a split between his 
current identity and his lost childhood through a contradictory and falsified text. 
He continues, “(but didn’t I say a moment ago that I was three?).” His history is 
being altered as it is written, his memory changes with his words. The author’s 
desire to create a false image of wholeness in order to orient his identity and rewrite 
his fragmentation is not so dissimilar from the phantom limb and BIID recreations 
of self-as-whole. Just as Perec writes his unity through paradoxical sentences, 
individuals with the limb syndromes are only whole in a fragmented context. 
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However, instead of drawing this out through literary fiction, it is already drawn 
into the those with PLS and BIID. Thus, although the author and sufferers of 
those with apotemnophilia and phantom limbs present many similarities that we 
have been unpicking, these individuals lack control over and distance from these 
feelings; they lack the mediation of language. The importance of linguistic 
mediation is emphasised in the above passage because newspapers encircle the 
narrator; his identity is wrapped in language. This plays a double role: it both 
distances the narrator from the familial illusion, and draws the reader’s attention to 
the page being read. The book, like the newspaper, separates (but also connects) 
the reader and author, raising the question as to how language plays a part in 
individuality and dependence, subjectivity and objectivity, rupture and cohesion. 
At this point I will touch on how the concepts in discussion extend to the island 
“W” and to the author’s own social memories, to how society is shaped by, and 
shapes others, through an image of unity. Just briefly, the metaphorical island of 
“W” is also founded upon a struggle with forming dangerously whole social bodies 
in reaction to fragmentation. This system of thought, Perec indicates throughout his 
memories, has also shaped him. His struggle with wholes and fragments relate to an 
embodiment of environmental ideology. The metaphorical island and the two 
conditions in discussion thus show us that if these relationships are not explored 
they might have detrimental effects. Here, identity is formed through wholes that 
are transmitted through language, a concept I will later develop. However, in order 
to elaborate this idea, it is important to examine how psychoanalysis plays a role in 
the author’s linguistic bodily border, in separating from absolute dependence, and 
at how this is represented in W. 
 
A Psychoanalytic Voyage 
“I have no childhood memories,” begins W or The Memory of Childhood, a statement 
that paradoxically contrasts its title (as, how can a text about childhood memories 
begin with none?). Already we are privy to the text and Perec’s structural conflict: 
through fiction, the author is searching for what has been deleted. I want to look at 
how this journey is represented through one storyline (of Gaspard Winckler and 
Otto Apfelstahl), while also examining how the author’s experience in 
psychoanalysis is interlinked with his literary and personal endeavour. As Bellos 
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put it, like “psychoanalysis, autobiography involves the transformation of memory 
into narrative” (154), introducing the inextricable link between W and 
psychoanalysis. Here, autobiography and psychoanalysis work together in the 
endeavour to define his forgotten and traumatic past, or as Motte writes, he 
“materialises and inscribes upon the page the kinds of gestures that real anamnesis 
requires, that is, looking back, recalling and reconsidering” (61). Perec’s trauma, 
reflective of BIID and PLS, involves an embodied response to visualised images of 
brokenness. If the broken bodies he drew as a child illustrate this, the allegories 
within W suggest a more cohesive (linguistic) attempt to reconnect those figures. I 
will investigate how psychoanalysis is involved in this attempt by linking Perec’s 
writings about psychoanalysis to Winnicott’s theory of development. 
For this I will be drawing upon “Backtracking” (1977) and “The Scene of a 
Stratagem” (1977), which describes the author’s own experiences in session: the 
rituals, repetition, play, silences, physicality, relationship with the other, dreaming 
and fantasy, and the temporality involved in the “talking cure.” In both texts, Perec 
discusses the correlation between speaking in psychoanalysis and writing in 
relation to his own self-definition. In his words: “I was going [to psychoanalysis] to 
seek to recognise myself and to give myself a name” (“Scene” 164). In W we see 
this attempt to name what he cannot remember: his felt loss. And as discussed, the 
phantom limb and BIID sufferers also struggle with self-recognitions. Can Perec’s 
journey, then, reveal something about the conditions: how their own struggle with 
bodily fragmentation and wholeness is connected to the need to recognise 
themselves? To open a linguistic reading of the kind of pain and repair involved in 
apotemnophilia and PLS, I will look at psychoanalysis within W. To begin this 
exploration, I will trace a story in Part One about the narrator and a lost boy, 
suggesting that through the processes of psychoanalysis and writing, the author is 
breaking down a false identity that has caused him physical and psychical pain. 
Since the story also illuminates the similarities between Perec’s pain, and that of 
individuals with BIID and PLS, I am interested in exploring how the literary 
journey he offers can be connected to the mirror-box treatment: in how semiotic 
reworking may affect the individual. 
 The story begins as the narrator Gaspard Winckler receives a letter with 
blank pages and “abstract symbols” such as a “hand that was simultaneously a root” 
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(Perec, W 8). The letter, from a mysterious doctor named Otto Apfelstahl, requests 
that Gaspard meet him to discuss an unknown matter, which Winckler believes will 
change his life. Left feeling anxious, impatient and curious, Winckler searches for 
clues, but “found nothing” (Perec, W 11). This description mirrors the explanation 
of the psychoanalytic experience in the essay “Backtracking.” Here he writes that 
in deciphering his own words in analysis: 
 
I skipped along the paths of the maze I had made for myself, following 
suspiciously legible signposts. It all had meaning, it was all connected, 
obvious and could be unravelled at will: signs waltzed by, proffering their 
charming anxieties. But beneath the ephemeral flashes of verbal collisions 
and the controlled titillation of the beginner’s book of Oedipus, my voice 
encountered only its own emptiness. (49) 
 
 This suggests that Perec’s search for meaning and understanding began to 
unravel in psychoanalysis, the signs he was accustomed to deciphering only 
revealed their rupture. The empty signification described in this context is of course 
echoed in his writing: “I assume from the start that the equivalence of speaking and 
writing is obvious, just as I assimilate the blank sheet of paper to that other place of 
hesitations, illusions, and crossings-out, the ceiling of the analyst’s consulting room” 
(“Backtracking” 45). Winckler’s blank letter can thus be seen as an allegory for the 
analyst’s ceiling/the pre-written story. As perceptible in his encounter with the 
abstract letter, Winckler’s search for meaning through signs only discloses its 
nothingness. The passage above similarly indicates that a search for specific 
psychoanalytical plots (such as the Oedipus Complex) also comes up blank, and 
yet because it shows the author’s “emptiness,” it is paradoxically significant. 
Returning to Winckler’s letter, we also see ambiguous signs (instead of linear 
narratives) that point towards something important. Therefore, the 
meaninglessness of signs does not negate their importance here; their nothingness 
may expose alternative forms of thought, which must be signified in some way. For 
instance, “a hand that was a root” may open a reading of the corporeal nature of the 
author’s self-exploration. Although we cannot be sure, the image suggests a search 
for bodily grounding, stability, and family roots. Revealed in these binaries between 
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meaning and its impossibility (silence) is a split, a double that is portrayed in the 
Winckler story and that can also be related to Winnicott’s theory of trauma. 
 According to Winnicott, when the infant’s environment has been 
insufficient, it “develops a split. By one half of the split the infant relates to the 
presenting object, and for this purpose there develops what I have called a false or 
compliant self. By the other half of the split the infant relates to a subjective object, 
or to mere phenomena based on body experiences” (“Communicating” 183). 
Winckler’s letter (an object) also indicates a split. The letter presented is given false 
meaning, while also having a nonverbal and even bodily affect (anxiety). For me, 
this is important because it illuminates the divide between the physical feelings and 
objective realities rendered so clear by both limb conditions; and like Perec, the 
traumatised Winnicottian individuals and those with PLS and apotemnophilia 
develop a way of coming to terms with what is not there. Put another way, the 
traumatised subject and the suffers with alienated limbs reveal a split: the False Self 
that conforms to an idea of unity, and the acknowledgment of its material lack 
(which as we will see, more closely resembles a True Self). I now return to the 
Gaspard/Otto narrative to examine how the author begins to break down that 
False Self, and seek out its underlying darkness, in a process that reflects 
psychoanalysis. 
The story continues as Gaspard goes to the hotel to meet the doctor, where 
he comes across two bellboys with crossed arms, followed by a porter carrying two 
hefty suitcases, and a woman holding a small dog in her arms. These images reflect 
those brought out in Winnicott’s theory: arms holding not him but themselves, a 
heavy weight, and a helpless animal (like a baby), enwrapped in a female figure’s 
arms. These images of self-holding, weight, and helplessness echo the PLS 
individual’s psychosomatically “heavy” extra limb. The following image features a 
barman with wrinkled hands dragging his feet. Again, we see images of bodily 
weakness: an ambiguous illustration of (perhaps the author’s) feelings of being 
insufficiently held. Winnicott states that the True Self may begin to have life 
“through the strength given to the infant’s weak ego by the mother’s 
implementation of the infant’s omnipotent expressions” (“Ego Distortion” 145), 
meaning that if the barman stands for a part of the narrator’s holding environment, 
he is too weak to give strength to Gaspard’s brittle ego. The barman then offers 
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Winckler a pretzel, which he refuses. Not only does this point towards a rejection 
of environmental imposition and protection of “inner” emptiness (as outlined in 
“Fear of Breakdown”) but also to a lack of personal definition. This, because, 
according to Bellos, Perec’s name is (in Hungarian) associated with the word 
“pretzel” (a pun the author plays with in some of his other works); in a sense, he 
refuses his own name (his True Self).  
The state of anxiety developed in this scene, I suggest, echoes the anxiety 
which brought the author to psychoanalysis. The connection is further solidified as 
he writes, Otto neither “was late; neither could you say that he was on time” (W 
16), reflective of the psychoanalytic experience described in “Backtracking.” He 
writes: “[t]here was something abstract in this arbitrary time, something which was 
both reassuring and fearful, an immovable and timeless time” (46). Though the two 
descriptions suggest a similar state, in “Backtracking” we directly learn about 
Perec’s experience, while in the allegorical tale, we are a part of it. W involves the 
reader in a timeless place where images do not make perfect sense, where his past is 
told, but not told (imagined), where we are reading in the present that which was 
written in the past. Thus, the reader becomes closer to the author’s search for his 
hidden other; the book itself is brought towards the material world. 
The journey proceeds as Gaspard finally meets Otto Apfelstahl, and 
immediately, he stops Gaspard from standing up “with a wave of his hand” (Perec, 
W 17). Thus, in just a short space, two hands are juxtaposed: the frail barman and 
the more aggressive doctor, a physical change seems to be taking place. If this 
memory alludes to the author’s hands having been formed through his mother’s 
own injury (as discussed), perhaps the alternating Otto story sets up a new pair of 
hands through which he may begin to restructure. Put differently, the layering of 
the book, its characters, and the analytic experience may all present a stronger pair 
of hands to replace his mother’s absence and help the author learn how to dig 
towards his roots¾ his truer and silent self. Following nicely along with these 
thoughts, Apfelstahl asks Gaspard, “‘[d]id you ever wonder what became of the 
person who gave you your name?’ ‘I beg your pardon’ I said, ‘not grasping’” (W 
18). At this point, Perec cannot grasp his own identity; like those with BIID and 
PLS who cannot contain their phantom, and those with BIID who feel helplessly 
fractured, he has a problem defining himself. In response, he questions the 
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“ambiguity” of Otto’s remark, to which Otto answers: 
 
I am not alluding to your father, nor to any member of your family or your 
community after whom you might have been named, as is, I believe, still a 
fairly widespread custom. Nor am I thinking of any of the people who, five 
years ago, helped you to acquire your current identity. I mean, quite 
straightforwardly, the person whose name you have. (Perec, W 22) 
 
The first part of this statement may allude to a certain kind of self-discovery 
that aims to define specific familial narratives. Instead, what Otto offers is more 
nebulous: he wants to discuss the identity that Winckler has at that very moment; 
what hides behind his False Self. If for Winnicott, a trauma “cannot get into the 
past tense unless the ego can first gather it into its own present time […] (assuming 
the auxiliary ego-supporting function of the mother)” (“Fear” 104); the exchange 
between Otto and Winckler exemplifies this time collapse. Instead of retreating to 
the past, Perec explores it within his current identity: with the analyst figure, in the 
book, and in the story itself. Thus, the author’s experience of psychoanalysis, its 
representation, and the book itself, all support his pursuit for a True Self, which is 
allegorised through Otto’s suggestion to find Winckler’s true identity. 
 Apfelstahl explains that after the war, the narrator was given a false 
identity, the name of Gaspard Winckler, which actually belonged to a sick boy 
(isolated, deaf, helpless, and dumb). Although the boy was taken to doctors, 
explains Otto, they discovered no injury, ascribing the illness “to some infantile 
trauma whose precise configuration unfortunately remained obscure despite 
examinations by numerous psychiatrists” (Perec, W 23). Given the context of this 
story, we may assume that this little boy stands for the childhood Perec has 
invisibly integrated and lost. The sick boy metaphor, the author’s obscure other, 
then, sheds light on those with BIID and PLS who also feel a non-diagnosable pain 
relating to a loss; a physical, inexplicable disability leaves the individuals to 
helplessly search for an explanation. The allegory in his story points towards his 
own environmental lack. Otto tells the narrator that “the support organisation” that 
was to provide the narrator with an identity was killed before having set anything 
up and so, “[t]he organisation was at a loss” (Perec, W 23). Due to a loss of 
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support, the narrator’s own organisation was broken: the author developed a split 
upon being abandoned. Could this reflect the ego of the traumatised child who in 
Winnicott’s eyes “organises defences against breakdown of the ego organisation” 
(“Fear” 103)? If the environmental organisation was at a loss, could Gaspard’s 
(Perec’s) ego have devised a defence against this breakdown such as a fake 
identity? Otto continues to explain that the child was taken on a yacht voyage with 
a group of others in the hope of improving his health. He explains that the crew 
searched 
 
ever more vainly for the place, the creek, the vista, the beach, the pier where 
the miracle could happen; […] that there is, somewhere on the ocean, an isle 
or atoll, a rock or headland where suddenly it could all happen – the veil 
sundered, the light turned on. (Perec, W 24) 
 
While the above-quoted sentence encompasses several strands of thought, it first 
and foremost is reminiscent of Perec’s experience in psychoanalysis. He writes in 
“Backtracking,” “you think that talking means finding, discovering, understanding, 
understanding at last, being illuminated by truth. But,” he continues, “it doesn’t” 
(44). Just as the author’s search for clarity is shattered, so too is the crew’s: “each 
of them clings to this illusion, until one day, off Tierra del Fuego, they are hit by 
one of those sudden cyclones which are everyday occurrences in those parts, and 
the boat sinks” (Perec, W 25). The crew’s trauma is immediate and too fast to 
comprehend, whereas in psychoanalysis, writes Perec, in looking for “the image I 
was after […] something like a crash in my memory set in” (“Backtracking” 50). 
While his description of analysis involves reflection, those on the ship blindly cling 
to a belief, indicating that his child-self and environment could not face a traumatic 
situation. However, the psychoanalytic crash is beneficial: a crashing of protective 
identity, and moreover, one composed of words. He explains that in 
psychoanalysis, “[w]hat had to give way first was my armour¾the hard shell of 
writing, beneath which my desire to write was hidden, had to crack; the high wall 
of prefabricated memories had to crumble […] I had to go back on my tracks, to 
travel once more the path I had trod” (“Backtracking” 52). Again reflective of the 
Winckler story, something had to be destroyed in order for the author to take a 
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linguistic journey back in time, through his lost past. Paradoxically, then, the crash 
in analysis, like the crashing of the yacht, left traces that began to unveil something 
hidden (however not through a “light not turned on,” but by one turned off) by 
opening more pathways and fragmented realities and illusions. 
 For Winnicott, it is the psychoanalytic breakdown experienced between the 
patient and analyst that leads to health. In “Fear of Breakdown,” Winnicott warns 
that analysis may go wrong if the “analysing couple are pleased with what they 
have done together. It was valid, it was clever, it was cosy because of the collusion. 
But each so-called advance ends in destruction” (105). If the analytic journey heads 
towards a specific and more linear narrative when dealing with this kind of trauma, 
suggests Winnicott, the falsely cohesive ego is merely replicating itself, similar to 
the BIID and phantom limb replication of cohesive bodily egos. Winnicott 
continues: “there is no end unless the bottom of the trough has been reached, unless 
the thing feared has been experienced. And indeed one way out of this is for the patient 
to have a breakdown (physical or mental)” (“Fear,” 105 emphasis in original). The 
story of Gaspard, I am suggesting, traces the author’s breakdown. Moreover, in 
writing this plot, the author enacts the thing feared: he must face both the loss of 
his parents and his split-off self in order to compose the story at hand. If those with 
BIID and PLS also cling to a fiction, I want to suggest that the mirror-box shows 
us Perec’s process of writing in a different way, a connection I will soon develop. 
For now, however, I will examine how W functions in a way similar to the mirror-
box, albeit linguistically, which opens an avenue to explore identity formations. Put 
another way, if W is a metaphor for and embodiment of mirror therapy, it 
decelerates the mirror phenomenon because it linguistically stretches the act of self-
reflection and reconstruction. Accordingly, in the following reading, I will be 
examining how through W, the author copes with the kind of trauma that (as we 
have already seen) parallels BIID and PLS. 
To return to the narrative, Otto goes on to explain that he did not belong to 
“the assistance organisation which made it possible for you [the narrator] to find, in 
this very place, under the cover of a new identity, a degree of safety [...]. But 
nothing could be further from the truth” (Perec, W 43). If seen as an analyst figure, 
Apfelstahl is suggesting that he cannot find the narrator’s True Self; he cannot 
replace the assistance organisation (the family) that was unable to sufficiently be 
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there to begin with. The doctor seems to be revealing something that for Perec was 
central to psychoanalysis: that although he initially expected those fantasies and 
dreams revealed through the analytic process to become texts, they did not end up 
being the “‘royal road’ that I thought they would be, but winding paths taking me 
ever further away from a proper recognition of myself” (Perec, “Backtracking” 51). 
He was accustomed to habitually creating cohesive stories, and thus expected a 
unified answer from psychoanalysis¾again paralleling the dilemmas of those with 
apotemnophilia and phantom limbs. However, in self-reflecting in this 
psychoanalytic way¾in a way that like the mirror-box, plays with habitual self-
recognition¾the author did not recognise himself, but something beyond, 
something silent. 
 Perec writes that in the narrator’s exchange with Apfelstahl, the doctor 
went silent and Winckler noticed that the bar was deserted again. “I looked at my 
watch; it was nine o’ clock. Was I still called Gaspard Winckler?” (W 44). Here an 
absence creates a reaction; a moment of silence with another person causes a piece 
of the narrator’s assumed identity to fall. Winnicott’s thoughts on analysis resemble 
and encourage this kind of exchange: “a period of silence may be the most positive 
contribution the patient can make, and the analyst is then involved in a waiting 
game” (“Communicating” 189). In the mirror-box, a false identity also crumbles 
through a lack, the box holds up an empty space that erases the false image that the 
sufferers embody. If for them, a physical effect ensues, can we see a similar effect in 
Perec’s description of psychoanalysis and through the lost boy narrative?  
 
At every session I waited for him to speak. I was sure he was keeping 
something from me [...]. As if the words that went through my head flew 
straight into his head and settled deep inside it, building up over the sessions 
a neat lump of silence as dense as my speech was hollow. (Perec, 
“Backtracking” 50) 
 
A lump of silence, hollow speech: these images physicalise a shared silence, which 
is dramatised by the fact that the author feels his words escape him and “fly into” 
the analyst’s head. Winckler’s experience is not so different: Otto’s “voice seemed 
amazingly close, and his slightest word affected me directly” (Perec, W 45). Again 
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we see a relationship between the other, language, and the body, transmitted 
through an absence. He is physically affected through silence, as though 
unoccupied speech is creating bodily sustenance, which further implies an 
exchange/relief of bodily emptiness (the words in the author’s “head” are 
transferred directly to the analyst’s “head”). The two passages also stress the 
importance of language in his false identity, implying that a silence between self 
and other can uproot a linguistic self-formation to affect him directly. Thus, we can 
see that the mirror-box phenomenon is not so disconnected, because it too uproots 
one’s form (the subjectively felt limb) by replacing it with an erasure, an image that 
(like Perec’s writing and the analyst’s silence), exposes its underlying void to affect 
the body. I want to explore a little more carefully how this may work. What is this 
empty silence that underlies speech and has the power to create psychosomatic 
change? 
 This story suggests that it refers partially to his forgotten past, the lost 
identity of Gaspard Winckler. The originally blank pages of the text W, like the 
letter that brought Gaspard to Otto, and the silence in analysis, also act as a blank 
space upon which the author is able to begin rupturing his unity. To approach this, 
the Gaspard story suggests, the author must fictionally write a traumatic past 
because it was never linguistically grasped to begin with (because he was 
abandoned by his parents at a young age). This is represented in Otto’s remark that 
a whaler “picked up a distress call from the Sylvander [the boat] but failed to 
establish radio contact with her […. When we] tried to raise contact it was to no 
avail” (Perec, W 57). Gaspard, representing Perec’s split-off childhood, has been 
left; no one can hear a call of distress. In Winnicott’s terms, due to a maternal 
absence, the boy was left alone and dropped in the pre-linguistic state. Though the 
child would not have known this at the time, it has formed him. Thus, the author’s 
felt fragmentation can only be written now, “[t]he only way to ‘remember’ […] is 
for the patient to experience this past thing for the first time in the present” 
(Winnicott, “Fear” 103) (for Perec, in analysis and in writing). Through the blank 
spaces involved, the author may be able to establish a kind of contact he was 
unable to forge as a child, which can be connected to the mirror-box’s empty space, 
as it allows the individual to establish visual contact with her absent limb by 
showing it to her.  
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One case study by David Oakley and Peter Halligan exemplifies the 
likeness between one limb sufferer and Gaspard in this instance (when he 
experiences his fragmentation in the present with the doctor’s support). The study 
examines a man (NB) with a phantom (right) hand, whose pain level went from 
“seven to zero” when he placed the existent (left) hand in a mirror-box. However, 
when “NB closed his eyes the sensation of moving his left hand was lost” (Oakley, 
80). One hour after using the mirror-box, his phantom pain started up again, when 
the doctors began to employ a hypnotic-like procedure of producing a “general 
relaxation,” by helping NB think of calming imagery. Shortly thereafter, the doctor 
instructed him to “[p]lease imagine, and then see, the mirror-box in front of you” 
(Oakley, 80). Since in a state of relaxation, NB was able to mentally visualise the 
hand’s reflection and reported a lessening, and after time, elimination, of phantom 
pain. “NB said that the virtual mirror experience had felt ‘real’ to him, that it was 
like actually being there with the mirror and that he could clearly ‘see’ the mirror 
reflection of his right hand” (Oakley 80), suggesting that the phantom “was free to 
be shaped by environmental influences and NB’s own emotional state” (Oakley 
80). Thus, although NB could not initially integrate the phantom limb’s absence, he 
was slowly (with support from others in the world and the cleared space in his 
mind induced from the calming images) able to begin integrating the phantom’s 
absence. In other words, he needed support from others to come to terms with a 
blank space in his mind and integrate his fragmentation to more successfully 
establish visual contact with the absent limb in the present. A similar kind of 
exchange is depicted in the novel when Gaspard thinks, “I did not speak. It was as 
though, at this point in his story, Otto Apfelstahl expected me to give a reply or at 
least a sign of some sort, even if only an expression of indifference or hostility. But 
I found nothing to say. He too fell silent; he was not even looking at me” (Perec, W 
59). In a way we see a repetition of the narrator’s/Perec’s loss of contact in 
childhood; however, here it takes place in a different scenario wherein Otto/the 
analyst, though silent, is still there. In NB’s experience, the second (hypnotised) 
procedure repeats the first; however, this time, the patient is able to integrate the 
loss of his phantom because he is supported and given psychical space. The author, 
therefore, decelerates and shows us a different way of looking at this kind of a 
process. The narrator additionally conveys a realisation that speech cannot fill the 
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empty space¾the words upon which he relies are proving meaningless¾ drawing 
his awareness to something beyond himself. If this something points towards that 
non-linguistic feeling of fracture, perhaps this illuminates the anxiety in the above 
quotation from W (and as seen in NB): the fear of re-experiencing fragmentation. 
Here, everyday speech and habitual narratives are uprooted. In “Backtracking,” 
Perec writes that in analysis he found that he had an “arsenal of stories, […] 
fantasies, puns, memories, hypotheses, … and ways of hiding” (49), hiding perhaps 
from that True Self, the fractured and silent other. Again a conflict between his 
True and False Self is conveyed; he is stuck with a shield of speech that papers over 
silence. Thus, the conflict is, in the words of Winnicott, that it is a “joy to be hidden 
but disaster not to be found” (“Communicating” 186). This conflict is one we have 
been relating to the mirror-box, writing, and psychoanalysis: by holding up a 
visible and invisible area at once, the individual can both hide and expose a sense of 
fracture. If, as suggested, this can enable a physical change, how does it work? 
How can attending to “lumps” of empty speech create both a bodily release and 
simultaneous sustenance?  
While of course we cannot know, Perec’s dialogue, in line with Winnicott’s 
thoughts on psychoanalysis, suggest that these silent spaces may leave room for 
more spontaneous gestures to arise. In W, amongst the uncomfortable silences, the 
narrator took a cigarette and Otto had his “hand stretched out, offering a lighter 
flame” (59). A particular kind of object relation is occurring here: the narrator is 
not rejecting a beer from a frail hand, but accepting a lighter from the doctor. We 
see, therefore, a step towards accepting the other, and an example of someone else’s 
hands assisting him. In a maternal fashion then, Otto is implicitly helping Gaspard 
physically care for himself between silences. “We remained silent like that for 
maybe five minutes,” continues Perec, until Otto “break[s] an increasingly 
oppressive silence” with the words:  
 
[i]f we accept that a master will fail to perform the elementary but essential 
safety routine of taking his daily bearing only in the event of extreme 
disruption or something close to outright panic, then we are led of necessity 
to only one conclusion. Can you see what it is? (Perec, W 59)  
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In our metaphor, the passage suggests that Otto’s games¾creating a lack while 
remaining present and handing the narrator desired objects at times¾may help 
Winckler learn to carry himself in the present, to “take his own daily bearing,” and 
lessen the fear or panic of breaking down. In other words, if Winckler/Perec can 
learn to accept that the other (Otto/the mother) will fail to perform every task, but 
that he will survive nonetheless, then one conclusion remains. To this, Gaspard 
answers, “I do not know” (Perec, W 59), a recognition of emptiness, of the 
unknown. Perhaps by facing his breakdown with an analyst, Perec can trust silence 
enough to withstand the urge to fill it with an “arsenal of stories.” His empty speech 
has been exhausted, and all he can say is that he does not know. Thus, in tracing 
the story of his lost childhood, the author, it seems, is beginning to face a hidden 
void, strengthening his capacity to hold up a lack; just as NB was momentarily able 
to face his fracture by slowly feeling stable enough to imagine it. The mirror-box 
thus physicalises the author’s process, because it too breaks self-construction 
through an empty space. Furthermore, in both models, one’s self-constitution is 
broken through an image of self-as-other: in the mirror-box, a falsely four-limbed 
individual; and for Perec, through both the analyst and the character Gaspard 
Winckler. In both the mirror-box and book, therefore, one’s feeling of fissure is 
rebuilt through an illusory figure that stands for something else. What I will 
examine now is, why illusion, and why fiction? Why and how does the mirror 
stand-in work for the phantom limb subject, and how do the author, the analyst 
and literature elaborate this process? 
 
Symbolising the Body 
“Backtracking” commences with the words, “I had to write, had to restore in and 
through writing the trace of what had been said.” He continues, “[w]hy choose to 
write and publish, to make public what was perhaps only ever named in the privacy 
of analysis?” (43-4). I want to explore this question here, why and how Perec 
writes, and how this might bear physical results. Is he, like Orpheus, “seduced from 
a desire that comes to him from the night” (Blanchot, Space 174), who begins to 
write because he has no choice but to look into the dark? In W, Perec gestures 
towards a reason. He states, “I write because we lived together, because I was […] 
a body close to their bodies. I write because they left in me their indelible mark, 
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whose trace is writing. Their memory is dead in writing; writing is the memory of 
their death and the assertion of my life” (42). Indeed, like Orpheus, he is drawn to 
(another’s) death. Since the loss of his parents left the author, in a sense, erased, he 
must write it; since marked by a lack, he must define himself. This linguistic 
reaction to wounding, I contend, resembles that of the two limb syndromes: like the 
BIID and phantom limb subjects, his rupture requires an unusual outline. 
Although we have already seen this idea allegorised in the Gaspard 
Winckler narrative, here I want to look at a different representation. I will explore 
a few segments in the novel that bring out not only the narrative about, but also the 
feelings involved in, the formation of this outline, focusing on how Perec’s way of 
telling brings the process closer to a lived reality. I shall examine how the passages 
in conversation situate the author as being physically constituted through a symbol 
of nothingness, how the book is an extension of this, and how he conveys the 
feelings of breaking down into this nothingness. This time, as opposed to the falls 
previously explored, the drop is suspended, supported, and self-contained, 
suggesting a therapeutic (as opposed to traumatic) rupture. I will additionally focus 
on how the book itself embodies Perec’s experience of breakdown, because it 
disrupts assumed everyday language and symbols, echoing the author’s experience 
in analysis. My aim is to draw out a relationship between, and trace the effects of, 
semiotic and bodily cohesion and rupture. 
To return to the main dilemma, then, the author, those with BIID, and those 
with PLS all suffer from psychosomatic injuries that relate to a feeling of loss; and 
while the phantom limb and BIID individuals respond with a painful invisible 
border, he shows us a more psychical reaction. He begins to work his way out of 
this pain with a different kind of border: writing. Like the limb outlines, writing 
also creates a contour that lies between the mind and body, disclosing a different 
version of the two syndromes. As apotemnophiles may cut into their bodies to self-
define, the ink cuts into the paper’s vacancy. It simultaneously forms a new symbol, 
as apotemnophiles would be shaped anew post-amputation, and as we see in the 
(often specific) outline of the phantom limb. These definitions depend upon a 
blankness; and for Perec, psychoanalysis has a similar effect. He writes that in 
session, “there rose to the surface the words […] with my eyes stranded on the 
ceiling and ceaselessly scrutinising the plasterwork for outlines of animals, human 
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heads, signs” (“Backtracking” 52). It is as though this blank space on the ceiling 
revived the rupture in his childhood that initially caused him to draw those 
fragmented bodies that would provide the backdrop for the fictional island “W.” If 
the author has been written through gaps, forgotten behind repetitious cohesive 
borders, it is the bareness of the analytic room and the untouched page that has 
allowed him to begin glimpsing at that fragmentation. If, as I have been arguing, W 
traces this journey, it is partially by bringing out the physical nature of this 
linguistic fracture. 
This is particularly clear in one statement that immediately follows the scene 
in which the narrator was surrounded by all of his family and Yiddish newspapers 
(an image that I suggested paralleled the Winnicottian state of illusory omnipotence 
and linguistic wholeness). Here he explains that he pointed to a Hebrew character 
called “gammeth, or gammel,” a character that is not actually in the Hebrew 
alphabet, and thus false; it is a character that represents nothing, and is thus 
emptied of meaning. He writes that it was “shaped like a square with a gap in its 
lower left-hand corner” (W 13). This image alters the previously quoted one (of the 
Yiddish newspapers) because here, the language with which he identifies does not 
encircle him, but bears a gap. Moreover, in stressing the letter’s physical shape, 
Perec brings meaning closer to the body. Since the character has a gap in its 
corner, it means nothing in content, and is incomplete in form: it thus embodies 
what it stands for. It is implied that he also bears a physical sign of a gap, he 
identifies with this broken letter, he is named by an act of “breaking through.” 
Although this may initially remind us of the those with PLP and BIID who are also 
somatically defined by rupture, it differs in that unlike those with the syndromes, in 
this instance, the author is able to show an acceptance of incompletion. This carries 
over into the reader’s experience, because by representing himself in this way, the 
author brings the reader towards a linguistic materiality, attending to how the 
characters on the page are linked to the actual text and to his own body. Like 
“gammeth or gammel,” the text both embodies and stands for a void: although it 
consists of no actual memories, it is a book of memories written through fragments. 
Therefore, instead of feigning cohesion, the textual object embodies a wound. In 
this way, the text not only shows feelings of repair, but almost acts as prosthesis, 
albeit one that helps Perec heal. However before exploring how this works, we 
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further investigate how his feelings of pain and mending are imagined within the 
book. 
Thus far we have looked at how the author’s reparative process has been 
illustrated through an allegorical narrative and a symbol. However, it is elucidated 
most clearly in one final repetition of the parachute memory. Though we have 
already explored this image as related to a traumatic drop, in the following passage, 
a different sense of this fall is conveyed: 
 
A triple theme runs through this memory: parachute, sling, truss: it suggests 
suspension, support, almost artificial limbs. To be, I need a prop. Sixteen 
years later, in 1985, when, by chance, military service briefly made a 
parachutist of me, I suddenly saw, in the very instant of jumping, one way 
of deciphering the text of this memory: I was plunged into nothingness; all 
the threads were broken; I fell, on my own, without any support. The 
parachute opened. The canopy unfurled, a fragile and firm suspense before 
the controlled descent. (W 55) 
 
By pairing the falsified memory of having fallen and broken his arm with one of 
jumping from a parachute, Perec gives us a sense of timelessly dangling over a void, 
similar to his descriptions of psychoanalysis. The passage in this sense brings us 
closer to that space between words in the analyst’s room, where his false identity 
began to crumble. In “The Scene of a Stratagem,” he writes that in the “movement” 
of analysis, “I” had to let “the rationalisations I had taken refuge in fall into dust 
[…]. Of this subterranean place I have nothing to say” (169). Parachuting, from 
this perspective, symbolises this fall beyond deceptively cohesive words. Those 
letters and signs through which Perec is built begins to shift, leaving him to drop 
through language. It is almost as though analysis has pushed him towards that gap 
in “gammeth or gammel” that was already written upon his body. He writes of 
analysis: “[i]t happened, it had happened it is happening […]. Something has 
simply opened and is opening: the mouth in order to speak, the pen in order to 
write” (“Scene” 162). Something has shifted, the void unfurling: the parachute 
opening. However, this “fragile and firm suspense” is not only an ominous fall to 
death, but a liberating jump towards it, a return to a death never experienced.  
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In “Fear of Breakdown,” Winnicott explains that the patient in analysis 
must experience agony through the analyst’s failures in order to begin overcoming 
the agony: “the patient gathers the original failure of the facilitating environment 
into the area of his or her omnipotence” (“Fear” 105). Parachuting in the above text 
dramatises this, showing us the author’s control over the failure through a fiction. 
The strings, like the analyst’s transitional arms, carry the author through a death-
like experience in a non-traumatic manner. Kaufman writes, “[w]hile the parachute 
fall is in one sense the fall into the void and the recognition of trauma, it is also a 
fall out of trauma and into life” (4). Thus, the fall, like “gammeth or gammel,” 
embodies what it stands for: it is a fall out of trauma and into life and in writing. By 
suspending the fall, Perec, through writing W, is able to look into the dark, towards 
his ambiguous annihilation, at the gap through which he was written; and in this 
look, just as Orpheus was “lifted,” a sense of freedom ensues. Like Orpheus’s fall to 
the Underworld, Perec’s is a liberating “fall into dust,” into “this subterranean 
place” that opens language.  
If it also echoes the analytic words and gestures that stand in for the 
mothers absent arms, perhaps this can lend more insight as to why the author 
imagines “almost artificial limbs” in connection to this fall. From a Winnicottian 
perspective: the breakdown in analysis moves the patient’s trauma from the body 
towards the mind through the analyst’s stand-in arms, those “almost artificial 
limbs” that act as a metaphorical and physical substitute. This metaphorical and 
physical substitute, he indicates, affects him and thus in a way becomes him: 
“gammeth or gammel,” the book, and the psychoanalytic exchange. The author 
writes of the trauma faced in psychoanalysis: “I know that it happened and that, 
from that time on, its trace was inscribed in me and in the texts that I write. It was 
given to me one day […] like a gesture” (“Scene” 169). The analyst in this 
description opens an embodied linguistic darkness that, like Orpheus’s gaze, “frees 
himself from himself […] frees the work from his concern [....] gives the sacred to 
itself” (Blanchot, Space 175). Shedding the flesh of his everyday language and 
identity through the analyst and book, Perec’s wound is exposed and yet contained. 
This process calls up the mirror-box because it too sheds psychical flesh. It 
actualises those “almost artificial limbs”: a non-physical prosthesis, a mere image of 
self-holding that has bodily effects. In both events, it is by suspending an absence 
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through a presence (the absent memory through the book) that the individual can 
“[amputate] a phantom limb” (Ramachandran, Phantoms vii) to more comfortably 
integrate fracture. In both examples then, the symbol becomes physical, and it is 
here that I want examine how in W, the author exposes the negation behind 
symbols (that permeate into the physical) by breaking them apart. 
This sentiment is elucidated most clearly in W when Perec playfully breaks 
apart the letter “X”: 
 
[t]he starting point for a geometrical fantasy, whose basic figure is the 
double V, and whose complex convolutions trace out the major symbols of 
the story of my childhood: two Vs joined tip to tip to make the shape of an 
X; by extending the branches of the X by perpendicular segments of equal 
length, you obtain a swastika, which itself can be easily decomposed, by a 
rotation of 90 degrees of one of its segments on its lower arm. (77) 
 
By simply moving signs, the author exposes their meaninglessness while 
simultaneously unveiling their importance (as these symbols are burdened with 
meaning and history). If the symbol itself can be easily decomposed, he implicitly 
asks, can its significance? If so, may a possible future attached to its signification 
also be altered? Again, language becomes physical. This symbolic fracture, then 
echoes the author’s own psychoanalytic and linguistic breakdown that has evoked 
his negation. If this engendered somatic affects, can rupturing language have a 
similar outcome? 
The mirror-box, I contend, extends the question because it too involves the 
image of a segment of an arm to release its phantom wholeness and expose its 
negation, which results in bodily change. By altering the symbols above, the author 
indicates that words are often read with closed meanings, and that an imaginary 
assumption between the sign and its significance dangerously leaves out thought. 
BIID and PLS illuminate this tendency to fill a lack with imaginary wholeness, and 
in causing pain they also depict the danger in this. However, if a swastika, 
according to Perec, can be decomposed if a segment on its lower arm is rotated, and 
the mirror-box decomposes the phantom appendage by rotating it, can these 
dangers also begin to decrease? I am not comparing a swastika to a phantom limb 
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of course. I am simply seeking to draw a parallel between the reflection in the 
mirror-box and the author’s discussion of symbols, which is most clearly drawn out 
in the above quotation. Can using symbols differently have physical effects on a 
wider scale? 
To bring these thoughts together, I want to turn our attention to how the 
text W itself carries symbolic fragmentation towards the world, and how it is 
materialised in the mirror-box. Since Perec draws the reader’s attention to the 
physicality of the book and its symbolic presence, we are reminded of the 
transitional object, a replacement for the mother’s arms. The text is a kind of 
transitional object, I suggest, because as I have sought to show, it stands for unity 
and its lack. It is bound as a complete object, and also composed of unknowns (the 
symbol’s meaning, the author’s intent, the reader’s interpretation). Permeable in the 
reader and writer’s hands, the text is both material and not: though a person can 
hold it, its meaning slips through her fingers. For Perec, it is this object that creates 
a sense of support, which helps the author carve himself into the world and away 
from the traumatic feeling of dependence and falling.  
 The text also acts as a transitional object because it draws an outline 
between the “me and not-me,” and thus helps the author avoid the drive to create a 
falsely united outline that we see echoed in the two conditions. It helps the child 
Perec grow towards independence and psychosomatic integration in the present. 
This is partially due to its concurrent presence and absence, its ability to 
communicate¾but not completely¾which allows the author to bring his private 
thoughts towards the world, while also keeping them open through fissured 
language. It is through this openness that his True and ambiguous self can remain 
hidden. “Perec even suggests,” writes Spiro, “that when it comes to knowing his 
past [… he] was like a child playing hide-and-seek, who doesn’t know what he 
fears or wants more: to stay hidden, or to be found” (133). Like the BIID and 
phantom limb subject, his pain isolates him from the environment, because it 
magnifies the feeling that can never be understood, both by the author himself, and 
by others.  
 However, just as the mirror-box brings the imaginary self towards the 
material world to be more thoroughly seen and understood, W brings his painful 
fragmentation towards more communal understanding. In his own words: “it is 
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language that throws a bridge between the world and ourselves, language that 
transcends the world by expressing the inexpressible” (“Robert Antelme” 262). 
Throwing a bridge between that fearful fall and the environment, language holds 
up his split-off self to help Perec move towards the healthier individual illustrated 
in Winnicott’s framework, who has the desire to “not [be] communicating, and at 
the same time wanting to communicate and to be found” (Winnicott, 
“Communicating” 186). W allows the author to hide and seek at once. He both 
finds that lost child by writing him, and yet preserves this impossibility¾this 
hidden self¾by fictionalising him. In sum then, Perec is brought to life by and 
through the text, while remaining hidden behind its fictional nature; and the 
phantom limb is brought to life in the mirror-box, while its fragmentation remains 
intact. Thus, it seems as though an absence reflected through fiction may decrease 
the need to form a painful whole. By recognising that a lack cannot be erased, the 
pain or danger of attempting to do so may decrease. To conclude this thesis, I will 
be looking at how one more symbol in W¾an ellipsis¾illuminates how the 
(simultaneously present and erased) body is inseparable from the themes we have 
been discussing, such as the relationships between self and other, text and reader, 
psychoanalyst and subject. 
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Conclusion: (…) 
 
W or The Memory of Childhood opens with the epigraph:  
 
In this break, in this split suspending the story on an unidentifiable 
expectation, can be found the point of departure for the whole of this book: 
the points of suspension on which the broken threads of childhood and the 
web of writing are caught.  
 
This short passage about a split, a departure, and suspension allude to an ellipsis 
that divides and connects W’s two halves. Although ambiguous, it also, for me, 
points towards specific ideas within the text, which resonate with the dilemmas of 
the sufferers of apotemnophilia and phantom limbs. The intention here is to 
contrast the textual split of the ellipsis illustrated above, with the embodied 
discontinuity experienced by individuals with these conditions, looking at how the 
ellipsis is a literary, as opposed to bodily carving out. As I have established 
throughout this thesis, the central dilemma in the limb syndromes involves a 
traumatic rift between a fractured and whole sense of self. It has been argued that 
Perec conveys a similar struggle in his text, personified in the adult narrator who 
signifies Perec’s Other (Gaspard), and the lost child who represents Gaspard’s 
Other¾both the child lost at sea, and the forgotten child Perec pieces together in 
his semi-autobiographical self-reconstitution. This painful split, as I have explored, 
stems from a childhood obscured by a fragmented and war-torn environment, and 
is ultimately triggered by the departure of the narrator’s mother. The narrator, in 
my reading, has embodied this rupture, and (as indicated in the quotation above) it 
is this break, this departure, that lays the foundation for the text.  
In my reading of W, I have argued that this split illuminates the 
psychosomatic split suffered by apotemnophiles and those with PLS. Furthermore, 
both syndromes echo W in demonstrating how a struggle to apprehend a rupture 
may manifest itself upon the body. In this context, the ellipsis can be perceived as a 
way of bridging the novel’s content and the limb phenomena: since it is placed in 
the centre of W it not only represents but embodies the fracture signified in the 
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text, by separating the book into halves. In this way, it stands for a kind of rupture 
that those with BIID and PLS embody, albeit in a less painful and self-destructive 
manner. Moreover, it is the parenthesis around the ellipsis that reflects a desire to 
contain an ambiguous absence that becomes manifest in the limb disorders 
discussed above. David Bellos suggests that “brackets normally signify that what is 
inside them does not belong to the structure of what is outside” (A Life 549). Put 
another way, the parenthesis forms an outline of absence that, perhaps, can counter 
the drive to create a painful, false sense of unity. While apotemnophiles attempt to 
sever parts of their bodies away from the world to create a specific lack, and those 
with PLS are driven to contain a particular form of fracture through a self-created 
border (as Stephen explained, “I can’t affix any borders to me” [Sumner 44]), 
Perec is shaping a self-created border through the physical text to alleviate the 
painful pressure of his bodily and mental wounds. 
Judith Butler writes, “if traumatic events make giving an account difficult 
or impossible, or if they produce elision or ellipsis within a narrative, then it would 
seem that precisely what is not spoken is nevertheless conveyed through that 
figure” (Parting 182). In light of Butler’s statement, we might conclude that the 
ellipsis in W also stands for the impossibility of forming a cohesive narrative from 
traumatic events. Although the author could have manufactured a story of his 
childhood to fill the gaps¾as those with apotemnophilia and PLS invest their 
rupture with a cohesive fantasy of self¾W reveals the impossibility of its 
completion. Put another way, sufferers with these syndromes seem to actualise a 
loss rather than symbolising an overpowering feeling of rupture. Perec, on the 
other hand, has begun to write himself out of something similar: he has created a 
symbolic version of loss based on real lived experiences, stories and photographs. 
Through a combination of illusion and reality (by using illusion and fiction to 
suggest that there is no cohesive reality), Perec symbolises the kind of loss that 
those with BIID and PLS experience. The ellipsis, in revealing precisely what is 
not conveyed, encapsulates the impossibility of creating a cohesive notion of self in 
just three full stops. It also signifies the novel’s paradoxical title: the Memory of 
Childhood told by a narrator who has “no childhood memories” (Perec, W 6). In a 
way, then, the memories of the narrator’s childhood exist as the ellipsis exists: as an 
embodied absence that cannot be entirely expressed. And as noted, this is partially 
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due to the traumatic loss of the maternal figure. 
In his article “The Work of Mourning” (2004), Warren Motte suggests that 
the ellipsis in W acts as a replacement for the memory of, and information about, 
Perec having seen his mother for the last time. However, since this is impossible to 
remember, “what he puts in its place, escaping from language as it does and 
suspended as it is, clearly points towards something that remains well beyond 
language¾and perhaps beyond thought, too” (Motte 62). For Motte, the two 
pages upon which W hinge represent an absence that cannot be conceived in 
thought. Furthermore, an ellipsis, according to Jenny Chamarette “foreground[s] 
materiality […], and draws attention to our own (interrupted) perceptual 
apprehension and comprehension of the text. Ellipsis slips between materiality and 
metaphor, overflowing the signifying relationships of the written text” (Chamarette 
35). Thus, the ellipsis in W might be not only a representation of, but also a 
symbolic manifestation of Perec’s internal psychical gap that was left by a parental 
loss. In the words of Lawrence Kritzman, “[t]he traumatic loss of Perec’s parents 
fractures not only his life but also his memory and inscribes on his body a series of 
irreparable wounds. Typographically the text marks this gap” (Kritzman, 192). In 
other words, from this angle, the narrator has been constituted through an absence 
that is embodied within the text’s ellipsis. These two pages, therefore, can be seen 
as an extension of the author’s body; perhaps (to recall Perec’s previous statement) 
an “almost artificial limb.” When read in this way, the ellipsis physically and 
symbolically stands in for a lack. 
 As discussed in this thesis, Winnicott’s “Fear of Breakdown” suggests that a 
transitional object may allow for the reparation of such a loss. In my reading of W, 
I propose that this process is perceptible in the text’s form and content. “What is 
crucially at issue” in regard to the ellipsis, writes Motte, “is the parental touch, the 
act that emblematizes and guarantees everything else that Perec longs to recall in a 
past with which he is so bleakly out of touch” (Motte, 63). In this reading, Perec is 
out of touch with his past, which is revived through an elliptical replacement for a 
parental encounter. I want to extend this thought in light of Winnicott’s theory, to 
suggest that the ellipsis also signifies the mother’s/narrator’s missing arms. The 
individual in Winnicott’s model is stuck with a void generated by a 
psychical/physical “drop” (a lack in parental holding). A painful fracture is 
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consequently embodied, creating a split between the mind and body, self and other, 
which I have linked to Perec’s text in both form and content, because this reading 
provides a different way of viewing BIID and PLS. In Winnicott’s theory, such a 
lack of mental integration could give way to the creation of a False Self (a falsely 
whole and hollow ego), which Perec exemplifies in his narrative of society and of 
his own life. Since formally Perec’s fragmented prose exposes this formation of 
empty unity, W attends to an inextricable link between linguistic (symbolic) and 
human formation, which those with BIID and PLS bring to a lived reality. In 
reacting to a void with a painfully false formation of unity, these individuals 
demonstrate how our conceptual analyses can be extended to bodily drives, and to 
immediate physical enactments. 
Winnicott’s transitional object provides a healing element to these ruptures, 
by offering a degree of control which enables the subject to negotiate presence and 
absence, unity and its lack, the self and other. By reconstituting the mother’s 
missing arms, the transitional object can ostensibly help individuals integrate the 
mind and body. In translating bodily needs to the external world, the transitional 
object functions in a way similar to language; and accordingly, assumes the 
structure of the written text. In order to enable integration, Winnicott suggests that 
another individual (specifically, an analyst) should stand in for the mother’s arms to 
help the individual build a stronger ego. We have seen this process most clearly 
represented in W through Gaspard’s exchange with the doctor. I additionally 
suggested that writing the book was itself a therapeutic process that enabled Perec 
to translate this lack to the symbolic realm, providing a degree of cohesion without 
denying a lack. In these ways, the text works as a transitional object. The 
parenthesised ellipsis cements this idea because, like the transitional object, it is 
both present and absent: it is in the text, and yet reveals its linguistic lack. It is both 
united and dispersed, as it captures an endlessness between parentheses. And like 
the transitional object, it is part of Perec and other to him¾the text that he has 
written is now out of his hands. I suggest that by inscribing this transitional object, 
this figurative extra limb, in the field of the textual and the symbolic, the author 
may more successfully contain its endlessness, and thus, his own fragmentation. 
Moreover, the ellipsis not only splits the text (reminiscent of a traumatic split), but 
also binds its two halves. From this angle, the ellipsis is not only reflective of a 
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transitional object, but is a transitional object in its own right. This is important to 
us, because it reflects what we see in the limb disorders: both the apotemnophile 
and the individual with a phantom limb are physically and psychically fractured. As 
Peter explains, “that stupid leg was still on my body [… I] seach[ed] for 
perfection.” However, as Stephen demonstrates, the mirror illusion can enable a 
sense of psychosomatic integration, and release a drive towards wholeness. Thus, 
the mirror-box, I propose, not only represents a transitional object (as the limb 
image supplants the fracture), but constitutes a transitional object. Not only does it 
symbolise self-as-other by presenting an image of self-as-whole; it can also replace a 
painful lack with an alleviating one. Although mirror therapy cannot alleviate BIID 
sufferers’ pain, since it parallels PLP, the process of mirror therapy provides 
insight as to how this kind of psychosomatic phenomenon can be understood.  
To further investigate, let us review the ways in which Perec’s working-
through is depicted in W, by returning to his statement: “[a] triple theme runs 
through this memory: parachute, sling, truss: it suggests suspension, support, 
almost artificial limbs. To be, I need a prop” (W 55). These three points of 
suspension (parachute, sling, and truss) call up Perec’s epigraph: a reference to the 
ellipsis that also resembles a limb reminiscent of those “almost artificial” ones 
discussed in Chapter Five. Accordingly, the parenthesised omission presents a 
picture of Perec’s empty sleeve. The ellipsis thus brings that image of a broken 
appendage that materially and metaphorically exposes its lack of original wholeness 
closer to a physical reality. This image does not connote a helpless break, but a 
suspension of fracture that allows for a slower integration: the arms of another that 
help carry the author through the fall. Put another way, this elliptical suspension 
signifies a kind of strap that holds the two sides of the book together, the bandage 
holds up Perec’s ruptured limb. The truss here is connected to the language within 
the book that suspends Perec’s lost childhood, the previously-quoted “broken 
threads of childhood and the web of writing are caught.” The ellipsis thus reveals a 
manifestation of the link between the textual signifiers and physical syndromes that 
I have been tracing throughout the thesis. By materially and symbolically holding 
up the presence and absence of fragmentation and unity at once, it helpfully makes 
conscious a painful split related to a desire for original wholeness.  
In short then, the ellipsis, like the transitional object, W, and the mirror box, 
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reveals a manifestation of the link between the textual signifiers and physical 
syndromes central to this thesis. By materially and symbolically holding up the 
presence and absence of fragmentation and unity at once, it helpfully makes 
conscious a painful split related to a desire for original wholeness. This concept has 
been developed throughout the thesis, and here, I will briefly review how I have 
elaborated these thoughts. It has been established that BIID and PLS, though they 
are the inverse of one another, both involve a painful desire for wholeness that is 
predicated upon a sense of rupture. The phantom limb, however, is a psychically 
orientated reaction to a physical loss, while apotemnophilia involves a physical 
reaction to a psychically orientated loss. We have additionally learned that PLP can 
be appeased through mirror therapy, which, I have argued, functions in a way 
similar to language. To draw out these links within the thesis, I have analysed 
psychoanalytic, literary, and fictional texts that discuss psychosomatic rupture. 
What ultimately comes to light is that a particular kind of linguistic or symbolic 
exchange that simultaneously holds up a presence and absence, and which is both 
part of the body and separate from it, can help define the psychosomatically 
ruptured individual and, in some cases, undo a disturbing, fetishistic desire for 
wholeness. 
I began this exploration by discussing how two individuals, Peter and 
Stephen, expressed their experiences with BIID and PLS. While Peter’s 
unsuccessful attempt to physically amputate a psychically orientated absence was 
problematic, Stephen was able to “amputate” a disturbing psychically experienced 
limb through an illusory presence. In addition to this, Peter’s feelings of loss related 
to unsupportive emotional relationships and impositions from those in the medical 
field, suggesting a connection between an environmental and bodily lack. Since 
Stephen and Peter expressed similar feelings of discord between the mind and 
body, self and other, and mirror therapy healed Stephen, this discussion raised the 
question as to why and how an illusion, a symbol of one’s phantom, has physical 
affects, and what this reveals about the fractured subject.  
This question was addressed in Chapter Two, which examined how BIID 
and PLS bring out an affinity between psychoanalysis and literature. Here, with 
reference to the work of two psychoanalysts, I focused on the physical impact of 
language and specifically, linguistic gaps. First, I turned to André Green’s concept 
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of negative hallucination, wherein experiences that have been registered as 
inaccessible blanks can be traced through breaks in speech. Green proposed that 
the analyst and the analysand use “the negative in his own way […] A bridge 
thrown between the two allows them to meet mid-way” (The Work 366). These 
thoughts were exemplified through a case study in which psychoanalyst Marilia 
Aisenstein unearthed a patient’s split-off traumas by accessing his previously 
obscured “symbolic meaning,” and was thereby able to alleviate his physical 
wound. These analyses shed new light on the mirror-box phenomenon, because 
they involve a form of healing that occurs by conjuring symbols from a specific 
absence. In this way, the physical syndromes were elucidated through a theoretical 
endeavour. The “bridge” between the analyst and analysand discussed in this 
chapter, moreover, reflects the ellipsis in W, because it is a contained blank that 
bridges the gap between author and reader, thus opening the concept of a symbolic 
form of support.  
Chapter Three involved a more detailed analysis of the disturbing split 
experienced by those with PLP and BIID through the concept of the double. First, 
I explored how Lacan’s notion of the mirror stage¾wherein an ungraspable image 
of wholeness contrasts the physical reality of fragmentation¾provided insight into 
PLS, BIID and the mirror-box. The paradoxical split outlined here was elaborated 
through Blanchot’s notion of the space of literature, which revealed a structural 
link between literary negation and the mirror-box. To further investigate this link, I 
analysed Blanchot’s essay “Orpheus’s Gaze,” in which Orpheus’s glance back to 
Eurydice “lifts concern, [and] interrupts the incessant by discovering it” (Blanchot, 
Space 175). Here, Blanchot allegorises the writer who may release preconceived 
notions of self. This “freeing leap,” I suggested, was materialised in the mirror-box, 
because it can free an amputee of the “weight” of a preconceived notion of self 
through a symbol of simultaneous presence and absence. Vicky’s suicide in The Red 
Shoes provided a fictional and artistic example of these thoughts, as illuminated by 
Ian Christie’s statement that, “Powell illustrates death not only by an ellipsis but 
also by an eclipse of the body […]. A strange suspension gives the illusion of 
weightlessness” (Christie 235). These kinds of suspensions, reflective of the ellipsis 
in Perec’s text, demonstrate the inextricable fabric formed by the intersecting 
symbolic and somatic dimensions, and how this could lead to working-through 
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pain; a notion elaborated in Chapter Four through analysis of D.W. Winnicott’s 
“Fear of Breakdown” and the concept of the transitional object.  
The experiences of the traumatised subject outlined in Winnicott’s model, I 
argued, parallel those of the BIID and PLS sufferers. The transitional object acts as 
a reparative mechanism that, standing in for an early parental lack, allows the 
traumatised individual to suspend and integrate a feeling of annihilation and in turn 
feel “gathered together.” This process, I suggested, was made manifest in the 
mirror-box that suspends one’s rupture through a structure that parallels the 
transitional object, as it is paradoxically whole and fragmented, part of and 
separate from the individual. Quentin Tarantino’s Death Proof dramatises these ideas 
through the depiction of an annihilation that is reconfigured in the film’s latter half. 
The car crash, reflective of the ellipsis in W, separates and connects the film’s two 
halves. Here, I explored how the film’s spectators may begin coming to terms with 
feelings of rupture rather than disavowing these feelings (echoing the disavowal 
conveyed in those with BIID and PLS). Moreover, the supportive belt depicted in 
Death Proof in the car chase scene, and in the “Fighting It” dialogue (which was 
thought to facilitate self-amputation), can be regarded as illustrating, both 
corporeally and metaphorically, the bandage on Perec’s arm, and that which the 
ellipsis seems to materialise. These suspensions, I propose, hold, but do not sever 
an absence, and in so doing, resemble the structure of language. Thus, the ellipsis 
points towards an exchange between the body and mind, and the subjective and 
objective senses of self, reflective of Perec’s concept of language, “language that 
throws a bridge between the world and ourselves, language that transcends the 
world by expressing the inexpressible” (Perec, “Robert Antelme” 262). It is the 
mirror-box that presents a manifestation of this ellipsis, and of these reflections on 
rupture and wholeness; thus bringing these theories towards a lived reality, and the 
bodily conditions towards a linguistic, non-biomedical examination. This kind of a 
bridge, therefore, is reflective of this thesis, as it too holds up a space between the 
known and unknown. Although I do not attempt to find answers about 
apotemnophilia, the phantom limb syndrome, and the mirror-box treatment, I read 
real physical experiences and individuals’ expressions of these experiences 
alongside a more abstract and theoretical investigation, to engage in an important 
linguistic reflection on BIID and PLS that opens new avenues of understanding a 
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certain kind of rupture.  
These links, therefore, demonstrate that certain feelings of psychosomatic 
fissure can be altered through a particular kind of symbolic representation that 
simultaneously holds up a presence and absence. While I do not suggest that BIID 
and other instances of rupture can be cured by the kind of symbol I have been 
discussing up to this point, these relationships help us think about how we cope 
with the kind of feelings described by those with apotemnophilia and PLS. This 
thesis, accordingly, has reflected upon psychoanalysis and literature that are 
concerned with bodily rupture, and the way in which we engage with and 
symbolise felt absences. While the lack of complete understanding of BIID and 
PLS has been problematic in the biomedical field, I have discussed various 
statements and testimonies of those with the conditions in relation to more abstract 
theories. In this way, my thesis, like the mirror-box which involves a material and 
non-material reflection, has taken two physical disorders, and individuals’ written 
experiences of these disorders, and reflected upon them through more abstract 
ideas and concepts to develop an indeterminate, yet pointed conclusion: a 
disturbing need to control a sense of one’s own completeness can be mediated 
through a process of reflection, a kind of reflection that both exposes one’s 
fragmentation and keeps it intact. 
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